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1 
Abstract 
 
Brunei Darussalam is one of the few remaining absolute monarchies 
in the world today. In an era that sees countries move towards 
democratisation, Brunei has moved towards the entrenchment of its 
absolute monarchy. With that in mind, the question this thesis seeks 
to examine is how Brunei has managed to remain an absolute 
monarchy in the face of global democratisation, particularly given that 
it was under the British sphere of influence until 1984. What are the 
reasons behind Brunei’s exceptionalism in development and will 
these reasons allow Brunei to remain an absolute monarchy? To 
answer the central question, this research looks at constitutional 
developments in the light of Brunei’s history, traditions, culture and 
society. The research undertaken to answer this question has been 
purely doctrinal in nature. The primary reason this approach was 
adopted was because the nature of Brunei’s absolute monarchy has 
resulted in general disinclination in the country to discuss matters of 
local politics frankly. This has resulted in a distinct lack of 
authoritative research about Brunei in most fields. The contribution 
that this research makes to the subject is that, it is the first research 
that attempts to explain the existence of the constitutional anomaly 
that is the absolute monarchy of Brunei, through a contextual 
understanding of Brunei’s constitutional journey. Drawing on 
historical, legal, political and sociological elements, this thesis 
concludes that the absolute  monarchy of Brunei was built by the 
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restructuring of traditional governance by the British, entrenched by 
the manipulation of constitutional provisions by the Sultan and 
enshrined through the use of nation building ideology also by the 
Sultan. This ideology being so successfully implanted into Brunei 
society over the last thirty years, barring the entry of new variables, it 
seems likely that Brunei will remain an absolute monarchy in the 
years to come. 
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Introduction 
 
Samuel P. Huntington describes global democratization as arriving in 
three waves1. Each wave was described as a period of time in global 
history when democratization occurred in many countries at 
approximately the same time. In its simplest terms, to qualify as a 
wave, in this specific time period, the transitions of countries to 
democracies would have to outnumber the countries transitioning to 
authoritarian rule. These waves were often triggered by significant 
global events. Between the waves there was a trend for the number 
of democracies to drop before that number rose again with the next 
wave. This trend was termed a “reverse wave” by Huntington. The 
first wave of democracy according to Huntington began in the early 
19th century and lasted up to 1922.  The second wave of democracy 
began after the Allied victory in the Second World War in 1942 and 
ended in 1962. It was in this wave that the democratization of South 
East Asian nations began. Exceptionally, unlike all its South East 
Asian neighbours, particularly those that were also under the British 
sphere of influence, Brunei resisted democratisaton and to this day 
stands as one of only a handful of countries that has an absolute 
monarch. What were the reasons that allowed such a small and 
                                                        
1 Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late 
20th Century, University of Oklahoma Press (1993) 
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seemingly insignificant country to stand firm against such a sweeping 
global trend?  
 
Standing at only 5765 square kilometers and with a population of 
approximately 400 000 people, the small physical size and 
population of Brunei belies an interesting past and it is in this past 
that we seek answers. First mentioned in approximately 977 A.D in 
Chinese records, Brunei went from being powerful in its own right at 
the start of Chinese records to being a vassal state of the Majapahit 
Empire in the 14th century. Brunei then reached its peak between the 
15th to the 17th century when its power extended from Borneo to the 
Southern Philippines. War with the Spanish, problems with 
succession and piracy brought Brunei into decline after the 17th 
Century. It was in this state of decline that the British first became 
involved in Bruneian affairs in the mid 19th Century. The importance 
of the coming of the British to Brunei cannot be overstated for it is my 
contention in this thesis that the British played a pivotal part in the 
building of the absolute monarchy we see in Brunei today.  
 
The Brunei monarchy can trace its lineage back to at least the 16th 
century when Islam became firmly a part of Bruneian heritage. The 
monarchy as it was then however was a far cry from the absolute 
monarchy we see in Brunei today, having more similarity then to a 
system of feudal lordships then to an absolute monarchy, as we 
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know it today. This was the system that the British had to contend 
with on their arrival. Finding it unworkable, they imposed a whole 
new system of governance on Brunei in the form of the Residential 
system that continued until Brunei achieved internal self-governance. 
From that point on, the Sultan slowly but surely accumulated power 
and support that has resulted in the absolute monarchy we are 
familiar with today. 
 
Of the approximately 196 countries in the world today, Brunei is one 
of only seven that are considered to be absolute monarchies2. What 
this means is that in these countries, absolute power vests in one 
single person. In Brunei that one person is the Sultan who is the 
head of the Government as well as the head of the State. 
Interestingly, five of the seven absolute monarchies remaining today 
profess Islam as its national state religion. One of the things this 
paper seeks to explore is if this religious belief is one of the many 
reasons for Brunei being an absolute monarchy. In an era when 
governments move towards democratization an absolute monarchy 
such as the one existing in Brunei is an anachronism; therefore the 
pertinent question is how has Brunei resisted democratization thus 
far? What are the reasons for Brunei’s exceptionalism in this 
respect? Following on from that, will Brunei continue to resist 
                                                        
2 The other six are Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Swaziland, the United 
Arab Emirates and the Vatican City 
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democratization? Do the reasons for Brunei’s exceptionalism mean a 
continuation of this status quo? 
 
To answer the question of how the absolute monarchy of Brunei was 
built and then endured, the central argument that this paper seeks to 
prove is that the reason for Brunei’s absolute monarchy is in fact two 
fold. Firstly, the establishment of the residential system of 
government by the British funneled untrammeled power into one 
office i.e. that of the British resident. The transfer of these powers to 
the Sultan upon the achievement of internal self-government in 1959 
gave rise to the absolute monarchy that we know in Brunei today. 
Should the establishment of the office of Resident be the only reason 
for the development of an absolute monarchy however, Malaysia and 
Singapore would also have developed along the same lines being 
also former British territories that employed the use of the Residential 
System. While it is arguable that these countries only exude a 
“sheen” of democracy, the systems in place in both Singapore and 
Malaysia are still a far cry from the absolute monarchy that exists in 
Brunei. What then made the difference in the case of Brunei? 
 
This brings us to the second reason, which is that upon the 
achievement of self-governance; the postcolonial process of nation 
building saw the development of national ideologies in South East 
Asia. The specific national ideology propagated by the Sultan in 
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Brunei was that of “Melayu Islam Beraja” (hereinafter referred to as 
MIB) which could loosely be translated as “Malay Islamic Monarchy”. 
This ideology legitimised the preservation of the absolute monarchy 
by building a nexus between the Sultan, history, the Malay ethnic 
identity and Islamic values.  From its inception after independence in 
1984, MIB was “marketed” by the Sultan and his government as the 
path that would ensure Brunei’s future. Put very simply, this ideology 
legitimizes the Sultan in the eyes of the Brunei populace because it 
stresses that loyalty to the Sultan and his state is an Islamic religious 
obligation as well as a manner of governance prescribed by 
traditional Malay Culture. It cleverly makes loyalty to the Sultan a 
bridge between Brunei’s traditional past and the belief and fear of the 
general populace in the hereafter. 
 
This thesis aims to provide a historical “roadmap” of Brunei’s past 
followed by a discussion of the situations and issues arising out of 
that past, that will exemplify how it was indeed a combination of 
these two reasons that “built” the absolute monarchy of Brunei and 
will potentially allow for its continued existence for the foreseeable 
future. 
 
Overview and scope of the thesis 
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In order to understand the reasons that Brunei deviates not only from 
the world trend towards democratization but also from the norm in 
South East Asia, we would need to delve into Brunei’s history.  
 
Chapter One introduces the reader to the social structures prevalent 
in Brunei society in the mid 19th century, the traditional system of 
governance in Brunei and its shortcomings. Specifically we consider 
the powers and limitations of the role of Sultan in Brunei under this 
traditional system of governance. This part of the discussion begins 
with a look at the stratification of Brunei society and how that 
stratification affected the distribution of wealth and power in 
traditional Brunei governance. We consider the question of if the role 
of Sultan at this point in time was “absolute” in the same way it is 
today. We also discuss the circumstances under which Brunei 
became a British protected state and the various treaties that started 
the British- Brunei relationship. The chapter concludes with an in 
depth analysis of the MacArthur report which was highly influential in 
cementing Brunei’s status as a protected state.  
 
Chapter One gives us an overview of the many reasons for the start 
of the British involvement in Brunei from the point of view of both the 
Bruneians and the British. The beginning of British- Brunei relations 
is chosen as a start point in history because it is the first prong of my 
argument for Brunei’s exceptionalism, i.e. that the power wielded by 
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the Sultan presently can be traced back to the office of the British 
Resident in Brunei during her time as a British protected state. 
 
Chapter Two concerns itself with Brunei from 1906 to the start of the 
Second World War. It begins with a consideration of how the treaty of 
1906 had changed the nature of the office of the British Resident in 
Brunei and looks at what the concept of being a “protected state” 
entails. It highlights the extensive powers of the British Resident in 
Brunei and the seminal reforms to government by the Resident.  
 
Chapters One and Two together outline the process by which 
supreme power in Brunei came to be vested in one office i.e. that of 
the British Resident.  
 
Chapter Three considers the first stirrings of nationalism in Brunei 
post World War Two and thoroughly analyses two reports prepared 
for the purposes of the promulgation of the Brunei written constitution 
of 1959. It offers a selective account of the various factions involved 
in the discussions and conferences in the lead up to the writing of the 
written constitution. This chapter sees the transfer of power from the 
British Resident to the Sultan of Brunei in 1959. By the end of the 
brief journey into Brunei’s constitutional history up to the 
achievement of internal self governance in 1959, the reader should 
be able to track how the absolute power in Brunei, starting in the 
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hands of the British resident, came to reside in the hands of the 
Sultan.  
 
In Chapter Four we see how Brunei moved completely away from 
democratic ideals, choosing instead to entrench its monarchy. This 
chapter considers the immediate aftermath of the promulgation of the 
1959 Constitution which included various proposals for Brunei to join 
what is now known as Malaysia and how public discontent with the 
“Malaysia issue” culminated in a rebellion in 1962. I examine how the 
Sultan took advantage of the consequences of the rebellion and 
powers afforded to him under the constitution to start to entrench an 
absolute monarchy in Brunei. 
 
Taken as a whole, Chapters Three and Four enable the leader to 
understand, not only the transition of a large portfolio of power from 
the British Resident to the Sultan of Brunei but also how the Sultan 
took advantage of circumstances to enlarge that portfolio of power 
and solidify the absolute position of the monarch in Brunei. 
 
Chapter Five focuses on Brunei from 1962 to the present day. It 
deals briefly with the issues that arose in the lead up to Bruneian 
independence in 1984 and a consideration of Brunei’s national 
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philosophy of MIB3. MIB, though officially promulgated on Bruneian 
independence from the British, is based on elements, such as the 
superiority of the Malay race that can be seen in Brunei from as early 
as 1959 if not even earlier. MIB is a national ideology that seeks to 
‘nation build’ and provides legitimacy for the monarchical regime 
through fostering a national identity based on the three pronged 
pillars of a shared Malay culture, Islamic religion and loyalty to the 
Sultan4. Chapter five then takes the reader through the various 
constitutional changes between 1979 and 2004 in which the Sultan 
ensured his continued absolute status through constitutional 
amendment. The chapter concludes with postulations as to what I 
consider to be the primary factors present in Brunei, working in 
tandem with MIB, which allow the continued existence of the 
monarchy to this day. I very briefly consider: - 
 
i. the consequences of the  suppression of political parties in 
Brunei; 
ii. the effect of constitutional favoritism in favour of the ethnic 
Malays in Brunei;  
iii. the role of Islam in legitimizing rule via absolute monarchy;  
                                                        
3 Sharon Siddique, Brunei Darussalam 1991: The Non- Secular Nation, 
Southeast Asian Affairs, Institute of Southeast Asian studies, Singapore, 
1992;  
4 G Braighlin, Ideological Innovation Under Monarchy: Aspects of 
Legitimation Activity in Contemporary Brunei, Comparative Asian 
Studies, VU University Press 
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iv.  the role of economic development in democratization and 
how as a small wealthy nation, Brunei does not partake in 
the general rule.  
 
Brunei’s exceptionalism with regards to how she is governed can be 
attributed to a fortuitous confluence of both unintended and 
manufactured circumstances. Unable to administer a country with a 
pre- existing set of ruling traditions, the British were forced to 
reorganize Brunei’s government structure. It was unforeseen at the 
time that the British Empire would collapse and equally unimaginable 
that the power of the British resident would be transferred to one 
person such as it was in Brunei. Working concurrently with this was 
the fact that Brunei was in possession of a capable and wily Sultan 
determined to not only preserve, but also enhance his position in 
government. 
 
Limitations 
 
It was felt at the outset of the writing of this thesis that any 
methodology other than a theoretical approach to research would not 
contribute greatly to this thesis. The reason for this being that much 
of this work is based on examining the historical circumstances 
leading up to the drafting of Brunei’s constitution for which no there is 
no useful avenue for qualitative or quantitative research. It was also 
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felt that qualitative or quantitative research would not aid in the 
contextualization of the constitution in modern day Brunei due to the 
reluctance and fear of the general public to discuss governance in 
anything but an amiable light. 
 
The biggest limitation on this thesis has been the difficulty of 
obtaining source material. This is mainly due to the fact that there is 
not very much scholarly research that deals with Brunei and 
particularly little that addresses Brunei’s constitutional history and 
framework. Primary sources for this work predominantly take the 
form of archived material from the National Achives in Kew. In 
particular, the primary sources for this work, come in the form of 
government correspondence on, and the text of treaties signed 
between Brunei and the UK. These primary sources provide the 
backbone for this thesis in the sense that they are key to 
understanding the timeline of, and the relationship between, Brunei 
and the British Government. 
 
Secondary sources of information mostly come from the texts of work 
from British historians. Though some may argue that some of these 
secondary sources are dated, they have been chosen specifically 
because it is my opinion that they provide the most comprehensive 
overview of Brunei in that period of Brunei history. Other secondary 
Rabiqah N. H. B. M. Yusof 
March 2017 
Introduction 
 
17 
sources used are mostly articles written about Brunei, although not 
necessarily on Brunei constitutional history. These secondary 
sources are predominantly used to provide context to this thesis. 
 
It is notable that there is a distinct lack of material from Brunei itself. 
The reason for this absence is twofold. Firstly there is little to no 
access given to the Brunei National Archives and hence no way of 
obtaining primary sources from a Bruneian perspective. The second 
and perhaps more salient reason for the lack of Brunei resources is 
that for fear of incurring the ire of the Government, there is very little 
local constitutional research and discourse. There however are few 
notable Bruneian historians whose work has been cited in this thesis 
as secondary sources. 
 
In conclusion, Brunei’s continued existence as an absolute monarchy 
can be attributed to two things. Firstly, the necessary reorganization 
of Brunei’s governance by the British which allowed immense power 
to transfer from the British Resident to the Sultan. Secondly, the use 
of that power by the Sultan to propagate an ideology which gave the 
monarchy political legitimacy in the eyes of its people.  
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Chapter One 
1. Introduction 
 
The coming of the British was pivotal in changing the face of 
Bruneian governance. The change in Brunei however produced 
unexpected and unique results. History has shown that in most 
British territories, the nascent forms of democracy left by the British 
at the end of their empire, by and large worked with the traditional 
systems in place to produce largely democratic ends. Traditional 
Malay governance therefore, while possibly being a contributory 
factor, cannot be the only reason for Brunei’s unique development 
into an absolute monarchy. Similar traditional systems were also 
found in Malaysia, which is now a democratic nation1. To establish 
what the various factors were in Brunei’s unique development it 
seems pertinent not only to examine how traditional Brunei was ruled 
but also how that rule was changed by British involvement and the 
evolution of the Brunei rulers and Bruneian people in light of those 
changes. 
 
                                                 
1 Sadka, Emily, The Protected Malay States 1874- 1895, University of 
Malaya Press (1968)  
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2.  Constitutionalism and Waves of Democracy 
 
As a starting point however, in order to understand how Brunei went 
against the trend we must first understand what the trend was. 
Samuel Huntington theorized that democratization in the world 
occurred in  “waves”. It is with an explanation of what is meant by 
“waves of democracy” that this chapter begins because it concisely 
explains the trend towards democratization in the world in the 20th 
century. How did this trend towards adopting democracy manifest in 
South East Asia; the geographic region where Brunei is found? I 
briefly highlight the democratic journey and constitutional status of 
two South East Asian nations i.e. Singapore and Malaysia in the 
second wave of democratization as relevant case studies of the 
manifestation of this trend within this geographical region. From the 
brief account of Singapore and Malaysia in the 1960’s, followed by a 
more in depth look into Brunei in the chapters after this, we will see 
that despite the convergences in culture, traditions, society and 
historical backgrounds of Brunei, Singapore and Malaysia, 
democracy in the region took different forms. Indeed in the case of 
Brunei, democratic institutions took no form at all. More importantly, 
examining Singapore and Malaysia will allow a comparison in the 
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later parts of this paper of how far Brunei’s current constitutional 
model has diverged from these two other nations and allow us to 
infer reasons for the differences in development.  
 
The central argument that this paper seeks to prove is that the 
reason for Brunei’s absolute monarchy is in fact two fold. Firstly, the 
establishment of the residential system of government by the British 
funneled untrammeled power into one office. The transfer of these 
powers to the Sultan upon the achievement of internal self-
government in 1959 gave rise to the absolute monarchy that we 
know in Brunei today. It is at this point that comparisons between 
Brunei, Malaysia and Singapore become pertinent to this study. 
Should the establishment of the office of Resident be the only reason 
for the development of an absolute monarchy, Malaysia and 
Singapore should also have developed along the same lines.  
 
This brings us to the second reason, which is that upon the 
achievement of self-governance the post colonial process of nation 
building saw the development of national ideologies in South East 
Asia. The specific ideology propagated by the Sultan in Brunei was 
the national ideology of “Melayu Islam Beraja” (hereinafter referred to 
as MIB) which can loosely be translated as “Malay Islamic 
Monarchy”. This ideology legitimised the preservation of the absolute 
monarchy in Brunei. 
Rabiqah N. H. B. M. Yusof 
March 2017 
Chapter One 
  
21 
 
Samuel P. Huntington describes global democratization as arriving in 
three waves2. Each wave was described as a period of time in global 
history when democratization occurred in many countries at 
approximately the same time. The first wave of democracy according 
to Huntington began in the early 19th century and lasted up to 1922. 
This period saw the granting of suffrage to white males in America 
and it was also the period in which the French revolution took place 
in Europe.  The second wave of democracy began after the Allied 
victory in the Second World War in 1942 and ended in 1962. It was in 
this wave that the democratization of South East Asian nations 
began. Huntington attributed the beginning of the third wave of 
democracy to the Carnation Revolution in Portugal in 1974. It was 
this third wave that to date has seen the biggest rise in the number of 
democracies in the world. The question as to if the third wave has 
crested and is in fact over is something that is currently discussed by 
theorists3. Some theorists question if the events of the Arab spring 
are in fact the beginnings of a fourth wave of democracy4. 
 
                                                 
2 Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late 20th 
Century, University of Oklahoma Press (1993) 
3 See Larry Jay Diamond, Is the Third Wave Over?, Journal of Democracy 
7.3 (1996) 20- 37 and Larry Jay Diamond, The End of the Third Wave and 
the Global Future of Democracy, Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna, 
Political Science Series No. 45, July 1997. 
4 See Philip N. Howard and Muzammil M. hussain, Democracy’s Fourth 
Wave? Digital Media and the Arab Spring, OUP, 2013 and Larry Diamond, 
A Fourth Wave or a false start?, Foreign Affairs, 22nd May 2011. 
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At the outset let me clarify two things. My first clarification is that at 
no point in this paper will there be a discussion as to the value of 
democracy as a system of governance over any other system. The 
focus of my paper being to understand the reasons for Brunei’s 
entrenchment of its monarchy, a philosophical discussion on the 
superiority of democracy as a mode of governance explains nothing 
in Brunei’s journey from British “colony” to absolute monarchy. 
 
My second qualification is that there will only be limited discourse on 
the many theories of democracy and constitutionalism. The reason 
for this being that an in depth study into the vast number of theories 
and explanations into these two things would leave very little time to 
answer the actual focus of this paper. 
 
Having made those clarifications, it is useful and pertinent at this 
juncture to understand Huntington’s definition of “Democracy” when 
he classified time periods into waves. In his book, The Third Wave, 
Huntington defined democracy as “a political system to the extent 
that its most powerful collective decision makers are selected 
through fair, honest and periodic elections in which candidates freely 
compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult population is 
eligible to vote”. Huntington also qualified that “democracy also 
implies the existence of those civil and political freedoms to speak, 
Rabiqah N. H. B. M. Yusof 
March 2017 
Chapter One 
  
23 
publish, assemble and organize that are necessary to political debate 
and the conduct of electoral campaigns”5.  
 
The trend that we can see emerging with the new democracies is the 
prevalence of a single written document called the constitution. 
There is also increasingly a move towards homogeneity in the values 
that these new constitutions seek to protect6. Menzel7 opines that 
this single written document seems to have become “ a necessary 
element of statehood” but questions if every state that possesses 
such a written document embraces the concept of constitutionalism. 
Menzel considers the failure to embrace the constitutional essentials 
of democracy, protection of basic rights and the rule of law as the 
lack of constitutionalism in any given state despite the existence of a 
document called a constitution. Bearing this in mind, in later chapters 
when we consider the Brunei constitution, we should question the 
existence of constitutionalism in Brunei, a country with a single 
written document called a constitution that does not make any 
mention of the rule of law and does not in any way shape or form 
protect any of the basic rights of the people. 
 
                                                 
5 Huntington, supra at note 2 
6 Cheryl Saunders, Towards a Global Constitutional Gene Pool, 4 National 
Taiwan University Law Review 2 (2009). 
7 Jorg Menzel, Constitutionalism in Southeast Asia, Volume 3, Konrad 
Adenauer Stiftung, Singapore (2009). 
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Despite the tendency of constitutions themselves to possess more 
similar traits, we see an increasing variance the forms of governance. 
From this it becomes more and more obvious that constitutionalism 
takes root differently from state to state depending on factors already 
existing within the state. The plethora of systems of governance and 
different practical interpretations of constitutionalism has given rise to 
a resurgence in interest in comparative constitutional law. The issue 
with comparative constitutional law in general is its tendency to 
compare a Western nation with one that is considered less 
constitutionally developed. The western nation normally being the 
benchmark to which the less constitutionally developed nation should 
aspire. To quote a colloquialism, this is like comparing apples to 
oranges because, with respect to South East Asia for example, the 
concepts of democracy and constitutionalism are considered western 
ideals that do not translate smoothly due to substantial cultural and 
traditional diversity as well as the existence of its own value system8. 
 
2.1 Constitutionalism in South East Asia 
 
The civilizations found in South East Asia are ancient. Despite this 
however, South East Asia was not identified as a distinct region until 
well after the end of the Second World War. A South East Asian 
                                                 
8 Black, Ann, Ideology and Law: The Impact of the MIB Ideology on Law 
and Dispute Resolution in the Sultanate of Brunei Darussalam, Asian 
Journal of Comparative Law / Volume 3 / January 2008, pp 1-41 at page 4 
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identity was forged in this period of the ebbing of colonialism, as 
many nations in this geographical region achieved nationalist 
consciousness and were swept up in the second wave of 
democratization. This initial identity was based on geographical 
proximity, a similar albeit not identical value system and a shared 
desire to be self- governing and later to nation build. A tangible 
manifestation of this South East Asian identity was the formation of 
the Association of Southeast Asia (the ASA) in 1961, which later 
became the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 
1967. 
 
In trying to forge a national identity in the aftermath of colonialism the 
universal applicability of western democratic values and institutions in 
South East Asia were questioned by South East Asian national 
leaders. Some nations, such as Singapore became proponents of 
the concept of “Asian Values”. The basic finding of those who 
subscribed to this concept was that on a fundamental level, the 
values required of a liberal democracy in fact run contrary to Asian 
culture9. Naysayers of the concept of Asian Values believed that the 
reluctance of the proponents of Asian Values to adopt a liberal 
democracy is not so much a problem of intrinsic incompatibility but 
rather that the “soft” authoritarian regimes that subscribe to Asian 
Values use it as a “principled defense of their reluctance to broaden 
                                                 
9 Seah Chee Meow, Asian Values and Modernization, Singapore University 
Press, 1977. 
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political participation10”. While “Asian Values” as a concept was 
highly debated and criticized, what emerged from the period 
following independence in South East Asia was that the leaders of 
the South East Asian nations began to advance national ideologies 
to provide a vision for the future of their respective countries. In 
Brunei that national ideology was MIB, the impact of which will be 
further examined in later chapters of this thesis. 
 
2.2 Malaysia in the second wave11 
 
The precursor to Malaysia that was formed in 1957 was the Malayan 
Federation of 1948. This consisted of 11 Malay states, all of which 
were in some way under British control. 9 of these 11 states were 
ruled by a Sultan prior to British involvement. The Malayan 
Federation gained independence from the British in 1957 and in 
1963 became Malaysia with the addition of three other former British 
territories i.e. Singapore and the two Bornean states of Sabah and 
Sarawak. 
 
The constitution of Malaysia formed in 1963 was essentially the 
independence constitution of the Malayan Federation made in 1957 
                                                 
10 Inoue Tatsuo, Liberal Democracy and Asian Orientalism, in The East 
Asian Challenge for Human Rights, ed. Joanne R. Bauer and Daniel Bell, 
Cambridge University Press, 1999. 
11 Entire subsection is based on information found in Weiss, Meredith L., 
Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Malaysia, (Routledge) 2015. 
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that was amended to accommodate the three new states. The 
Malaysian constitution framed the Malaysian government to be a 
federal parliamentary democracy with a constitutional monarchy. 
Governance of the states was divided between the federal 
government and state government. The division of jurisdiction 
between the two was set out in the Constitution. Additional executive 
powers were given to Sabah and Sarawak (the East Malaysian 
states) as compared to the remaining 11 states. These additional 
powers were also set out in the constitution. There was to be a 
strong federal government with only residual powers exercised by the 
state. 
 
The head of the federal state was the Yang Di- Pertuan Agong (the 
Agong) who was elected from a pool of the 9 hereditary Sultans of 9 
of the Malaysian states. The remaining 4 states did not have Sultans 
and therefore would not participate in the election of the Agong. The 
title of Agong was ceremonial and for a term of 5 years. The title was 
to customarily rotate between the 9 Sultans. 
 
The federal legislature was to be a Westminster style bi- cameral 
system made up of the fully elected lower house called the ‘House of 
Representatives” or “Dewan Rakyat” and the upper house, made up 
of a combination of elected and nominated members, called the 
‘Senate’ or “Dewan Negara”.  
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The head of the federal government was the popularly elected Prime 
Minister. Executive power at a federal level vested in the Cabinet, 
which was headed by the Prime Minister. The Cabinet was made up 
of members chosen by the Prime Minister from both the upper and 
the lower houses of parliament. 
 
The head of state government was the elected Chief Minister of each 
state.  
 
The legislature of each state, also called the state assembly, was in 
the form of a unicameral legislature, members of which were elected 
from single member constituencies on a first past the post system.  
 
The Malaysian Judiciary was to operate on a dual system with the 
common law being generally applicable and Syariah law being 
enforced in specific cases dealing with Malaysian Muslims.  
 
The issues that were difficult to resolve in 1963 were not the ones of 
structure or forms of governance. Instead the difficulty lay in 
resolving the communal issues of race, language and religion. 
Ignoring British advice, the Malaysian constitution formally set out 
Islam as the religion of the federation and Malay as the official 
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language. Further, the constitution also set out the special status of 
the Malay and native people. 
 
2.3 Singapore in the second wave12 
 
Singapore gained independence from the British and joined Malaysia 
in 1963. It then broke off from Malaysia in August 1965 and adopted 
the constitution it had when it was a state of Malaysia as its national 
constitution supplemented by the Republic of Singapore Act 1965 
and the Constitution of Singapore (Amendment) Act 1965.s 
 
Under the original 1965 constitution, Singapore was a parliamentary 
representative democratic republic. The nominated President was 
head of state. The head of the Government was the Prime Minister 
who was normally the leader of the party that formed the majority of 
the seats in Parliament. 
 
Executive power was to be exercised by the Cabinet, headed by the 
Prime Minister. The Cabinet was made up of sitting members of 
Parliament who were then appointed by the President on the advice 
of the Prime Minister. 
 
                                                 
12 Entire section summarized from information obtained in Vasil, R, 
Governing Singapore: A history of National Development and Democracy, 
Allen & Unwin (2001) 
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Legislative authority vested in both the President and the Singapore 
Parliament however the Presidents’ legislative authority was nominal 
at best. The Singapore Parliament was unicameral with members 
being elected on a first past the post system. 
 
Judicial independence was guaranteed under the Constitution. The 
Singapore legal system, unlike that of Malaysia was purely based on 
English Common law. Other notable differences between the 
Singapore constitution and the Malaysian constitution were firstly the 
description of Singapore as a secular state and secondly the fact that 
the Malays were given no special status under the constitution. 
 
2.4 Comparisons between Singapore and Malaysia in the 
second wave 
 
From the very brief descriptions of the paths that Malaysia and 
Singapore intended to take on independence it should be noted that 
in matters that made up the elements of a democracy both countries 
seemed to by and large adhere to the model. Both consisted of an 
elected chamber, both saw executive power vested primarily in a 
cabinet government headed by a prime minister and there was the 
existence of political parties. The differences between the two lay in 
the states’ stance as to the religion, the rights of the Malays and the 
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effect of Malaysia being a federation with a constitutional monarchy 
in contrast with Singapore’s individual republic state.  
 
The next step would be to compare how Brunei differed from 
Singapore and Malaysia and at what point did diversion from the 
“normal” path occur. A comparison between these three countries 
provides context to this study and will become possible after 
examining Brunei’s constitutional history. 
 
In order to understand the reasons that Brunei deviates not only from 
the world trend towards democratization but also from the norm in 
South East Asia, we would need to delve into Brunei’s history. For 
this reason, the rest of this chapter will give a historical overview of 
Brunei from approximately 1840 to 1905 highlighting facets of 
Bruneian governance and society as well as important events that 
helped to shape Brunei’s constitutional history in the early 20th 
century. It is hoped that an understanding of the historical events in 
this and the following chapters will help to contextualise the many 
factors that enabled Brunei to resist democratization and develop 
into an absolute monarchy, as opposed to a democracy, post British 
protection. 
 
This chapter first gives a geographic overview of where Brunei lies 
because a basic understanding of who Brunei shared her borders 
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with will aid the reader in understanding the significance of the loss 
of Limbang in this historical narrative. 
 
I will explore the two foreign influences that played a pivotal part in 
the shaping of the Bruneian borders. Subsequently I will then explain 
the traditional method of governance that was in place in Brunei prior 
to the arrival of the British in the mid-nineteenth century. This will 
include an explanation of the Brunei class structure because 
traditional Brunei was ruled by the higher echelons of society. In this 
quasi- feudal method of governance, the system of land 
administration was also linked to the Bruneian class structure. The 
system of land administration will be explained in this chapter as the 
importance of this system of land administration ensured that the 
Sultan was not all-powerful. An understanding of land administration, 
class structure and governance and the interplay between the three 
is necessary to give the reader a foundation upon which the changes 
that followed the arrival of the British can be understood.  
 
This chapter will then go on to outline the involvement of the British 
Government in Brunei affairs, charting the circumstances leading up 
to the signing of the Anglo- Brunei treaty of 1847 and why it became 
necessary to sign a further treaty in 1888. I will also examine the 
provisions of these treaties in some detail in order to show a step-by-
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step progression of how the British came to be involved in Brunei 
governance. 
 
Finally I will explore the circumstances that led to the commissioning 
of the McArthur Report in 1904. I will highlight the key considerations 
in the making of the recommendations of the report which were 
instrumental in the ratification of the Supplementary Anglo- Brunei 
Treaty of 1905/ 1906. This was the treaty that defined the 
relationship between Brunei and the British Government for the first 
half of the twentieth century.  
 
3. Overview 
3.1 A Geographic Overview 
Though the exact origins of Brunei are uncertain, there is evidence to 
suggest that the Kingdom of Brunei has existed in some form since 
the 7th Century13. At its peak, Brunei is said to have been in control 
of most of Borneo Island along with parts of the Southern 
Philippines14. For the purposes of this chapter however it is enough 
to know of the geographical locations of Brunei and East Malaysia, 
both currently and in the mid 19th century.  
                                                 
13 Pehin Jawatan Dalam Seri Maharaja Dato Seri Utama Dr. Haji Awang 
Mohd. Jamil Al- Sufri, History of Brunei in Brief (Brunei History Centre, 
Ministry of Culture Youth and Sports, 2000) 
14 Ibid 
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Located on the North Eastern tip of Borneo island, modern day 
Brunei Darussalam currently stands at 2226 square miles15. Sharing 
Borneo island with both East Malaysia (the states of Sabah and 
Sarawak) and Indonesia (Kalimantan), Brunei is bordered to the 
North by the South China Sea and shares all land borders with the 
East Malaysian state of Sarawak. Brunei is in fact divided into two 
parts by the Sarawakian district of Limbang. These borders of Brunei 
have remained relatively unchanged since the cession of Limbang in 
1890. The eastern Malaysian state of Sabah lies to the east again of 
Sarawak.  
 
In the mid 19th Century, prior to the intrusion of the Brooke family and 
the British North Borneo Company (hereinafter referred to as ‘the 
BNBC’) both the East Malaysian states of Sabah and Sarawak were 
part of Brunei16. It is Brunei’s loss of what is now East Malaysia to 
the British that provides the starting point of historical significance for 
this research. 
 
3.2 The Two Foreign Influences 
3.2.1. The Brooke Family- The White Rajahs of Sarawak 
                                                 
15 CIA World Factbook 2011 (Skyhorse Publishing, 2010) 
16 Supra at note 13 
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Key to the shrinking of Bruneian borders were the Brooke Family. 
James Brooke, the first of the Brookes to have dealings with Brunei, 
was a retired British army officer whose interest in South East Asia 
was piqued upon reading the accounts of Sir Stamford Raffles’ 
success in Singapore17. Looking to achieve a similar level of 
success, he set sail for Singapore on his ship “The Royalist”.  
 
While he was in Singapore the antimony wealth of Sarawak, which 
was then a territory of Brunei, caught his eye. Seizing the opportunity 
and hoping to carve out a similar niche in Sarawak as Raffles had 
done in Singapore, he arrived in Sarawak shortly thereafter.  
 
Brooke took the opportunity to befriend Raja Muda Hashim, a close 
relative to the reigning Sultan of Brunei then, who had been 
dispatched to Sarawak to quell riots that were taking place there 
against the Governor of Sarawak (who was also a member of the 
Brunei royal family)18. This friendship was a tactical move on the part 
of James Brooke as Raja Muda Hashim was of a higher noble status 
than the Governor of Sarawak19. Eager to quell the riots and having 
                                                 
17 Tarling, N, Britain, the Brookes and Brunei, Oxford University Press 
(2001) 
18 Saunders, G, A History of Brunei, Routledge (2002) 
19 Ibid 
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had no success on his own, Raja Muda Hashim promised Brooke the 
governorship of Sarawak should Brooke be able to achieve this 
task20.  
 
Upon Brookes’ success in quelling the rioting, he became the 
Governor of Sarawak in 1842 with the condition that he would pay an 
annual monetary tribute to the Sultan of Brunei21. In 1845, James 
Brooke was formally appointed as Queen Victoria’s confidential 
agent in Borneo. 
 
In 1845, Raja Muda Hashim returned to Brunei after his stint in 
Sarawak accompanied by Brooke and British naval forces (who had 
been brought into this matter by Brooke calling in his old naval ties). 
Having lost much popularity during his time in Sarawak, Raja Muda 
Hashim required help from Brooke to forcibly re- instate his claim on 
the title of Bendahara and as successor to the throne22.  
 
Raja Muda Hashim was subsequently murdered by local chiefs who 
resented his claim to the throne and also his bringing of British forces 
                                                 
20 It should be noted here that this appointment of Brooke as Governor of 
Sarawak had to be confirmed by the Sultan. There was an issue with regards 
to this appointment, however as it does not relate directly to the treaty of 
1846, I feel that detailed discussion is unnecessary. 
21 Saunders, Supra 
22 Saunders, Supra 
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to enforce this claim23. This murder of Raja Muda Hashim was 
carried out by the local chiefs with orders from the Sultan.  
 
Seizing the opportunity provided by the internal disturbance in 
Brunei, Brooke, in his official capacity, enlisted the help of the 
Admiral Sir Thomas Cochrane of the British Navy to intimidate the 
newly ascended Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddin II. Brooke’s pretext was 
using that the murder of Raja Muda Hashim for his pro- British 
tendencies was an insult to his personal prestige and also to the 
prestige of Britain24.  
 
After a brief exchange of fire, the Sultan who had fled the capital was 
persuaded to come out of hiding to sign a treaty with James Brooke 
in 1846, formally recognizing Brooke as the sole and sovereign ruler 
of Sarawak.25 The gunboat diplomacy that was employed by Brooke 
in the signing of this treaty that made him the Rajah of Sarawak can 
be seen in the account of Frank Marryat26 as follows: - 
 
                                                 
23 Saunders, Supra 
24 Saunders, Supra 
25 History of Brunei Darussalam 1800 – 1967, Ministry of Education, 
Brunei Darussalam, Pan Pacific Publications (S) Pte. Ltd (2000) at pages 45 
to 46. 
26 Frank Marryat was a British Midshipman who served on the HMS 
Samarang between 1843 and 1846. His account of the cession of Labuan 
can be found in his book “Borneo and the Indian Archipelago”, Longman 
Brown Green and Longmans, London (1848) 
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“… the barge, in which were Lieutenant Baugh (since dead) and 
myself, was ordered to lie on her oars abreast of the audience 
chamber, and to keep her 6- pounder, in which there was a fearful 
dose of grape and canister, pointed at the sultan himself during the 
whole of the interview… the barge was so placed that the 
assassination of Mr. Brooke and the Europeans would have been 
revenged on the first discharge of out gun by the slaughter of 
hundreds; and in the main street lay the steamer, with a spring on 
her cable, her half ports up, and guns loaded to the muzzle, awaiting, 
as by instruction, for the discharge of the gun from the barge, to 
follow up the work of death. The platform admitted one of the 
steamer’s guns to look into the audience chamber, the muzzle was 
pointed direct at the sultan, a man held the lighted tow in his hand.”27 
 
One of the conditions of this treaty was that the Sultan had to write a 
letter of apology to Her Majesty Queen Victoria for the alleged insult 
to the British made by the murder of Raja Muda Hashim28.  
 
In this letter the Sultan also offered to cede Labuan, an island 
territory of Brunei some 42 miles off the Brunei coast, to the British in 
return for British aid in the suppression of the infighting between the 
many parties who wanted to claim the Brunei throne, one of whom 
                                                 
27 Ibid at pages 114 to 115. 
28 Saunders, Supra 
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had the support and help of Brooke and his warships29. This was a 
timely offer for the British Government, the reasons for which will be 
examined later in this chapter when discussing the relationship 
between Brunei and the British Government. 
 
It seems likely however that the murder of Raja Muda Hashim was 
simply exploited by Brooke in order to obtain sovereignty over 
Sarawak and to cease paying the annual monetary tribute to the 
Sultan of Brunei30. As will be seen later in this research, Brooke 
continued to harass the Sultan of Brunei for the purposes of 
expanding his personal domain in the region 
 
3.2.2 The British North Borneo Company- The BNBC 
 
The other key faction in the shrinking of Bruneian borders was the 
BNBC. The BNBC was set up when Alfred Dent, a British merchant 
and entrepreneur, who acquired the lease rights to almost the entire 
                                                 
29 Saunders, Supra 
30 Graham Irwin, Borneo Abad Kesembilan Belas (translation by Mohd. Nor 
Ghani and Noraini Ismail), Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, Kuala Lumpur 
(1986) at pages 157 to 158. 
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North Borneo for ten years in 1877. Dent and his partners formed a 
company to develop these leased territories31.  
 
The company subsequently acquired a Royal Charter from the British 
Queen in 1881. The Royal Charter set out the terms under which the 
BNBC could trade and also set out the rights and responsibilities of 
the company. Arguably the Royal Charter was a very liberal method 
of indirect rule over this part of Borneo as it allowed the British 
Government to set boundaries over North Borneo while not investing 
in it financially.  
 
Over the years the BNBC administered and developed these leased 
territories and also bought over the territorial rights of other Bruneian 
nobles in North Borneo. Despite great improvements to North Borneo 
under the BNBC, such as the expansion of trade and the 
development of infrastructure such as a working railway, the BNBC 
was much reviled by the local North Borneo population for the high 
taxes that they imposed.  
 
 
                                                 
31 Secondary History for Brunei Darussalam, Pan Pacific Publications 
(1993) 
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3.3. Traditional Bruneian Governance (pre British involvement) 
 
The Salasilah Raja- Raja Brunei (hereinafter referred to as the 
Salasilah) which translates into “the Laws and Regulations of 
Bruneian Kings” and Hukum Kanun Brunei (hereinafter referred to as 
the Hukum) are two of the oldest written Bruneian accounts of the 
traditional system of governance in Brunei.  
 
The Salasilah contains a list of Bruneian Sultans starting from the 
first Muslim sultan of Brunei as well as accounts of the rules of 
various sultans. The Salasilah as a source of Brunei history is given 
great local regard as it is the most comprehensive account of the 
Sultans and their varied reigns. The sources used in the compilation 
of these accounts however would perhaps not stand up to academic 
scrutiny because record keeping in Brunei was piecemeal at best 
prior to the coming of the British and historical accounts up to then 
were normally relayed from one generation to the next by word of 
mouth. 
 
The Hukum, written during the reign of the 9th and 10th Sultans of 
Brunei in the late 16th century and early 17th century, is a document 
containing 44 chapters that cover most aspects of socio- economic 
life in Brunei. It contains chapters on the rights of the Sultan, 
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traditional customs, penalties for various crimes and rules governing 
specific economic transactions and marriage.  
 
It is notable that the rules and punishments as codified in the Hukum 
have a distinct leaning towards Islamic law in its content.32 As an 
example of this Islamic leaning, all the articles contained in the 
Hukum Kanun begin with the words “According to the written law of 
Allah Most Exalted”33. Furthermore, the punishment for certain 
offences, as itemized under the Hukum are well known as 
punishments under Islamic Syariah law. Examples of this are the 
punishment of death for a charge of murder as in articles 5 and 8 of 
the Hukum and the punishment of amputation of a hand for the 
offence of theft under article 5 of the Hukum34.  
 
Though neither the Hukum nor the Salasilah is a definitive account, 
they give us valuable insight into how Brunei was run in the pre- 
British days. Derived from these two sources is an explanation of the 
stratification of Brunei society in the days before the British. 
 
                                                 
32 Mahmud Saedon Awang Othman, “The Implementation and 
Administration of Islamic Law in Brunei Darussalam”, Islamic Da’awah 
Centre, Brunei (2008) 
33Pehin Jawatan Dalam Seri Maharaja Dato Seri Utama Dr. Haji Awang 
Mohd. Jamil Al- Sufri, Survival of Brunei: A Historical Perspective, Brunei 
History Centre (2002), at page 29 
34 Hukum Kanun Brunei, Brunei Museum. 
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3.4. The Brunei Class Structure 
 
The Brunei people were divided into four layers of society35. The four 
layers were as follows: the core nobility (which comprised of the 
Sultan and Wazirs), the common nobility (Chetria), the aristocrats 
(Pehin) and the commoners (rakyat).  
 
This stratification of the Brunei people was explained by D.E. Brown 
in his study of Brunei. Brown observed that the major difference 
between the nobility and the non- nobles was nearness of patrilineal 
descent from the crown36. The highest rank of nobility being able to 
trace their descent from the current or recent Sultans or other high 
officials. The lower strata of nobility in turn traced their descent from 
earlier Sultans. At the head of the non- noble classes were 
aristocrats who were descended from non- Bornean nobility in the 
ancient past. This was followed by the average Bruneian who was 
stratified based on their occupation or place of dwelling. The lowest 
strata of Brunei society as observed by Brown was made up of a 
class of slaves. 
 
                                                 
35 D. E. Brown, Brunei: The Structure and History of a Bornean Malay 
Sultanate, BMJ, Vol II, No. 2, 1970 
36 Ibid 
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Each strata of society carried with it different roles and 
responsibilities. Essentially, as noted by Sweeney in his translation of 
the Salasilah, when looking to appoint anyone, the Sultan would look 
to the following qualities: 
 
“… the person must first be of noble blood, secondly, he should also 
be intelligent and thoughtful, thirdly courageous and bold in all 
undertakings and fourthly, he must also fear and respect the King. If 
any one of these conditions are not met, the person would be 
deemed unsuitable for the appointment of minister, warrior or 
official”37 
 
D.E. Brown goes one step further in his observation of Bruneian 
society by noting that the exact responsibility of each position was 
often imprecise. 
 
“Parallel to the division of Brunei society into noble and non- noble 
strata was a division of offices into those held only by nobles and 
those held only by non- nobles. At the apex of all was the sultan… 
The highest ranked and most powerful officials beneath the sultan 
were four viziers (wazir) usually appointed from among the core 
                                                 
37 Sweeney, P.L.A., “Silsilah Raja- Raja Berunai’ Journal of the Malaysian 
Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, Vol. XLI, Part 2, 1968, at page 21. 
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nobility… The duties and privileges of viziers were imprecise except 
in relation to their appanages. That is, the territorial domains in which 
they alone administered and taxed the population were very 
precisely demarcated, while their central governmental functions 
were vague”38 
 
3.5. The System of Land Administration 
 
Each strata of society (with the exclusion of the slave class) carried 
with it differing levels of legal rights over land39. To exemplify, with 
the title of Wazir or Chetria, by virtue of that title one was given the 
right to vast expanses of land. 
 
 Land rights were divided into three main types, the Kerajaan held by 
the Sultan, the Kuripan held by the Wazirs and the Tulen held by the 
common nobility. In the case of commoners and slaves, in the 
absence of a noble title, land ownership was scarce if it existed at 
all40. Dominion over each piece of land as well as the people that 
lived on that land belonged to the owner of the land. Herein lay the 
difficulty with this system of governance and land administration. 
                                                 
38 Supra at note 12 
39 D. E. Brown, Brunei: The Social Structure of 19th Century Brunei, BMJ, 
Vol I, No. 1, 1969 at page 172 
40 Ibid 
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Whilst the Sultan was the overall ruler of Brunei, in internal matters 
he had no rights over Kuripan or Tulen land and people because 
similar to a feudal system these lands and the people living on them 
were only subject to the rules imposed on them by their ‘feudal lords’. 
 
The ambit of the Sultan as agreed between the Sultan himself and 
his Wazirs was to protect the Kingdom against foreign intervention41, 
a prospect made difficult, if not impossible by the fact that there 
being no national treasury and the Sultan was normally too poor to 
fulfill this responsibility.  
 
All national expenditure came out of the pocket of the Sultan. The 
best description of this system would be that of a collection of small 
semi- independent fiefs that nominally recognise a head. As such the 
Sultan only had the semblance of power that was tenuously given to 
him so long as he accommodated the wishes of the other nobility 
who were every bit as powerful as he was. 
 
A byproduct of this manner of governance was that the system of 
succession was also uncertain. There was no enforcement of a 
system of primogeniture to the Brunei crown as though a noble may 
                                                 
41 Ibid 
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have the bloodline of the previous Sultan he may lack the support of 
the other nobles, rendering his bloodline effectively useless.42 
 
4. Brunei and the British Government 
 
The relationship between Brunei and the British if of supreme 
importance to my research as it was this relationship that was the 
catalyst for the establishment of the British Residency in Brunei. The 
Residency was the method by which the British government ruled 
Brunei indirectly and will be discussed in further detail in chapter 2. A 
discussion of the residency is pivotal to any historical narrative of 
Bruneian constitutional history as it laid the foundations for the 
governance of post independence Brunei. 
 
The Sultan of Brunei in the 19th century was increasingly aware of his 
tenuous position as ruler (due to the traditional methods of 
governance as discussed earlier in this chapter) and also of the 
piracy threat Brunei was facing from the Southern Philippines.43 
 
                                                 
42 Ibid 
43 Nicholas Tarling, Britain, the Brookes and Brunei, Oxford University 
Press, 1971 at pages 15-17. 
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To safeguard his position and the country, he stared to court foreign 
“friendship” in order to afford Brunei some protection from the pirates. 
Brunei’s first foray into such a relationship was in fact with the East 
India Company44. This relationship was however short lived and the 
Sultan was looking to establish a similar arrangement with another 
foreign entity. 
 
The British Government, while not seeking to expand their territory in 
Asia in the mid 19th Century, were keen to establish a base in 
Southeast Asia as it was on the trade route to China. Furthermore, 
with the French establishing a base in Saigon and the Spaniards in 
the Philippines, the establishment of a base in Southeast Asia 
became more important to ensure that the British had a foothold on 
this increasingly contested corner of Asia without which, the South 
China Sea would be closed to them45. Five harbours of great value 
were identified in the area, Labuan being one of them. The merits of 
Labuan were outlined to the Foreign Office in the a report as follows:- 
 
“By this cession Great Britain obtained possession of an island 
containing a fine harbour, capable of harbouring vessels of war, and 
also commanding the entrance to the River Brunei, in fact, a naval 
station which gave her the command over the whole north- western 
                                                 
44 Ibid 
45 Report of Mr. St. John 9th August 1860- FO 881/2514 at pages 4 to 5 
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coast of Borneo. Great Britain also obtained at the same time 
valuable coalmines… The mercantile community in Great Britain 
were strongly in favour of such a measure; the Sultan of Borneo has 
offered to cede the island; a favourable report had been made about 
the harbour; the account of the climate was satisfactory; and it was 
the opinion of Her Majesty’s Government that this island possessed 
many of the qualifications necessary for such a station as was 
wanted in that part of the world, particularly as other Powers had 
shown a disposition to obtain a footing on the Borneo coast.”46 
 
The British Government secured this aim of establishing a base by 
cession of Labuan to the British Government in 1846 and thereafter 
the treaty signed between Brunei and the British Government in 
1847. 
 
4.1. The Cession of Labuan 1846 
 
The British consideration of Labuan as its base in South East Asia 
began as early as 1843 when the ship the “Samarang” under the 
                                                 
46 Observations made by Lord Palmerston on behalf of Her Majesty’s 
Government contained in a letter to the Admiralty. Quoted in the secondary 
from FO 881/2514 at pages 6 to 7 
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command of Captain Sir Edmund Belcher was sent by the British 
Government to report on the viability of Labuan as a British base47. 
 
Upon Belcher’s return to Britain in 1844 the Sultan of Brunei, in 
furtherance of Brunei’s desire for aid and protection, sent the British 
government a letter via Belcher. An excerpt of this letter is 
reproduced below: - 
 
“This letter is addressed by Sultan Omar Ali and Raja Muda Hashim 
as rulers of the State of Brunei to the Queen of England. The Sultan 
and Raja Muda Hashim desire to gain the friendship and aid of the 
Queen of England for the suppression of piracy and the 
encouragement and extension of trade, and to assist in forwarding 
these objects, they are willing to cede to the Queen of England the 
island of Labuan and its islets on such terms as may hereafter be 
arranged by any person appointed by Her Majesty”48. 
 
As previously mentioned, in 1846, after Brooke was made the 
sovereign of Sarawak, the Sultan wrote a letter of apology to Her 
                                                 
47 Original correspondence found in FO 12/2. \ 
48 Translation from original Malay correspondence quoted in the secondary 
from M. Hall, Labuan Story, Memoirs of a Small Island, Chung Nam 
Printing Co., Jesselton 1958 at page 95. 
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Majesty Queen Victoria and in this letter, the Sultan offered again to 
cede Labuan to the British.  
 
Capitalising on the unrest in the region and the repeated offer of 
Labuan by the Sultan of Brunei, the British Government obtained 
Labuan via a treaty signed on 24th December 1846.  
 
The circumstances surrounding the cession of Labuan are 
interpreted differently by different scholars. Bruneian scholars49 seem 
to be of the opinion that Labuan was given to the British under 
duress whereas non- Bruneian scholars50 tend to view it as a quid 
pro quo arrangement in exchange for British help in suppressing 
piracy51. To shed light on this discrepancy it is helpful to look at the 
account given by Captain Rodney Mundy who was the 
representative of the British Government ordered to oversee the 
voluntary cession of Labuan52. Mundy in his account states that he 
sent “Lieutenant Little in charge of the boats of the Iris and Wolf, 
armed with twenty marines, to the capital, with orders to moor them 
                                                 
49 B.A Hussainmiya and Pehin Jawatan Dalam Seri Maharaja Dato Seri 
Utama Dr Haji Awang Mohd Jamil Al- Sufri amongst others 
50 Such as Graham Saunders and Nicholas Tarling 
51 This disparity is perhaps due to the respect that the position of Sultan now 
commands in Brunei giving rise to the situation where nothing negative 
would be written about the Sultan. This situation is further discussed in the 
concluding chapter of this work. 
52 Account found in the secondary in W.H.Treacher, British Borneo: 
Sketches of Brunai, Sarawak, Labuan and North Borneo, Singapore 
Government Print Department, 1891 at pages 85- 88. 
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in line of battle opposite the Sultan’s palace, and to await my 
(Captain Mundy’s) arrival”. Mundy then goes on to describe that the 
Sultan upon receipt of the treaty attempted to negotiate some of the 
terms, in particular on the issue of a monetary payment in exchange 
for the cession of Labuan. Mundy was not keen to negotiate and 
instead told the Sultan firmly that he was to “Bobo chop bobo chop”. 
A translation of this is “Affix the seal affix the seal” referring to the 
Sultan’s Royal seal. Perhaps in this account lies a reason for the 
discrepancy.  
 
From the perspective of the Brunei scholar it is not surprising that the 
unwillingness of the British to negotiate terms combined with the 
boats lined up for battle facing the palace would lead to the 
conclusion that there were indeed strong- arm tactics employed in 
the cession of Labuan.  
 
To the non- Bruneian scholar the previous offers of Labuan to the 
British by the Sultan combined with the orders given to Mundy could 
lend themselves to the conclusion that the cession of Labuan was 
voluntary.  
 
Rabiqah N. H. B. M. Yusof 
March 2017 
Chapter One 
  
53 
In whatever circumstances however, the loss of Labuan to the British 
undoubtedly contributed to the Sultan’s feeling of insecurity over the 
shrinking of his Sultanate. This insecurity was a factor that, as we 
shall see later in this research, would influence the Sultan’s decisions 
and actions with regards to ruling the Sultanate. 
 
The treaty itself made provision for “eternal friendship” between the 
two countries and for the cession of Labuan to the British 
Government. In return, the Queen would use her best endeavours to 
suppress piracy affecting Brunei and to protect lawful commerce 
between the two countries.  
 
The consideration given to Brunei for the cession of Labuan was the 
subject matter of the treaty of 1847 signed shortly thereafter.  
 
4.2. The Anglo- Brunei Treaty of Friendship and Commerce 1847 
 
The Treaty of Friendship and Commerce was signed on 27th May 
1847. The significance of this treaty for the purposes of this research 
lies in that fact that it was the first formal document setting out the 
official relationship between Brunei and the British Government. It 
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signaled the start of official British Government relations in Brunei 
history.  
 
The treaty contained thirteen articles in total, which defined the 
commercial scope of the British Government in Brunei, contained 
clauses to facilitate trade and also extracted a responsibility for the 
British Government to aid the Sultan in the suppression of piracy. 
Details of the articles particularly relevant to this aim are: - 
 
Article 2 of the 1847 treaty states “The subjects of Her Britannic 
Majesty shall have full liberty to enter into, reside in, trade with, and 
pass with their merchandise through all parts of the dominions of His 
Highness the Sultan of Borneo, and they shall enjoy therein all the 
privileges and advantages with respect to commerce, or otherwise, 
which are not or which may hereafter be granted to the subjects or 
citizens of the most favoured nation”. The granting of most favoured 
nation status to Britain ensured the smooth facilitation of trade 
between the two nations. This focus on facilitating trade was 
furthered by Articles 3 to 7 of the 1847 treaty, which between them 
dealt with the purchase of property53, imports and exports54, taxes 
                                                 
53 Article 3 1847 treaty 
54 Article 4 1847 treaty 
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and duties on goods55 and permission for British ships to enter 
Brunei waters to take on required provisions56. 
 
Article 9 of the treaty states “Her Majesty the Queen of the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and the Sultan of Borneo 
hereby engages to use every means in their power of the 
suppression of piracy within the seas, straits and rivers subject to 
their respective control or influence…” This article details the promise 
made by the British Government to aid Brunei against piracy, as 
consideration for the cession of Labuan to the British. 
 
In essence, in line with the British intention to keep the China Sea 
open to them, this treaty was signed to solidify trade relations 
between Brunei and the British.  
 
4.3. The Amanat 1885 
 
In 1868 James Brooke died and the title of Rajah passed to his 
nephew Charles Brooke. Charles Brooke shared the same ambitions 
                                                 
55 Articles 5 and 6 1847 treaty 
56 Article 7 1847 treaty 
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of his uncle before him, i.e. to continue expanding Sarawak by 
acquiring more and more Brunei territory57. 
 
With Charles Brooke to the West and the BNBC to the East, there 
was a real possibility that Brunei would cease to exist.  
 
In an attempt to ensure survival, Sultan Abdul Mumin, the Sultan in 
1885 met with his fellow nobles and between them signed an 
agreement not to cede, lease or in any way discharge any more 
territories to foreign powers for fear of the extinction of the kingdom. 
This agreement called the “Amanat” was signed on 20th February 
1885. The Amanat also tried to bind the future rulers of Brunei and 
future nobility to do the same. Further, the Amanat protected the right 
of private property and stated the importance of inheritance of land 
and slaves in accordance with old Brunei customs58. 
 
The effectiveness of this Amanat was questionable for shortly 
thereafter, Brunei lost the territory of Trusan through an arrangement 
between the Temenggong (one of the signatories to the Amanat). 
While laudable in its intention, there was no penalty for going against 
it and that was its weakness. This weakness is highlighted here 
                                                 
57 Tarling, Supra at note 17 
58 Brunei Museum Journal, Vol. 3 No. 2 (1974) 
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because the ineffectiveness of the Amanat was a prime reason for 
the loss of Trusan and led to the start of the Brookes’ claim to 
Limbang. 
 
Whilst aware of the scramble for Brunei territory between the BNBC 
and the White Rajah, the British Government did not actively involve 
themselves in the situation. The British Government wanted Brunei to 
remain in British hands (as opposed to that of another foreign power) 
and either the White Rajah in Sarawak or the BNBC in Sabah would 
suffice, as these were considered private British interests and not 
foreign intervention59. 
 
Brunei had not proved to be of much economic value and as such 
the British were not interested in investing financially. The cheapest 
option that would still meet the objectives of the British Government 
was to leave Brunei to the British influences that were already 
embedded in a race for Brunei’s territory, i.e. the White Rajah of 
Sarawak and the BNBC.  
 
4.4. The Protectorate Agreement of 1888 
 
                                                 
59 Correspondence in CO 943 
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For the British Government the agreement of 1888 was seen as a 
consolidation of British interests in Borneo. They were aware that 
Brunei seemed to be losing territory at a very fast rate and could 
foresee the possibility that Brunei would cease to exist should the 
present state of affairs continue60G. To exemplify the British position 
we turn to the Confidential minute by Lord Salisbury of the Foreign 
Office to Sir Julian Pauncefoot of the Foreign Office in January 1888: 
- 
 
“My impression on reading these papers, is that the North Borneo 
Company and Sarawak are crushing out the Sultan between them 
and the process is going on with some rapidity. I think we had better 
let them finish it, and make no agreement with the Sultan of Brunei 
which would stand in the way of a consummation which is inevitable 
and, on the whole, desirable”61 
 
This is not to say that the British entered into the agreement knowing 
that Brunei would disappear but rather that it was one of the many 
options that was foreseeable and not entirely undesirable to the 
British, bearing in mind, as previously mentioned, the British 
government was interested in Brunei remaining under the British 
                                                 
60Various Government correspondence at FO 572/2 
61 Ibid 
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sphere of influence and not so much in Brunei actually being 
administered by the British Government.  
 
For the Sultan of Brunei however, the 1888 agreement was viewed 
as something that would save the nation from extinction.62 
 
Sir Hugh Low was sent on behalf of the British Government to sign 
the Protectorate Treaty of 1888, which would place Brunei foreign 
relations in the hands of the British Government. Similar treaties 
were also signed with Sarawak and British North Borneo earlier in 
the year.  
 
As shall be discussed in the following chapters, part of the signing of 
protectorate agreements with all the territories in North Borneo was 
probably to form a North Borneo territory. This idea of the British 
came to be more relevant in 1950’s Brunei in the lead up to the 
drafting of the constitution. This will be elaborated on in further detail 
later in this research. 
 
                                                 
62 Singh, D.S. Ranjit, Brunei 1839- 1983: The Problems of Political 
Survival, Oxford University Press (1984)  
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Despite being a short eight articles, the significance of this treaty was 
that signaled the start of British Government involvement in Bruneian 
governance. Significant clauses of the agreement are examined 
below. 
 
“Article 1- The State of Brunei shall continue to be governed and 
administered by the said Sultan Hashim Jalilul Alam Akamadin and 
his successors as an independent State, under the protection of 
Great Britain; but such protection shall confer no right on Her 
Majesty’s Government to interfere with the internal administration of 
that State further than is herein provided”63 
 
This clause in the agreement makes clear that Brunei retained a 
large amount of her sovereignty and was still recognized as a 
separate state and not a colony of the British. There is an attempt to 
qualify the extent to which the British Government can interfere with 
the internal affairs of Brunei by specifying the internal matters to 
which the British would have a say within the other articles of the 
agreement which are discussed below. 
 
“Article II- In case any question should hereafter arise respecting the 
right of succession to the present or any future Ruler of Brunei, such 
                                                 
63 Agreement Between the Sultan of Brunei and Her Britannic Majesty’s 
Government Signed on 17th September 1888- Brunei Annual Report 1946, 
p. 80- 81. 
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question shall be referred to Her Majesty’s Government for 
decision”64 
 
The effect of this clause is that practically, as the rules of 
primogeniture did not apply strictly in Brunei, the British Government 
had the power to decide who the next Sultan would be to some 
extent. 
 
“Article III- The relations between the State of Brunei and all foreign 
States, including the States of Sarawak and North Borneo shall be 
conducted by Her Majesty’s Government, and all communications 
shall be carried on exclusively through Her Majesty’s Government, or 
in accordance with its directions; and if any difference should arise 
between the Sultan of Brunei and the Government of any other 
State, the Sultan of Brunei agrees to abide by the decision of Her 
Majesty’s Government, and to take all necessary measures to give 
effect hereto”65 
 
By this clause, Brunei surrendered full control of her external affairs 
to the British, regardless of the Sultan’s position on the matter.  
 
“Article VI- No cession or other alienation of any part of the territory 
of the State of Brunei shall be made by the Sultan to any foreign 
                                                 
64 Ibid 
65 Ibid 
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State, or the subjects or citizens thereof, without the consent of Her 
Majesty’s Government…”66 
 
Under this clause, the British Government put to bed the worry that 
other European rivals would take advantage of the political instability 
in Brunei to get a footing on the trade routes that passed through 
Brunei. 
 
In short this treaty put Brunei under the sphere of British protection 
by giving the British Government rights over external affairs, however 
leaving the internal governance of the country by and large still under 
the Sultan. 
 
5. The McArthur Report67 
 
The MacArthur Report was commissioned by the British Government 
to allow them to decide on the future of Brunei.  
 
The purpose of the report on Brunei that was done by Malcolm 
Stewart Hannibal McArthur (hereinafter referred to as McArthur) was 
to study the local conditions for the purposes of making 
recommendations for the future administration of Brunei.  
                                                 
66 Ibid 
67 FO 572/39, pp 4f-48 
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The stimulus for McArthur being sent was that the British 
Government had been in receipt of numerous accounts of the 
“unsatisfactory character” of the Brunei administration, so he was 
also asked to investigate the various complaints made against the 
Sultan and his officials. Additionally, he was to conceal the exact 
nature of his mission from the Brunei Malays to ensure that he would 
get the opinion of the Brunei common people as to how they should 
be governed68 
 
Accounts received by the Colonial office that had been written by 
previous Consuls to Borneo69 had been found wanting. As was 
explained by a foreign office official to the Secretary of State: 
 
“For a long time past we (the Foreign Office) have had difficulty in 
obtaining correct information about the state of affairs (in Brunei), or, 
rather, in checking the contradictory reports to which conflicting 
interests have given rise. We have had a consul for Brunei but the 
salary has not been sufficient to prove an attraction, and the climate 
has been declared so bad as to necessitate residence in Labuan. For 
                                                 
68 A.V.M. Horton, Report on Brunei in 1904- M.S.H. MacArthur (Ohio 
University Monograph in International Studies 1987) Pages 3 to 4 
69 The Consul to Borneo was the highest ranking British government officer 
in Borneo at the time whose job it was to deal with the administration of 
British territories on Borneo island. 
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these reasons and some others of a personal character, the duties of 
the post have not been satisfactorily performed”70 
 
In addition, the accounts received by the Colonial Office from the 
Rajah of Sarawak and his followers were far from impartial due to the 
Rajah’s desire to absorb what remained of Brunei into his Raj. 
 
McArthur’s desire to provide a comprehensive account in his report 
led to him being the first Consul, acting or otherwise, to actually stay 
in mainland Brunei, all his predecessors preferring to reside in 
Labuan71. His refusal to consult with the Rajah on the matter of 
Brunei during or prior to his stay was well thought out. His demeanor 
towards the Sultan and interest in the common people of Brunei was 
well received72.  
 
“The impact of the new acting consul’s consideration for his highness 
was doubtless highlighted by the contrast with former consuls, who 
were variously brusque, disrespectful, or drunk, and all of whom 
furthered the cause of Sarawak. (Indeed, one acting consul was a 
retired Sarawak Officer.”73 
 
                                                 
70 FO 12/128 p. 408ff., memorandum by F.H Villiers, 3 June 1905. 
71 A V M Horton, Supra at note 67 
72 A V M Horton, Supra at note 67 
73 A.V.M. Horton, Report on Brunei in 1904- M.S.H. MacArthur (Ohio 
University Monograph in International Studies 1987) Page 9 
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The first written assessment by McArthur of the situation in Brunei 
was specifically on the conditions around the river Belait and the river 
Tutong, where there had been a number of small disturbances. This 
assessment was entitled “Notes on a Visit to the Rivers Belait and 
Tutong”74. Here he concluded that though there were indeed 
complaints against the Sultan by subjects in Belait and Tutong, the 
widespread support for the Rajah of Sarawak was perhaps rather 
exaggerated and skewed by supporters of the Rajah. 
 
“… The accounts I received on the spot agree in the main with those 
reported, but do not give me so strong an impression of wanton 
cruelty… It should, however be remembered that the accounts given 
at the time were those of biased refugees to Limbang and Labuan, 
and that the other side of the question was not heard…”75 
 
The McArthur report itself is 146 paragraphs long and is a 
comprehensive summary of the conditions in Brunei at the time, 
ranging in its coverage from the geography of Brunei in 1904 to 
issues of succession and ending with the various options McArthur 
felt were available to the British government in respect of Brunei. 
 
The following is a consideration of the report in more detail, focusing 
primarily on themes in the report that were the factors considered by 
                                                 
74 FO 12/126, pp. 146- 152 
75 FO 12/126, pp. 146- 152 at paragraph 15. 
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McArthur in coming up with solutions as to the future of Brunei. The 
themes shall be discussed in more detail under the following 
headings: - 
 
 Natural Wealth 
 The Sultan, Government and Constitution 
 Problems resulting from system of governance 
 The relationship between the Sultan and Consul 
 Limbang 
 Possible Solutions 
 
5.1. Natural Wealth 
 
It is important to note that at the time that the report was written, the 
oil wealth that Brunei is now synonymous with had not entered the 
equation. Oil was discovered in Brunei in 1929 and while the wealth 
that came with it has played a part in the shaping of the country, it 
was not yet a consideration in 1904. McArthur does however discuss 
the natural wealth in Brunei to some degree.76 
 
McArthur found that there was some degree of natural wealth in 
Brunei in the form of antimony, jungle produce, coal and oil. It seems 
evident from his findings that he was unsure of the value of the oil 
                                                 
76 FO 572/39, pp 4f-48 at paragraphs 87 to 91 
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extracted and feels that Brunei should concentrate on the coal 
mining and that antimony and other jungle produce could provide a 
steady flow of income for the country.77 
 
The problem with Brunei’s natural wealth was one of administration. 
The ineffective system of governance, the system of land 
administration that was not easily understood and poor infrastructure 
meant it was difficult to entice investments into the country and made 
it near impossible to capitalize on what little income the natural 
wealth could generate78. 
 
“Various concessions for minerals have been from time to time 
obtained, but no success has as yet attended the efforts of the 
concessionaires. I believe the explanation to lie in the weakness of 
the Government, which makes the investment of capital risky, and in 
the undeveloped state of the country, which makes the expense of 
winning minerals or bringing them on the market prohibitive”79 
 
While geographically in a desirable location, these factors perhaps 
make it easy to see why the interest of the British government in 
Brunei was initially limited to ensuring that it remained under the 
                                                 
77 Ibid 
78 Ibid 
79 Ibid at paragraph 6 
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British sphere of influence with minimal cost to the British 
Government. 
 
5.2. The Sultan, Government and Constitution 
 
“The Government of Brunei is despotic in theory, the Sultan being 
the sovereign of the whole territory. As, however, the State is divided 
up into negri and hamba kerajaan, or Crown property, and negri and 
hamba kuripan, or official property, and negri and hamba tulin, or 
hereditary private property, it would, I think, be more accurate to 
describe the country as an aggregation of small and semi- 
independent fiefs acknowledging one head”80 
 
In essence, the system of governance was tied to the idea of land 
ownership81 and the above observation by McArthur is an accurate 
representation of how Brunei was governed. From the language 
used, it can be deduced from this extract that McArthur did not 
consider this system of governance acceptable. The problems 
associated with this system have been discussed previously in this 
chapter. 
 
                                                 
80 Ibid at paragraph 8 
81 Further detail of this system of land ownership has been given in a 
separate section earlier in this paper. 
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The Sultan was traditionally assisted by four ministers of the state, all 
of who had separate functions. Important state documents required 
the seal of these four ministers, indirectly imposing a requirement 
that they be consulted in state affairs and in essence putting a rough 
and ready system of checks and balances on the Sultan. These roles 
were normally filled by members of the royal family. The four 
ministers and their scope were as follows: - 
 
i. Pengiran Bendahara- holder of the highest position in the 
state next to the Sultan. Responsible for the internal affairs 
of the country. Keeper of the State Archives and formed a 
Court of Appeal from the decisions of the other ministers. 
ii. Pengiran Di Gadong- Treasurer and tax- collector. 
iii. Pengiran Pemancha- Deputy of the Pengiran Di Gadong 
iv. Pengiran Temenggong- In charge of state forces, lead 
expeditions and carried out executions.82 
 
Practically, this system lead to a situation of fragmented power with 
each of the aforementioned officials working to serve their own self- 
interests as observed accurately by McArthur in his report  
 
“… they are all working against the Sultan and each other and only 
keep up a superficial show of cordiality. The result is unfortunate. His 
                                                 
82 FO 572/39, pp 4f-48 at paragraphs 10 to 12 
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Highness is surrounded by lesser chiefs and by relations, all of whom 
have private interests to serve in every matter that comes before him. 
The advice he receives from them is generally against the best 
interests of himself and of Brunei”83 
 
A recurring theme at many points throughout the report is that the 
Sultan has no power to govern which was cause for many of the 
troubles in Brunei at the time. There seems to be a general lack of 
respect for the Sultan as seen by McArthur’s following observation 
 
“I do not know what may have been the case in the past; I can only 
say that the Sultan appears to exercise little or no real power in 
Brunei at the present time. His attempts to deal with individuals 
generally fail; the intended victim generally curries favour with some 
powerful chief and defies the Sultan’s authority. The kampongs 
(villages) into which the town is divided have headmen of their own, 
who settle matters without much reference to him. The only direct 
control which His Highness and members of his so- called 
government exercise is over their own uluns, or household slaves, 
many of whom have been turned off owing to the poverty of their 
masters and left to fend for themselves”84. 
 
                                                 
83 Ibid at paragraph 13 
84 Ibid at paragraph 34 
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It seems as if the Sultan was merely a figurehead whose power to 
rule on any given day was entirely dependent on the state of his 
personal relationship with the other nobles at any given time. 
 
“The curious constitution of the country makes the Sultan only 
supreme in name, and his position is so much a matter of 
accommodation with Ministers as strong as himself that it seems 
unfair to expect him to risk, an open breach with them.”85 
 
 
5.3 Resulting Problems 
 
5.3.1. No Central Funds 
 
Firstly, due to the manner in which land ownership was administered, 
i.e. with some plots of land and its resulting revenue belonging to a 
noble as his hereditary right and some as part of his office, there was 
no way of keeping revenue from either stream distinct. This 
distinction was important because the revenue obtained as part of 
office should have been used for the maintenance of the 
responsibilities that came with the office and not used for personal 
expenses as they tended to be. As a result of this, there were no 
funds to be used to develop the infrastructure of the country. 
                                                 
85 Ibid at paragraph 42. 
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Secondly, there were no written rules for what could or could not be 
done with the land and resultant revenue that a noble had as part of 
his office. The effect of this was that the revenue from those lands 
was often leased away in advance for years to allow the noble to 
maintain his elaborate lifestyle.86 
 
“There would, of course, be no objection to the cession of these 
districts which would go to the holders of office, but in many cases 
these annual payments have been capitalized, and even where that 
has not been done, cash advances have been obtained from private 
speculators who hold documents entitling them to draw the cession 
money annually as it falls due.”87 
 
5.3.2. No Public Administration 
 
As discussed above, there was no system of governance in place 
that McArthur deemed “proper” which in my view is a direct result of 
the lack of central funds. There were no public services available as 
observed in the following 
 
“There are no salaried officers—unless the Pengirans Bendahara 
and Pemancha can be so described—no forces, no police, no public 
                                                 
86 Ibid at paragraph 14 
87 Ibid at paragraph 14 
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institutions, no coinage, no roads, no public buildings—except a 
wooden mosque, and—most crying need of all—no gaol. There is 
the semblance of a Judicature, but little justice. Cases are sometimes 
tried before the Sultan or Pengiran Bendahara, but it is not often that 
the Brunei people have recourse to these tribunals, for the fees—not 
so much for a hearing as for a verdict—are, in the Bendahara’s court 
at least, prohibitive; and, as a rule, cases are settled by a system of 
arbitration among the recognized, if not authorized, headmen of 
kampungs (villages)”88 
 
5.3.3. Oppression 
 
Oppression was most often seen in the form of high taxes that were 
due as and when the noble required. As the nobles leased more of 
their property, the burden of taxes weighed more heavily upon the 
serfs on the lands that they were still able to collect any revenue 
from. With no checks and balances on the amount that could be 
taxed, the serfs suffered. 
 
“The irresponsible power possessed by the owners naturally lends 
itself to the gross acts of cruelty and oppression.”89 
                                                 
88 Ibid at paragraph 55. Also cross reference to the intended composition of 
the modern Brunei Legislative Council where the village headmen were 
intended to retain their significance, being the only unappointed members of 
the said council. 
89 Ibid at paragraph 58. 
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5.3.4 Issues of Succession 
 
While the nominated successor to the throne was the eldest son of 
the current Sultan, as previously explained, primogeniture is 
secondary to the support of the successor from other nobles.  
 
McArthur highlighted the fact that he did not believe the crown prince 
to be of much standing either with the people of Brunei or in an 
intellectual capacity. McArthur went so far as to call the crown prince 
an “imbecile”90 and believed that there would be much opposition to 
his taking the throne on the death of the present Sultan. McArthur 
highlighted the other candidates who would likely contest his 
succession91.  Needless to say, a rush for the throne would further 
destabilize a country that was already barely surviving. 
 
5.4. The Relationship between Sultan and Consul 
 
Many of the accounts of Brunei prior to McArthur painted a wholly 
unpleasant picture of not only the country but also of the Sultan. 
While the reports of the Sultan’s intransigence and refusal to heed 
his treaty obligations92 is not wholly untrue, it had perhaps been 
                                                 
90 Ibid at paragraph 70 
91 Ibid at paragraphs 69 to 71 
92 Under the 1888 treaty, which has been discussed previously. 
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omitted until the McArthur report the possible reasons behind the 
Sultan’s behaviour.  
 
These reasons were very neatly summarized in the report as follows: 
- 
 
“His character has so often formed the subject in recent years of the 
most uncomplimentary reports that I feel bound in common justice to 
him to point out how much his alleged contumacy and disregard of 
his Treaty obligations is the result of the unsympathetic way in which, 
in my opinion, he has often been treated. His attitude is, in the main, 
the result of the Limbang episode, the decision in regard to which 
has impoverished his country, weakened his prestige among his 
subjects, and destroyed his faith in His Majesty’s Government. The 
establishment of the Consulate in Labuan, 42 miles away across a 
stormy bay, has done much to widen the breach. There is no direct 
or regular means of communication between the two places and, as 
a result, Consular visits have been few and far between. The Consul 
has had to depend on interested persons for his knowledge of what 
is going on in the State in which his work ought principally to lie, and 
his visits, made either in a man- of- war or in a Sarawak steamer, 
have been undertaken as a rule either to coerce the Brunei 
Government or to demand the immediate payment of an indemnity or 
claim. It does not seem to me possible that any satisfactory relations 
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with a Malay ruler can be maintained on such lines, and it seems 
inevitable that the Sultan should in such circumstances look upon the 
Consul as his enemy.”93 
 
McArthur’s time in Brunei and his general demeanor went a long way 
towards repairing the relationship between the Sultan and Consul 
and was perhaps the actual start of the success of the residential 
system in Brunei. 
 
5.5 Limbang 
 
Central to the relationship between the Sultan and the British 
Government via its Consuls was the ill will that was born out of the 
annexation of Limbang to Rajah Brooke.  
 
Limbang had been in a state of unrest from approximately 1860. The 
unrest was predominantly the cause of oppressive taxation of the 
people of Limbang by the Temenggong, the owner of the tulen land 
rights. The Temenggong at the time was the heir apparent to the 
Brunei throne and was in fact by and large administering the 
sultanate as the reigning Sultan was in very ill health.94  
 
                                                 
93 FO 572/39, pp 4f-48 at paragraph 60 
94 Eastern Confidential Report No. 97 to be foundt at FC) 24/1087 
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The uprisings in Limbang however escalated and in 1884 led to the 
killing of Sarawakian natives in Limbang95.  
 
It was at this point that Brooke started his involvement in this affair.  
Brooke demanded compensation for the loss of lives of his natives. 
The Sultan sought assistance from the Acting Consul General for 
Borneo, Mr. Treacher, in negotiating a settlement between Brooke 
and the Temenggong. The Rajah was demanding financial 
compensation, which the Temenggong could not afford. Instead 
Rajah Brooke was offered the rights to Trusan instead, contrary to 
the promise the Temenggong had made in signing the Amanat. 
Believing himself to have the upper hand, Brooke entered into 
negotiations for the rights over Limbang at the same time96. 
 
The BNBC was also making offers for the rights over Limbang as 
part of the scramble for Brunei as previously mentioned. Whilst 
negotiations were still being made between Brooke, the BNBC and 
Brunei with respect to the fate of Trusan and Limbang, the old Sultan 
of Brunei died and was succeeded by the Temenggong97. 
 
                                                 
95 Ibid 
96 Ibid  
97 Ibid 
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 The newly appointed Sultan confirmed the handing over of Trusan to 
Brooke but refused to give up Limbang, citing the Amanat that he 
had signed in 1885.  
 
Sir Francis Weld was sent to Brunei in 188798 on behalf of the British 
Government to assess the situation in Brunei and also to try and 
convince the Sultan to agree to give up Limbang. 
 
Weld’s subsequent report was that the situation with respect to 
Limbang was impossible to resolve as the Sultan remained adamant 
in his refusal. It was at this stage that the idea of a residential 
system, modeled on states in Peninsula Malaysia, was suggested by 
Weld to the Colonial Office.  
 
Under this residential system, the British Resident would be 
consulted on all affairs of state other than those concerning 
religion99.  
 
We will see in the next chapter that Brunei did indeed eventually 
come to have a residential system, however at this point the proposal 
                                                 
98 Ibid at page 12 
99 Ibid 
Rabiqah N. H. B. M. Yusof 
March 2017 
Chapter One 
  
79 
was turned down due to the cost of implementing such a system in 
Brunei, a country that was deemed unable to pay for itself.100  
 
The response of the Colonial Office to the report by Weld, was to say 
that it would approve the cession of Limbang to Sarawak on the 
conditions that all the people who owned rights over Limbang agreed 
to the cession, due consideration be paid to them and that the 
Amanat be considered cancelled. The Sultan’s continued 
disagreement in this matter further aggravated Brooke.  
 
Sir Hugh Low, who was sent to officiate the signing of the 1888 treaty 
as discussed previously in this chapter, was given a secondary 
objective in Brunei. That secondary objective was to try and get the 
Sultan to agree to the cession of Limbang to Sarawak, bringing the 
Sultan’s attention to the obligations under the treaty of 1888 with 
regards to the acceptance of British decisions in matters where there 
is a disagreement between the Sultan and the government of any 
other state, in this case the state of Sarawak. The Sultan was 
recalcitrant as ever. Sir Low returned to Britain to allow the colonial 
office time to decide on the next steps in the matter. 
 
                                                 
100 Ibid at page 14 
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All negotiations however became moot when approximately one year 
later on 17th March 1890, Brooke forcibly entered Limbang. 
 
“… before anything could be done Rajah Brooke entered the 
Limbang river with an armed force, hoisted the Sarawak flag, and 
issued a proclamation declaring that the district was annexed to 
Sarawak ‘unless Her Majesty the Queen of England may see fit to 
decide otherwise’. In the same proclamation he promised to pay a 
fair yearly sum to the Government of Brunei in compensation. As 
soon as his occupation was effected, he began to build stockades 
and Government buildings.”101 
 
Brooke’s reasons for the annexation were that the Brunei 
government had failed to exercise their rights in Limbang for the past 
few years and also that the people of Limbang preferred to be under 
Sarawakian rule and had forced him into action. 
 
The Colonial Office then sent the Consul to Borneo to determine the 
truth of Brookes’ claims and also dispatched the Governor of the 
Straits Settlements to Brunei to convince the Sultan to agree to the 
annexation of Limbang. The Consul returned confirming that Brunei 
                                                 
101 Ibid at page 17 
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had not of late exercised any sovereign rights over Limbang and that 
the village chiefs were in support of the annexation102.  
 
The Governor recommended that the British government allow 
Brooke to retain Limbang so long as fair compensation is paid to the 
Brunei Sultan. This recommendation of the Governor was adopted 
though it was intimated to Brooke via correspondence that the British 
Government did not approve of the tactics that were used103. Efforts 
were then put into the negotiating of a fair compensation for the 
Sultan. The Sultan continued for the next 15 years or so to write 
letters to the British Government seeking the return of Limbang to 
Brunei104. 
 
The Sultan of Brunei felt let down by the British Government, when 
contrary to the agreement to protect, as was his understanding of the 
purpose of the 1888 agreement, the British government acquiesced 
to the annexation of Limbang by the Rajah of Sarawak105.  
 
McArthur made numerous mentions of the issue of Limbang in his 
report. One of the very real solutions being considered by the British 
                                                 
102 There is some dispute as to if the feeling of the people was really for the 
annexation as the Consul only interviewed 15 out of a possible 33 village 
headmen.  
103 FO 572/39, pp 4f-48 at page 19 and FO 12/89 Correspondence from the 
Foreign office to Sir C. Smith the Governor of the Straits Settlements. 
104 FO 12/89- Various Correspondence between the Sultan and the Colonial 
Office 
105 Ibid 
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Government for the future of Brunei was to allow it to be absorbed by 
either Sarawak or the British North Borneo Company. The mission 
set for McArthur was to examine the conditions in Brunei to see 
which of the solutions would prove to be most effective. Invariably, 
the issue of the loss of Limbang to Sarawak, was a sticking point for 
many Bruneian nobles, the Sultan in particular. 
 
The main argument offered as evidence by the Rajah of Sarawak in 
favour of his actions was that the annexation of Limbang to Sarawak 
was for the overall benefit of the people of Brunei and also in 
accordance with the wishes of the population of Limbang.  
 
Contrary to this, McArthur found that the loss of Limbang was in fact 
devastating to Brunei as the geography of Limbang  (which sits 
between two parts of Brunei) and the river that runs through it (which 
forms the only main waterway connecting the two halves of Brunei) 
were the main arteries of trade. Furthermore, McArthur also found 
some evidence to suggest that the alleged preference of the 
Limbang people to be ruled by the Rajah was in fact the byproduct of 
the Rajah exploiting a feud between two Brunei nobles who saw 
each other as rivals for the eventual throne106. To this effect the 
McArthur report found that the loss of Limbang was a true loss for 
Brunei and not in its best interests as claimed. 
                                                 
106FO 572/39, pp 4f-48 at paragraphs 72 to 81 
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“It is, of course, impossible now to form any true conception of the 
cruelty and extortion which were at one time considered sufficient 
justification for the Rajah’s occupation of the Limbang: but for the 
reasons given above I venture to submit that His Highness’ 
intervention has punished innocent as well as guilty, and that the loss 
of the Limbang is a real loss to all Brunei, and not only to its 
unworthy owners”107. 
 
5.6. Possible Solutions 
 
McArthur surmised in light of his findings that there were four 
available options: - 
 
a. to encourage the BNBC to acquire what remains of Brunei 
b. to consent to the absorption of Brunei by Sarawak 
c. to support the present regime 
d. to establish proper British protection 
 
5.6.a The BNBC to acquire what remains of Brunei108 
 
Though aware of the limitations of his knowledge with regards to the 
BNBC, McArthur felt that this option could be discarded at the outset 
                                                 
107 Ibid at paragraph 77 
108 Ibid at paragraphs 105 to 107 
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as though the BNBC would not be a cruel taskmaster, taxes in the 
territories already controlled by them were high and potentially 
oppressive for an already stretched Brunei. Furthermore, McArthur 
was not convinced at their ability to finance the administration of 
Brunei as Labuan, which was in BNBC control seemed neglected. 
Primarily however McArthur was concerned that given Brunei’s 
history with Sarawak, it would be much harder to justify allowing the 
BNBC to take Brunei. 
 
5.6.b. Absorption of Brunei by Sarawak109 
 
Having considered the advantages and disadvantages of the 
absorption of Brunei into Sarawak, McArthur seemed not to be in 
favour of this option. 
 
The reasons against this can be set out in three broad-brush 
strokes:- 
 
i. Compensation 
 
The Rajah’s offer to buy out the rest of Brunei from the 
Sultan, Bendahara and Pemancha did not seem like a 
reasonable amount taking into consideration the amount of 
                                                 
109 Ibid at paragraphs 108 to 133 
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revenue that could be obtained from the land, poll tax on 
the attached serfs and the potential future income that 
could be produced by those lands under a stable 
government.110 
 
“Considering the advantages which would accrue to that 
Government from the absorption of Brunei and how easily 
the country can be amalgamated with existing districts, I 
am of the opinion that His Highness might well have 
offered higher terms, even as a business investment. I am, 
in fact, inclined to this that the present necessities of the 
rulers rather than the future prospects of the country have 
been the basis on which the price has been computed, and 
that many claims have been overlooked or disregarded”111 
 
ii. Loss of Dynasty 
 
The main, if not only, inducement for Brunei to enter into 
the Treaty of 1888 with the British government was to save 
the country from the advances on it made by Sarawak. On 
the British side, the clauses that related to the protection of 
Brunei have not been met. Given the recent scars from the 
loss of Limbang and various other Sarawakian slights, it 
                                                 
110 Ibid at paragraphs 122 to 126 
111 Ibid at paragraph 128 
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would have been very unlikely that any offers by the Rajah 
would ever be welcome.112 
 
“ But even if the terms were more generous I am 
convinced that their reply would be exactly the same. Their 
absolute refusal to discuss the terms seems to me to show 
that they are sometimes actuated by less ignoble 
sentiments than mere greed and avarice.”113 
 
The loss of a dynasty if Brunei were to be absorbed into 
Sarawak would be regrettable considering that Brunei had 
been in existence for hundreds of years prior to this and 
also considering the lengths the Sultan had gone to ensure 
Brunei’s survival. 
 
iii. Administration 
 
Part of the Rajah’s claim on Brunei lay in the fact that he 
had developed a reputation as having great experience in 
the ruling of the Malay people. McArthur discovered in his 
time in Brunei that this in fact was not true. Brunei was 
made up of several large tribes. The Malay people, who 
formed the majority were one of those tribes. A large 
                                                 
112 Ibid at paragraph 129 
113 Ibid at paragraph 127 
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number of the Rajah’s subjects and supporters were in fact 
members of various other minority indigenous tribes. He 
had in fact up till that point never had much to do with the 
governance of a Malay majority and was not in fact very 
well respected by the Malays. McArthur’s discovery of this 
lay doubt on this part of the Rajah’s claims.114 
 
 
In favour of the absorption of Brunei into Sarawak, McArthur could 
only justify one valid reason. This reason being that such an action 
would relieve the British government of the responsibility of dealing 
with the negative reports about Brunei, and would do so at minimal 
expense.115 
 
5.6.c. Supporting the Present Regime116 
 
 In a letter from Sultan Hashim to King Edward VII on 24th August 
1902, the Sultan wrote:- 
 
“From the day I set my hand to the Treaty of Protection (17 
September 1888), I have not received assistance or protection from 
Your Majesty’s Government and I beg, with all deference, for Your 
                                                 
114 Ibid at paragraph 117 
115 Ibid at paragraph 130 
116 Ibid at paragraph 104 
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Majesty’s help. Not a single consul has done anything to help 
strengthen my country. They all seem to help Sarawak and to try to 
hand over my country to Sarawak.”117 
 
In his time in Brunei, though finding some of the practices of the 
nobles in Brunei appalling, McArthur found the above statement by 
the Sultan to be true and as such felt that to allow the status quo to 
continue would be simply to allow Brunei to die a slow death and all 
whilst under British protection.  
 
“When it is remembered that these evils flourish under nominal 
British protection, and that it is that protection alone which keeps 
Brunei in existence as a separate state, it seems obligatory on His 
Majesty’s Government to take some steps to ameliorate them, either 
by insisting on internal reform or by withdrawing all semblance of 
suzerainty, when Brunei would rapidly be absorbed, piecemeal, by its 
neighbours.”118 
 
5.6.d.. British Protection119 
 
The form of British Protection as envisioned by McArthur was similar 
to the system of Residency that had been successfully implemented 
                                                 
117 CO 144/77 12955 
118 FO 572/39, pp 4f-48 at paragraph 100. 
119 Ibid at paragraphs 134 to 146 
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in the protected Malay states, under which the Sultan was advised by 
the British Resident on all matters other than those pertaining to 
tradition and religion. Whilst unsure if the Bruneian nobles had fully 
considered the advantages and disadvantages of being a British 
protectorate, McArthur was made aware by indications by various 
nobles that they would not find this arrangement unattractive 
provided that the governance of the country was carried out entirely 
in the name of the Sultan.120 With this in mind and also being mindful 
of the outcomes of his investigations, McArthur opined that this was 
the option that had the most to offer121, though he was aware that 
there were issues of policy that would need to be dealt with to realize 
this option. 
 
McArthur identified two problems with this option being firstly how to 
establish a base for the administration of Brunei and the second 
being the issue of the expenses that would be incurred. In relation to 
the first problem, he put forth the idea of reestablishing Labuan as a 
crown colony by taking it back from the BNBC122. He did not feel that 
the BNBC would be averse to this request by the British Government 
                                                 
120 Ibid at paragraph 135 
121 Ibid at  paragraph 136 
122 Labuan had become a crown colony in 1848 shortly after it was ceded 
from Brunei to the British. In 1888 when the British Government signed the 
1888 protectorate treaty with Brunei, they also signed similar treaties with 
Sarawak and North Borneo. Under the 1888 treaty with North Borneo, the 
administration of North Borneo was left to the BNBC while foreign 
relations were in the hands of the British Government. In 1890 the British 
Government had placed the administration of Labuan in the hands of the 
BNBC. 
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as it seemed that the company was struggling with the upkeep of 
Labuan. Conversely, for Brunei, if Labuan were administered by the 
same people, the geography of the island in relation to Brunei town, 
Belait and Temburong would go some way to circumventing the 
problem of Limbang dividing Brunei into two parts. This was so 
because geographically Labuan provided a convenient stopping 
point between the two halves of Brunei.123 
 
On the issue of expenses, McArthur recommended: - 
 
“It is no doubt true that all the possible revenues of Brunei have been 
recklessly anticipated and the proceeds spent. This has, of course, 
greatly reduced the present value of the country. It is also true that 
the original owners of the country, whether kerajaan, kuripan or tulin 
would have to be bought out before any process of reorganization 
could be commenced, and this would certainly require heavy initial 
expenditure. Similarly their various creditors and the financiers or 
money- lenders, who have acquired rights of taxation or the 
collection of revenue for years to come as security for loans 
advanced, would require some compensation, as also would the 
holders of trade monopolies.”124 
 
                                                 
123 FO 572/39, pp 4f-48 at paragraphs 137 to 142 
124 Ibid at paragraph 143 
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McArthur had correctly identified that the control of the country’s 
purse strings would be the first step forward in restructuring the 
system of governance should British protection be opted for. 
 
With the discussion of expenses McArthur ended his extremely 
comprehensive report on Brunei.  
 
Whilst his recommendations were not accepted wholesale, we see in 
the next chapter that it was this report that established the residential 
system in Brunei and it is my opinion that it was this system also that 
sowed the seeds of the absolute monarchy that Brunei is today. 
 
5.7. Conclusions 
 
This chapter has considered briefly the idea of constitutionalism in 
South East Asia and taken us through the constitutional status quo in 
Malaysia and Singapore post British independence. In order to 
understand the current situation in Brunei, the chapter then outlines 
the positions of the various parties that played a significant role in 
bringing Brunei under British protection despite the ambivalence of 
the British Government towards Brunei in the 19th century. It details 
the relevant treaties signed between Brunei and the British 
government. It also highlights, through the explanation of the losses 
of Labuan and Limbang, the insecure position of the Sultan and his 
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lack of power to effectively ensure the survival of Brunei without 
outside help. The McArthur report was discussed in great detail, 
which painted a comprehensive picture of the deficiencies in the 
traditional method of governance. It is my belief that it was the 
inadequacies found in these areas that led to monumental reforms to 
Brunei governance under the British Resident. The McArthur report 
was indeed the catalyst for the residency in Brunei and it was these 
reforms that paved the way for how large parts of Brunei Government 
structure operate today. 
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Chapter Two 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The period immediately following the establishment of the British 
Residency in Brunei was a time of great change. Not only were new 
systems being set up to enhance the administration of the country, 
but also, this was when oil was discovered. This chapter will address 
the fundamental changes to the Brunei Administration that were 
wrought by the British Resident from the beginning of the Residency 
in 1906 to 1946, the end of the Second World War.  
 
As has been set out in the introduction to this thesis and also in 
Chapter One, the aim of this thesis is to explain why Brunei uniquely 
developed into an absolute monarchy in the years after the British 
left. It is my contention that part of the reason for the current absolute 
monarchy is the restructuring of traditional Bruneian governance by 
the British. Prior to the coming of the British, as we saw in Chapter 
One, the Sultan, while revered by his people, had very little actual 
power. In this chapter we will see how the restructure of government 
in Brunei channeled unbridled power into the office of the British 
Resident while giving the Sultan a veneer of power in the process. 
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I will start by discussing Brunei’s legal status in the eyes of the British 
government. Understanding Britain’s relationship with Brunei helps 
us to understand what powers the British Resident had in 
implementing changes to systems of government in Brunei. This will 
include a discussion of the Supplementary treaty of 1905/ 1906 as it 
was the instrument by which the residential system was installed. I 
will then summarise the various reforms to the traditional systems of 
government that were carried out by the Resident. Understanding 
these reforms allows us to chart Brunei’s progression from the 
traditional methods of governance discussed in Chapter One to the 
way modern Brunei is governed. These reforms are significant 
because modern Brunei has built on these early reforms to get to 
where it is today. 
 
I will then briefly consider the impact of the discovery of oil in 1929 
and consider the effects of the British Government’s choice not to 
spend the resultant wealth. 
 
This will be followed by a look at the Brunei administration during the 
Japanese Occupation of Brunei from 1941 to 1945. A look at the brief 
Japanese spell in Brunei’s history is relevant to this paper as it helps 
to provide the context for the rise of nationalism in Brunei after the 
Second World War. 
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I conclude the chapter with a discussion of the British Military 
Administration that bridged the gap in Bruneian governance between 
Brunei’s liberation from the Japanese in 1945 and the return of the 
British Resident to Brunei in 1946. It is necessary to touch on this 
period to enable us to understand the changes to British policy with 
regards to Brunei in the aftermath of the Second World War. 
 
 
2. Supplementary Treaty 1905/1906 
 
The British Residency in Brunei was officially established by the 
signing of the Supplementary Treaty of 31st December 1905 and 2nd 
January 1906 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Supplementary Treaty’). 
Interestingly, The Supplementary Treaty contained only one 
substantial clause, which states as follows: - 
 
“ i. His Highness will receive a British Officer, to be styled Resident, 
and will provide a suitable residence for him. The Resident will be the 
Agent and Representative of his Britannic Majesty’s Government and 
his advice must be taken and acted upon on all questions in Brunei, 
other than those affecting the Mohammedan religion, in order that a 
similar system may be established to that existing in other Malay 
States now under British Protection.” 
 
I believe there are two reasons for the brevity of the Supplementary 
Treaty. The first reason being that the Supplementary Treaty was 
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made to be read in tandem with the Protectorate Agreement of 17th 
September 1888 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Protectorate 
Agreement’) between Brunei and the British Government. 
 
The significant clauses in the Protectorate Agreement have been 
discussed in detail in Chapter One previously.  
 
The second reason for the brevity of the Supplementary Treaty is 
because that single clause was sufficient to confer immense power 
over Brunei by the British Government through the conduit of the 
Resident.  
 
The Supplementary Treaty marked the transition from the post of 
British Consul to that of a British Resident. Perhaps the change in the 
title of the highest ranking British representative in Brunei was to 
mark the change in jurisdiction of the British representative; as 
Brunei surrendered control over most of her internal administration to 
the British1 the powers of the British representative on site would also 
be significantly altered and expanded. 
 
3. Legal Status 
 
                                                        
1 Article I Supplementary Agreement between Great Britain and Brunei 
3rd December 1905 & 2nd January 1906 
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It is important to note that both the Protectorate Agreement and the 
Supplementary Treaty use the term “British protection”. This choice 
of wording on the agreements I believe is an indicator of Brunei’s 
legal status in the eyes of the British Government. 
 
Mandy Banton opines that the term “colony” is used as an umbrella 
term for all territories dependent upon the British Empire. She goes 
on to state that there were technically four different types of 
dependency: colonies, dominions, mandated territories and 
protectorates.2 
 
I shall now go on to consider each of these different types of 
dependencies in turn with the intention of determining which type 
Brunei would have come under. It is stressed at this point however 
that the following discussion is kept brief as in depth examinations of 
the different types of dependency is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
 
3.1 Colonies 
 
Sir Charles Jeffries, a deputy under secretary of state, was of the 
view that “A Colony, in modern constitutional definition, is a territory 
which by settlement, conquest, cession or annexation has become a 
                                                        
2 Mandy Banton, Administering thru Empire 1801- 1968: A Guide to the 
Records of the Colonial Office in the National Archives of the UK, 
Institute of Historical Research and he National Archives, 2008 at page 
11. 
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part of Her Majesty’s dominions and over which Her Majesty, as 
Queen of the United Kingdom, exercises absolute sovereignty”3 
 
The Colonial Office List of 1878 classified colonies into three 
categories: 
 
i. “Crown Colonies, in which the Crown has the entire control of 
legislation, while the administration is carried on by public 
officers under the control of the Home Government 
ii. Colonies possessing Representative Institutions but not 
Responsible Government, in which the Crown has no more 
than a veto on legislation, but the Home Government retains 
the control of public officers. 
iii. Colonies possessing Representative Institutions and 
Responsible Government, in which the Crown has only a veto 
on legislation, and the Home Government has no control over 
any public officer except the Governor”4 
 
At the time of the signing of the Supplementary Treaty Brunei was 
governed by almost a feudal system of government as described 
previously in Chapter 1 of this thesis. Brunei therefore did not have 
“Representative Institutions” as mentioned in two of the three 
                                                        
3 Charles J. Jeffries, The Colonial Office, Allen & Unwin, 1956 at page 29 
4 Quoted in the secondary from Mandy Banton, Supra from footnote 2 at 
page 11 
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categories in the Colonial Office List. Further it is made clear by the 
sole clause in the Supplementary Treaty, which was discussed 
earlier in this chapter, that the Sultan of Brunei was obliged to listen 
to the advice of the Resident in most matters. This implies a retention 
of sovereignty in some aspects of internal rule. As we shall see later 
in this thesis, though the resident legislated, all legislation was 
passed in the name of the Sultan. It is for these reasons that Brunei 
cannot be classified as a British colony. 
 
3.2. Dominions 
 
Mandy Barton observed, “From the early 20th century ‘dominion’ was 
increasingly used for dependencies possessing responsible 
government”5. She goes on to detail the move towards being 
essentially self- governing in certain British settlements and the 
demands from these colonies for a different relationship with the 
British Government. This led to the establishment of the Dominions 
Office and the Balfour Declaration of 1926 which defined a Dominion 
as “autonomous Communities within the British Empire, equal in 
status, in no way subordinate to one another in any respect of their 
domestic or external affairs, though united by a common allegiance 
                                                        
5 Barton, Supra from footnote 2 at page 12 
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to the Crown, and freely associated as members of the British 
Commonwealth of Nations”6 
 
The very fact that Brunei was subordinate to the Crown for external 
affairs precludes her from being a Dominion by these definitions. 
 
3.3. Mandated Territories 
  
Of the four types of dependency, this was the one most clearly 
defined. Barton states, “the mandated territories were former 
dependencies of Germany and the Ottoman Empire entrusted to 
Britain by the League of Nations following the First World War”7 
 
Brunei, never having had any associations with Germany or the 
Ottoman Empire, was clearly not a Mandated Territory. 
 
3.4. Protectorates 
 
Defined by the Colonial Office in a report prepared by J. J. Paskin as 
follows: - 
 
“A British Protectorate is not part of His Majesty’s dominions. The 
native inhabitants are not, by reason of birth there, British subjects 
                                                        
6 Ibid 
7 Barton, Supra from footnote 2 at page 15 
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but are under His Majesty’s protection, and are generally known as 
British Protected Persons…. 
 
States in which there is a recognized Sovereign Ruler, by which, 
being under His Majesty’s protection, have no political relations with 
Foreign Powers except through or by permission of His Majesty’s 
Government. These states are usually referred to as “Protected 
States”. They may be roughly classified as follows: - 
 
a) States in which His Majesty does not possess jurisdiction (e.g. the 
various Malay States and Sarawak). In certain of these States, 
although de jure, His Majesty may have no control over the internal 
affairs of the State, such control is de facto exercised through the 
medium of British Residents or Advisers.”8 
 
Despite not being mentioned specifically, Brunei would fall within the 
same category as the Malay States of Malaysia and Sarawak. It was 
in fact on the model of the Residential System found in the Malay 
states that the system in Brunei was based, as previously mentioned 
in Chapter One when discussing McArthur’s recommendations for 
Brunei. 
 
Based on the concept of “indirect rule”, the idea of the protectorate 
did not go so far as an annexation and often entailed minimal 
administrative cost to the British Government9. “Indirect rule” was 
described by Burrows as being “limited liabilities and minimal 
                                                        
8 CO 323/1105/6, file 71376, 1930 
9 Andrew Porter, The Oxford History of the British Empire- Volume III- 
The Nineteenth Century, Oxford University Press (1999) at page 190. 
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management based on accommodation more than compulsion, on 
collaboration more than confrontation”10. 
 
The main problem with the idea of the protectorate was that the 
jurisdiction and responsibilities of the protecting state towards the 
protected state and vice versa, were ill defined11. Sir John Bramston, 
an officer with the Colonial office described the responsibility of a 
protecting state as  “… carried with it a right on the part of the 
protecting Power to exercise within that country such authority and 
jurisdiction- in short, such of the attributes of sovereignty- as are 
required for the due discharge of the duties of a Protector, for the 
purpose not only of protecting the Natives from the subjects of 
civilized Powers, and such subjects from the Natives and from each 
other, but also for protecting the Natives from the grosser forms of ill- 
treatment and oppression by their rulers, and from raids of slave 
dealers and marauders”12 
 
It was observed by Newbury13 that “By the 1890s, without the 
formality of annexation, the British authorities and local agents were 
freely establishing in Protectorates rudimentary frameworks of 
                                                        
10 Ibid at page 196 
11 Ibid at page 191 
12 CO 879/43, Bramston to Cardew, 16th October 1895, No. 497 at pages 
51- 52 
13 Colin Newbury, “Treaty, Grant, Usage and Sufferance: The Origins of 
British Colonial Protectorates”, in G.A. Wood and P.S. O’Conner, eds., 
W.P. Morrell: A Tribute (Dunedin. 1973). Pages 69- 84 
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government involving courts, taxation, military ‘pacification’, 
displacement of indigenous rulers, and the issue of certificates of 
land titles which paved the way for Crown land rights and 
appropriation by European settlers”14 
 
Practically, the administration of a protectorate differed very little from 
that of a Crown Colony, the only difference perhaps being that in a 
Crown Colony the Queen was recognized as Head of State whereas 
in a protectorate, even if nominally, the ruler of the protectorate was 
still deemed head of state. In the absence of a definitive official 
definition of what a protectorate is we are forced to summarize from 
the observations of various scholars and officials. The consensus 
seems to be that the protectorate is a state whereby, though the 
Queen does not technically have jurisdiction, there is a form of 
indirect rule in place whereby the protecting state possesses much 
power as is necessary to protect the interests of the protectorate both 
from internal and external influences. Indeed this seems to be the 
line that was taken in Brunei as we shall see throughout the course 
of this chapter. 
 
4. The Office of the British Resident 
 
                                                        
14 Porter, The Oxford History of the British Empire, Supra from footnote 
8 at page 195. 
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Barton suggested that though titles varied throughout the various 
British dependencies, ranging from Governor to Captain- General or 
Resident or even adviser, the function was the same in that this 
person would be the head of each individual protectorate15. There is 
no definitive list, document or statement as to what the exact 
functions and duties of the British Resident (as he was styled in 
Brunei) were. The aforementioned clause in the Supplementary 
agreement, while setting out the ambit of the Resident did not 
provide any further guidance as to what exactly needed to be done 
and how exactly those things would be achieved. 
 
According to Sadka “The plan to establish Residents in the Malay 
states was necessarily vague and ill- formulated; it suggested, 
without defining, the role of the Resident- as protector of British 
subjects and foreigners engaged in trade; as the medium of 
communication between the native states and the outer world, and 
as a progressive influence on government organization and policy” 16 
 
Despite this ambiguity as to function, duty and form there was no 
dispute as to the importance of the position.  This is succinctly 
summarized by Barton when she says “The governor was head of 
state; the representative of the British monarch. Technically he was 
                                                        
15 Barton, Supra from footnote 2 at page 15 
16 Emily Sadka, The Protected Malay States 1874- 1895, University of 
Malaya Press, 1968 at page 49. 
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also responsible to the reigning monarch, although in practice 
reporting to the secretary of state. He exercised virtually all the 
constitutional functions of the Crown within his territory, and was 
described by Lugard as combining the functions of king and prime 
minister”17 
 
Perhaps it was due to the importance of the role that the position was 
left so ill defined, so as to allow the Resident the greatest 
maneuverability in the carrying out of his duties. As will be seen later 
in this chapter however, it was this vagueness, particularly on the 
issue of where the Resident derived his authority from, that further 
inflamed the, by then, strained relationship between the Sultan and 
the Resident. 
 
The first example of the use of a Residential system of government, 
in a Malay state with its own traditional rules as to governance, was 
found in Perak. Perak is now a state of modern day Malaysia. A 
Resident was put in place with the signing of the Pangkor 
Engagement in 1874 between the British and Perak. At this time, 
Perak was a small independent Malay state in its own right. Under 
the terms of the Pangkor Engagement, the Raja of Perak agreed to 
accept the advice of the newly appointed British Resident on all 
                                                        
17 Banton, Supra from footnote 2 at page 16 where she also summarises 
the work of Sir F.D. Lugard, The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa, 
Edinburgh and London, 1926 at page 95 
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matters except Malay religion and custom. The Residential system 
was shortly thereafter adopted by the majority of the states in what is 
now modern peninsular Malaysia.18 
 
Indirect rule being such a fluid concept, outcomes differ for a number 
of different reasons. Firstly because of how the protecting power 
views the concept of indirect rule. Secondly, much also depends on 
the systems of government already in place in the country and finally, 
the nature of the individual Resident also plays a part. In the case of 
Malaya the deciding factor as to how much the role of Resident 
would encompass was the assessment of the Resident as to the 
capability of the Malay Raja to rule and of his people to participate in 
governance. On this, the first Resident of Perak said “my experience 
as an Executive and Judicial Officer for the last twenty- seven years 
among an Eastern people has taught me that they are perfectly 
incapable of good government, or even of maintaining order, without 
guidance or assistance from some stronger hand than is ever to be 
found amongst themselves”19. This perceived incompetence allowed 
the Resident more power to instigate great changes in a more direct 
                                                        
18 Andrew Harding, The Constitution of Malaysia: A Contextual Analysis, 
Hart Publishing (2012) at page 16 
19 Emily Sadka, Supra from footnote 15 at page 53 
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manner justified by the principle that indirect rule aims “to preserve 
order, to do justice and prevent oppression20” 
 
At this juncture, one might question how the views of the Resident 
could be so instrumental in how the protectorate was run. This is 
explained by Sir Charles Jeffries in his comments on the relationship 
between the Secretary of State and the Governor, in saying “The 
Secretary of State does not function in a vacuum… he necessarily 
relies mainly upon the Governor to lay before him all the necessary 
information and considerations which affect… to overrule the 
considered and maintained advice of a Governor is a thing which no 
Secretary of State would do lightly…”21 
 
The office of British Resident as was installed in Brunei by the 
Supplementary treaty was one that had the benefit of the British 
experience in Malaya. As seen in Chapter One when discussing the 
recommendations by McArthur for Brunei, it was in fact this British 
experience with the Residential system in the Malay states that led to 
this system being considered. Armed with this experience, the British 
made two notable differences between the Pangkor Engagement of 
Perak (which put the residential system in place in Malaya) and the 
Supplementary Treaty of Brunei. The first difference was the 
                                                        
20 Clarke of the Colonial Office to Birch the first Resident of Perak, 
quoted in the secondary from Emily Sadka, supra from footnote 15 at 
page 62 
21 Sir Charles Jeffries, The Colonial Office, London (1956) at page 36. 
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translation of the word “advice”. The Malay version of the Pangkor 
Engagement uses the word “berbicara” which means “to discuss”, 
there is no implication in this word that advice given to the Raja need 
to be taken. The Supplementary agreement on the other hand uses 
the proper translation for the word “advice” which is “nasihat” that 
carries with it the implication that the giver of the advice, i.e. in this 
case the Resident is a superior with more knowledge than the Sultan 
and therefore the advice or “nasihat” should be heeded.  
 
The second difference between the Pangkor Engagement and the 
Supplementary treaty is the clause pertaining to Malay customs and 
traditions. While the Resident in Malaya was restricted from giving 
advice on matters of Malay Custom and tradition as well as matters 
pertaining to the Islamic religion, the Resident in Brunei was only 
instructed to avoid Islamic religious matters. Perhaps the limitation on 
the Resident not to give advice on matters relating to religion or 
Malay custom meant more to the Rajas of Malaysia than to the 
Resident. Given the traditional system of government that the Rajas 
was used to, it would not be unthinkable for the Rajas to believe that 
their role was less restricted due to the fact that most aspects of 
traditional governance were arguably based on Malay customs or 
religion.22 To avoid experiencing similar difficulties with the Sultan of 
                                                        
22 Andrew Harding, Supra from footnote 17 at page 18 
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Brunei on this clause to those they had had with the Rajas of 
Malaysia, the limitation on traditional customs was omitted.  
 
5. Reforms under the Resident 
 
It was no exaggeration to say that the first Residents saw their task in 
Brunei as the proverbial ‘cleansing of the Augean stables’23 because, 
in the eyes of the British, to quote from the MacArthur Report there 
was “no Government in the usual sense of the term”24. “Pre- 
Residential Brunei had no salaried officials, no public institutions, no 
police, no coinage, no roads, no public buildings (except a wooden 
mosque) and only the semblance of a judicature”25 and the 
Residents saw it as their duty to establish a modern system of 
administration recognisable to the British. 
 
The major changes introduced by the Residential system can be 
grouped under the following headings: - 
 
i. Financial Restructuring 
ii. Political changes 
iii. Economic Development 
                                                        
23 CO 531/2 Correspondence between H Chevalier to Sir J Anderson 
(Item 28323) 26th July 1910 
24 McArthur Report, FO 572/39 at paragraph 8 
25 A. V.M. Horton, A Dying Kingdom Reprieved, Brunei Museum Journal, 
Volume 6. No. 4 (1988) at page 9. 
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iv. Changes in Administration 
 
I will discuss each in turn, giving a brief summary of the work done by 
the resident in each sector and highlighting the most important 
change within each section. 
 
5.1. Financial Restructuring 
 
One of the first matters for reform was to create a national revenue 
stream for Brunei. The traditional method of governance and the 
traditional rules surrounding land ownership as already explained in 
Chapter One previously made it impossible to distinguish between 
revenue collected by the nobles in their personal capacity from 
revenue collected in their official capacity. Hence there was no 
centralized fund from which the administration could draw for the 
day-to-day expenses of the country. 
 
Instrumental to creating a revenue stream for the country were the 
changes to land rights that were implemented by the Residency. The 
introduction of the Land Enactment in 1907 changed the traditional 
system of land ownership in its entirety26. Kerajaan (Crown Lands) 
and Kuripan (Ministerial lands) lands were taken into state ownership 
                                                        
26 AVM Horton, The British Residency in Brunei 1906- 1959, The 
University of Hull Centre for Southeast Asian Studies, Occasional Paper 
No. 6 (1984)  
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in exchange for a pension given to the initial owners of the land. The 
Tulin (private domains) lands were the sticking point in the land 
reforms as with no written records, it was particularly difficult to 
determine the authenticity of the claims. Eventually however the 
genuine claims to the land rights were established and compensation 
was also paid to the owners of the Tulin land rights.  
 
As most of the land in Brunei was now state owned, the state also 
controlled all the administrative and taxation rights over that land and 
could use those rights to generate state revenue. 
 
Another financial coup of the early Residents was the state 
acquisition of trade ‘monopolies’. As succinctly described by AVM 
Horton27 “A ‘monopoly’ was an item of ‘government’ revenue which 
had been alienated to a farmer, usually for several years in advance, 
in return for a cash payment”. Under the residential system, all these 
alienated rights28 to revenue were cancelled and compensation was 
paid to the owners of these monopolies. Future revenue from these 
monopolies was in this way secured for the central fund. 
 
Brunei however would not have been able to offer compensation to 
any of the landowners or monopoly owners without obtaining a 
                                                        
27 Ibid at page 14 
28 Alienated rights to revenue here meaning legally transferred rights of 
ownership to the revenue 
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substantial loan from the Federated Malay States. It was the 
Resident who realized such action was necessary and made 
arrangements for this loan to be granted to Brunei. 
 
Systems to manage the central fund were also set up in the form of a 
State Treasury and a formal and centralized system of tax and 
revenue collection29. 
 
5.2. Political changes 
 
A very subtle political change brought by the Resident was the 
bolstering of the Sultan’s position over that of his “Wazirs” or 
Viziers30. Due to the traditional system of land administration (that 
was overhauled by the Resident) the Viziers effectively ruled over 
their own lands without the need to consult the Sultan for any of the 
laws they deemed necessary to enforce on their lands. When land 
administration was centralized by the Resident, the Viziers lost most 
of their lands to the government and as such lost most of their 
political power. Further, as an indirect system of rule (as outlined 
earlier in this chapter) was employed by the British, the Resident 
astutely established legitimacy to his changes by passing them in the 
name of the Sultan. This simultaneously bolstered the relationship of 
the Resident with the Sultan and also enhanced the authority of the 
                                                        
29 Ibid 
30 Ibid 
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Sultan over his Viziers, which in turn enhanced the power of the 
Resident. This same method had been employed successfully by the 
British in Malaya31. In the beginning of the Residency, the effect of 
this reform was not obvious however it was this change that would 
aid a later Sultan in asserting his position as Sovereign ruler of 
Brunei because, while the function or substance of the power rested 
with the Resident, to the general populace, the form of the power lay 
in the person of the Sultan. 
 
The more obvious political change was the guarantee of the dynastic 
succession of rulers in Brunei32. As discussed in the last chapter, 
though the Sultan was technically succeeded by his first son, this rule 
of succession proved to be a rather fluid one. Should another noble 
have proven to be more popular than the heir apparent there was 
every possibility that he would be Sultan instead. Under the 1888 
Agreement, the British reserved the right to settle issues of 
succession. This backing by the British of the rules of primogeniture 
ensured that the dynastic line of the Sultan was carried on. This line 
of succession remains unbroken to the present Sultan. 
 
 
 
                                                        
31 Emily Sadka, Supra from footnote 15 at page 17 
32 AVM Horton, The British Residency in Brunei 1906- 1959, The 
University of Hull Centre for Southeast Asian Studies, Occasional Paper 
No. 6 (1984)  
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5.3. Economic Development33 
 
The transfer of monopoly rights to the state allowed for a greater 
ease and freedom of trade. This, coupled with the greater political 
stability in the country due to the Residency, also encouraged foreign 
capital investment into the state.  
 
The Resident encouraged the new enterprises such as oil exploration 
and ventures into the timber and rubber industries. At the same time 
the Resident tried to provide incentives for the people who lived in 
huts on Brunei Bay, who were traditionally fishermen, to abandon 
their village on the water and come ashore to provide manpower for 
the more established coal and cutch34 factories and to farm the fertile 
soil. While the Resident did manage to increase Brunei’s revenue 
through these industries, Brunei was by no means wealthy. The 
isolation of Brunei and lack of labour meant that there was nothing 
that was produced in Brunei that could not be produced more 
cheaply and in greater quantities in neighbouring states.  
 
                                                        
33 Whole subsection summarized from AVM Horton, The British 
Residency in Brunei 1906- 1959, The University of Hull Centre for 
Southeast Asian Studies, Occasional Paper No. 6 (1984)  
34 Also called Catechu, cutch is an extract from a species of Acacia tree. 
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5.4. Changes in Administration35 
 
Administrative reform by the Resident centered on setting up the 
basic state infrastructure. The Resident divided Brunei into four 
administrative districts (which remain until the present day), created a 
system of courts, oversaw the institution of a police force and the 
building of the first prison.  
 
The change to have the greatest impact to the administration was 
however the adaptation of the traditional body of consultants to the 
Sultan into a formal State Council, which was to operate primarily as 
a law making body. An examination of the State Council follows. 
 
6. The State Council 
 
Prior to the establishment of the Residency system in Brunei, 
traditionally the Sultan had to consult with his Wazirs in any decision 
or law making. Though ill defined in both theory and practice, there 
existed already in Brunei the idea that state decisions should be 
based on more than just the will of the Sultan36. This custom of 
consultation with the Wazirs in decision-making was a very rough 
                                                        
35 Whole subsection summarized from AVM Horton, The British 
Residency in Brunei 1906- 1959, The University of Hull Centre for 
Southeast Asian Studies, Occasional Paper No. 6 (1984)  
36 D.E. Brown, ‘Socio- Political History of Brunei, A Bornean Malay 
Sultanate’, Cornell University 1969 at page 267, 
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and ready version of what became the State Council, the flaw with 
the consultation custom being that none of the nobles had the power 
to make and enforce decisions, as none of them were supreme 
above the others. 
 
The “Salasilah Raja Raja Brunei”37, one of the oldest written records 
of Bruneian customary law as previously mentioned in Chapter One, 
mentions a daily gathering of officials at the residence of the Sultan. 
It also mentions that the Sultan required the concurrence of his 
subordinates in making the larger decisions that would affect the 
country. This same observation was noted by a British observer in 
Brunei in the 19th century “Neither in theory nor practice is the Sultan 
despotic: he must consult on all great occasions with his chief 
officers, and all important documents should bear at least two of their 
seals”38. While these two sources make mention of an informal 
meeting of officials, they however do not go into detail as to who the 
officials were. 
 
The major differences between the traditional consultations with the 
Sultan and the State Council were twofold. Firstly, the presence of a 
powerful foreign advisor significantly altered the dynamics of State 
                                                        
37 “Silsilah Raja Raja Berunai”, ed Amin Sweeney, Journal of the 
Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society (JMBRAS) 31, 2 (1968), 
35- 37 
38 Quoted in the secondary from D.E. Brown, Brunei: The structure and 
History of a Bornean Malay Sultanate, Bandar Seri Begawan: Brunei 
Museum Journal Monograph No. 2 1970 at page 94. 
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Council. Traditionally a leading local official guided the consultations 
with the Sultan at the helm. Under the residency, the power to call a 
session, the agenda and the conduct of the session was in the sole 
hands of the Resident. It would not be unfair to see this change as 
unrepresentative. The loss of power by a local member of the people 
to lead his people in discussions to a foreign advisor, and the very 
presence of a foreign advisor, that curtails frank discussion of local 
issues, goes against the very essence representation by the people 
for the people. While giving the illusion of moving forward by having a 
formally constituted body for consultation, it is arguable that in this 
aspect the State Council was actually a step back. 
 
The second major difference was the fact that the State Council as 
set up by the Residential system, went far beyond the simple 
principle of consultation. As we shall go on to see, the State Council 
eventually went on to have executive, judicial and legislative 
functions. As Sadka states of a State Council in Malaya, so it is the 
same with the State Council of Brunei “The Council was first 
conceived as an advisory body, but from the beginning it fulfilled 
other functions. It was the sole legislating body; legislation took the 
form of Orders or Regulations passed by ‘the Sultan in Council’. It 
was the final court of appeal; death sentences required its ratification 
and the Sultan’s warrant before they could be carried out, since the 
power of life and death, according to Malay theory, was a royal 
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prerogative. The Council was the chief executive body: changes in 
the tariff structure, Malay pensions and appointments, the jurisdiction 
and discipline of headmen and all other matters pertaining to local 
government, the appointment of kathis and the administration of 
Muslim personal law, were all dealt with by resolutions in Council”39.  
 
Though the Sultan possessed very little actual power, the 
hierarchically structured society of Brunei meant that there was still a 
large amount of respect that came with the title of Sultan and the 
people still looked to the Sultan as their leader. As they had done in 
the Federated Malay States40, the British did very little to interfere 
with this respect for the Sultan and chose instead to enhance it41.  
This enhancement of the Sultan’s status was achieved by funneling 
all the reforms made by the Resident through the Sultan. 
 
Perhaps the most important reform by the British Resident that had 
the added effect of elevating the status of the Sultan over the Wazirs, 
as discussed previously in this chapter, was the restructuring of the 
system of land ownership. The Wazirs and the Sultan were no longer 
all- powerful in their own districts, land administration was centralized 
and the rights over the land were given to the government. However, 
                                                        
39 Emily Sadka, Supra from footnote 15 at pages 184 to 185 
40 British Malaya (November 1945): Sir F Swettenham: “Administration 
in the Malay States” at page 222 
41 CO 531/11 G E Cator to HC, conf. 2, paragraphs 5 to 7 (item 50598) 
30th April 1917 
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as all these reforms were done by the Resident in the name of the 
Sultan, it followed naturally that the status of the Sultan was elevated 
because he was the head of the government. The Resident ‘s choice 
of enacting legislation via Sultan- in- Council also went a long way 
towards bolstering the Sultan’s position over and above that of the 
other nobles. This choice by the Resident to indirectly rule using the 
Sultan as a conduit, was the first step in solidifying Brunei as the 
absolute monarchy we know it to be today. 
 
There was no documentation setting out the ambit of the State 
Council and it was this ambiguity that was exploited by the British 
Resident. In the words of B.A. Hussainmiya “The actual functions of 
the State Council had never been spelled out, and it proved to be a 
convenient instrument to ‘manufacture consensus’ among the ruling 
elite for major decisions pertaining to the running of the State. It was 
the Resident who fixed the agenda and he has coercive powers that 
allowed him to push through legislation in accordance with the 
desires of the Imperial authorities”42. In theory the State Council 
passed legislation, however in practice it was all the work of the 
Resident. 
 
                                                        
42 B.A Hussainmiya, “Manufacturing Consensus: The Role of the State 
Council in Brunei Darussalam”, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. 
31, No. 2 (Sep 2000) pg 321- 350 at page 325 
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Essentially everything the British Resident did was given legitimacy 
due to the fact that everything he did, he did under the name of the 
Sultan. All decisions taken by the State Council were officially noted 
as being the decision of the “Sultan- in Council” with or without the 
presence of the Sultan at the council meeting. All official 
documentation came from the office of the Resident and bore the 
Sultan’s seal as the Sultan’s only role in this was to ratify the 
decisions of the Resident43.  
 
 
If the intention was to divest the Sultan of his traditional law making 
capacity, then the State Council was superficially a step in the right 
direction. The way the resident functioned within the State Council 
however meant that the law making capacity was now invested in 
practice in the office of the Resident. 
 
It is fair to say that at the beginning, the State Council was little more 
than a method by which the Resident informed the Sultan and other 
officials of his plans for the country.  “Administration was completely 
in the hands of the British Resident, and the State Council ‘a rubber 
stamp”44. The general attitude of the Resident towards these 
meetings was recorded in the Brunei Annual Report of 1909 when 
the Resident reported that the meetings were “rarely necessary or 
                                                        
43 Ibid 
44 CO 1030/1038- Report by D.C. White (British Resident) to Lord 
Landsdowne (Colonial Office), 15th August 1962. 
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advisable in the present state of Brunei. Their old age precludes the 
presence of the Pengirans Bendahara and Pemancha and the 
attitude of the other leading nobles shows that as yet they are 
incapable of forming any opinion for themselves discussion of which 
might tend to the benefit of the country”45.  
 
Due to the ambiguous ambit of the State Council, and the fact that it 
exercised legislative, executive and judicial functions, by 
constitutional doctrine it would be difficult to pigeonhole the State 
Council into any of the three traditional branches of power. It is 
interesting that in restructuring the administration of Brunei, the 
British Resident chose a form of administration that did not 
encourage a separation of powers and indeed it is arguable that this 
method of administration, put in place by the British, placed the 
Sultan in a position contrary to the rule of law. 
 
What is certain however is that in all of the three roles, the State 
Council was no more than a puppet46. There are perhaps three 
reasons for this. The first of these reasons was that at the start of the 
State Council, Brunei was a kingdom that had just been saved from 
extinction. The country was virtually bankrupt and it was the job of 
the Resident to help make the state viable again. With such an 
imbalance of power it would have been difficult for the Resident to 
                                                        
45 CO 824/1 Brunei Annual Report 1909 at page 6 
46 See footnote 44 
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take the State Council seriously and also for the members of the 
State Council to feel like they had a right to contribute. 
 
Secondly the members of the State Council, whilst traditionally held 
in high regard by the Bruneian people due to their position in social 
class hierarchy of Brunei, were not viewed with the same regard by 
the Residents. They were mostly viewed as lacking in education, 
intelligence and drive and therefore would have been unable to 
participate in any meaningful manner should State Council 
discussions have taken place. While this may have been true for 
some members, the situation was also perhaps aggravated by the 
fact that the early Residents to Brunei were normally more junior 
officers who lacked the experience to understand the language, 
customs and traditions of Brunei.  
 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the first two Sultans during the 
Residency ascended the throne as minors. Receiving no formal 
education and relying almost entirely on the advice of their regents, it 
could reasonably be argued that they were not properly equipped to 
effectively utilize the State Council as a method of exercising 
legislative and executive power. 
 
The first meeting of the State Council took place in 29th June 1907. 
This council was made up of ten members, which included the British 
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Resident and the Sultan47. The composition of this council was 
determined by existing customs and traditions and therefore, other 
than the Sultan and the British Resident, was made up of two Wazirs, 
two Chetrias and three Menteris. In short, the State Council 
consisted of members of the nobility of Brunei. One of the first orders 
of business was to establish the composition of the State Council. As 
this was a reconstitution of an existing traditional body of consultants, 
one of the viziers was asked to provide a list of which officials should 
be made members48. In the traditional consultations there were no 
definitive rules49 for who had a right to attend and so the composition 
of the State Council varied considerably at each meeting.50 Similar to 
the lack of rules for determining the composition, there were also no 
rules for the tenure of the members. It was understood that the 
prestigious appointment of a place on the State Council was until 
death or resignation.51 Similar to the practice in the Malay states, and 
like most matters in traditional Malay governance, all these matters 
were decided by custom and traditional practice as opposed to 
formal rules52. In an attempt to formalize the State Council, it was 
agreed that the Sultan would nominate members after consultation 
with the Resident and High Commissioner of Malaya. It was also 
                                                        
47 BA/FC/RBM/57, Minutes of State Council Meeting from 29th June 
1907 to 31st August 1949 
48 Ibid 
49 Ibid, State Council Meeting Minutes of December 1925 
50 B.A. Hussainmiya, Supra from footnote 42, Table 3 
51 B.A. Hussainmiya, Supra  from footnote 42 at page 328 
52 Emily Sadka, The Protected Malay States, 1874- 1895 (Kuala Lumpur: 
University of Malaya Press, 1968) at page 184 
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agreed that removal of members would be done in a similar 
fashion53. 
 
It was under the State Council that written laws in Brunei came into 
existence. As summed up by the Resident in the Brunei Annual 
Report of 1908 “The consideration of proposed laws by His Highness 
in Council is an innovation in a State where formally the Sultan and 
chiefs were laws unto themselves”54.  Legislation was drafted by the 
Resident’s office and then passed on to the office of the High 
Commissioner in Malaya for approval. Once approved, the legislation 
was sent to the State Council for assent. The requirement of the 
approval of the High Commissioner clearly indicates that the 
authority of the High Commissioner and therefore the Secretary of 
State for the Colonies superseded the authority of the State 
Council.55 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7. The Discovery of Oil 1929 and its impact 
                                                        
53 BA/FC/RBM/57, Minutes of State Council Meeting from 29th June 
1907 to 31st August 1949 
54 CO 824/1, Brunei Annual Report 1908 at page 7 
55 B.A. Hussainmiya, Supra from footnote 42 at page 329 
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On 5th April 1929 oil was struck in Brunei56 and it cannot be over 
stated how much its discovery has impacted Bruneian fortunes. 
While the economic effect of this discovery is obvious, its effect on 
the State Council is much less so. The start of the discontent within 
the members of the State Council with regards to the governance of 
Brunei directly correlated with the discovery of oil and how the British 
administration chose to use or not use that oil wealth. 
 
The newfound wealth from this discovery did not make the impact it 
could have had in 1930’s Brunei.  The Resident paid off the Brunei 
National debt quickly but continued to exercise extreme caution in his 
financial policy as the extent to which oil could be relied on as a 
source of consistent income was yet to be determined57.  
 
To this end, a very cautious approach was taken to the improvement 
of social services and modernization of the administration. The 
declared policy of the Government was “to exploit the oil resources of 
the State for the benefit of the people of the State and to use the 
revenues derived there from for the establishment of a settled system 
of agriculture, the enlargement of education, the expansion of social 
and health services and the raising of the standard of living 
                                                        
56 Pehin Jawatan Dalam Seri Maharaja Dato Seri Utama Dr. Haji Awang 
Mohd. Jamil Al- Sufri, History of Brunei in Brief (Brunei History Centre, 
Ministry of Culture Youth and Sports, 2000) 
57 CO 824/2 Brunei Annual Report 1938  
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generally”58. In line with this policy, a few more schools were set up, 
a State Medical Officer was appointed and the first Government 
hospital was built. Transport links were improved between the 
districts with the building of a few roads. Departments were set up for 
medicine, forestry and agriculture as well as Sanitary Boards for 
three districts59.  
 
Though this sounds like improvement in leaps and bounds, and it 
was indeed that, it was still proportionately much less than what 
Brunei could have afforded with the new oil wealth. Most notably, oil 
revenue was not spent on educating the populace beyond the level 
of primary school despite that fact that it was a recognized problem 
that it was a struggle to find anyone literate to be a teacher60. An 
examination of the financial reports for Brunei between the years 
1930 and 1938 showed a surplus of revenue that rose from six 
percent in 1930 to thirty- nine percent in 1938. The same financial 
reports also show that despite the large increase in surplus revenue 
there was no proportionate increase in the amount spent on 
education, that amount largely holding steady at two percent of 
yearly revenue between 1930 and 1939.61  
 
                                                        
58 CO 824/2 Brunei Annual Report 1938 at page 54 
59 Ibid 
60 CO 824/1 Brunei Annual Report 1911 at page 10 
61 CO 824/2, Brunei Annual Reports 1930 to 1939. 
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With the growing business of the government due to the finding of oil, 
matters that were brought to the State Council increased in both 
volume and complexity. This was so because the State Council 
continued to sign off on laws, orders and regulations required to 
manage the new wealth62. Despite the growing wealth of the nation 
however, the British Resident still kept a very tight hold of the 
nation’s purse strings. This reluctance of the Resident to release 
funds to the nation and the royal family not only kick started feelings 
of discontent in the members of the State Council but it also placed a 
particular strain on the relationship between Sultan Ahmad Tajuddin 
and the Resident63. As a form of protest at the Resident’s treatment 
the Sultan became indifferent to the State Council and chose not to 
attend the meetings henceforth. When he did attend meetings, he 
tried to curtail the work of the Resident and also incited other 
members of the State Council to do the same.64 Emboldened by the 
actions of the Sultan and their feelings of discontent, local members 
of the State Council started to take an interest in the State Council 
meetings65. The question of the legitimacy of legislation enacted by 
Sultan- in- Council, when the Sultan was not in fact in council, was 
not raised at this point and did not in fact come to light until after the 
Second World War. Though the relationship between the Resident 
                                                        
62 B.A. Hussainmiya, Supra from footnote 42  
63 Ibid 
64 B.A. Hussainmiya, Supra from footnote 42 at page 333 
65 Ibid 
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and the Sultan had soured considerably, the status quo remained in 
operation until the outbreak of the Second World War. 
 
8. The Japanese Occupation 1941- 1945 
 
The Japanese invaded Brunei on 16th December 1941 bringing an 
end to what had been a decade of growth for Brunei. For the period 
of the Japanese occupation of Brunei, which lasted for 4 years, all 
the Europeans including the British Resident were incarcerated in a 
detention camp. It was during the Japanese occupation of Brunei that 
local Bruneians got their first, albeit very limited, taste of self 
government and surprisingly, under the Japanese regime local 
participation in the State Council increased66. 
 
With the British officers incarcerated, the Japanese made an 
agreement with the Sultan to deal with the administration of Brunei. 
Under this agreement a Japanese Governor was left in charge of 
Brunei administration, to be helped by Inche Ibrahim, a local man, as 
Chief Administrative Officer. Prior to the occupation Inche Ibrahim 
was secretary to the British Resident67.  
 
                                                        
66 B.A. Hussainmiya in Resuscitating Nationalism, Wartime Japanese 
Anthropology in Asia and the Pacific edited by Akitoshi Shimizu and Jan 
van Bremen, Osaka: National Museum of Ethnology, 2003 at page 285 
67 Ibid 
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British Borneo was entirely reorganized into five Japanese 
prefectures. In the absence of their British superior officers, lower 
ranking Malay government officials remained at their posts and 
carried on the administration of the country as best they could.  
 
The State Council continued to operate in a much more limited 
capacity, as the Japanese found that it was useful to their 
administration of Brunei to allow the meetings to continue68. For the 
first time however State Council meetings were run in the local Malay 
language. This caused a greater level of participation amongst the 
members and the experience of limited self-governance during this 
period proved to be an invaluable. The Brunei Malays essentially had 
a small measure of self- administration thrust upon them and this 
experience helped to sow the initial seeds of nationalism in the 
people. 
 
It seems that at least in the early stages of the occupation the 
Japanese policy with regards to Borneo was “… the attainment of 
independence in the matter of food supply and the increased 
production of oil, coal and minerals and the economic exploitation of 
the forests” 69. While times were still undoubtedly hard, it was 
                                                        
68 Hussainmiya, B.A, “The Role and Functions of State Council in Brunei 
Darussalam, 1907-1959”, Kemerdekaan 25 Tahun (A collection of Articles), 
Yayasan Sultan haji Hassanal Bolkiah Foundation and Brunei History 
Association, (2012) 
69 Quoted in the secondary from AVM Horton, Ibid at page 36 
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perhaps this policy that meant that Brunei at least in the beginning of 
the occupation faced fewer hardships than the rest of the region. 
Intent on inculcating an anti- European sentiment, the Japanese 
embarked on a campaign of “Nipponisation” in Brunei, introducing 
Japanese language to the school curriculum, insisting on the use of 
Japanese money for transactions and even sending some young 
Bruneian men abroad for training70. B.A. Hussainmiya states the 
reason for this course of action by the Japanese as  “The 
propaganda and education system was designed indirectly to 
counter- balance any return of Western colonial governments to the 
East. Therefore, they selected promising indigenous young people to 
bear the nationalist flag should the time come.”71 
 
When the tides began to turn for the Japanese in 1943 however, the 
Japanese ceased to be quite as accommodating. The initial 
Japanese Governor was replaced and paranoia ruled among the 
invaders. Stocks of everything were running low and the increasing 
paranoia amongst the Japanese led to more incidents of torture by 
the Kempeitai. In June 1945 a combined Allied force liberated 
Brunei72. 
 
9. The British Military Administration 1945- 1946 
                                                        
70 Hussainmiya, B A, Supra at note 66 
71 Ibid 
72 Ibid 
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“The towns, apart from Kampong Ayer, had been flattened by Allied 
bombing. The oilfield had been set to the torch by the retreating 
Japanese and the spectacular fires could not be brought under 
control until September 1945. The people were suffering from 
malnutrition and endemic disease, and many might have died of 
starvation had the war lasted much longer: this, too, at a time of 
unprecedented world shortage of food and shipping. There were 
insufficient materials to rehouse the homeless. Economic activity had 
virtually ceased73”  
 
The scene painted by the passage above by Horton summarised the 
daunting task faced by the British Military Administration (hereinafter 
referred to as ‘the BMA’) in Brunei after the Japanese had been 
pushed out. As the stopgap measure before the resumption of 
civilian administration it was not the job of the BMC to rebuild 
infrastructure. The goal of the BMA was twofold. Firstly it was to 
provide relief and secondly it was to restore a basic administration in 
preparation for the return of the Resident. 
 
While the BMA was busy achieving these goals, the Colonial Office 
was deciding on the type of civilian administration that should be put 
into place in the aftermath of the war. The Colonial office was toying 
with the idea of a Borneo- Malaya Union74. The subject was not 
however considered urgent and was only finally decided upon after 
                                                        
73 AVM Horton, The British Residency in Brunei, Supra from footnote 25 
at page 39 
74 CO 537/6113 Note by Mr. J Higham dated 1st February 1950 
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the Colonial Office had decided on its plans for Malaya. The Colonial 
Office’s suggestions with respect to Malaya were received with such 
protest that it was decided to be more cautious in its dealings with 
Brunei 
 
What is important to take away from the interim period of the BMA is 
that even at this juncture the Colonial office was already entertaining 
the idea of either uniting Brunei with Malaya or with the other Borneo 
territories. Though neither option was advanced yet, we shall see in 
the next two chapters that it was disagreement as to which of these 
two options should be followed that caused the tumultuous events 
leading up to and immediately after the drawing up of the first Brunei 
Constitution in 1959. The handover from the BMA to the British 
Resident happened on 6th July 1946.  
 
10. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has looked at the changes that occurred to Brunei 
governance with the coming of the British Resident. We have seen 
that the power of the British Resident in Brunei at this point in 
Brunei’s history was essentially untrammeled, though in the eyes of 
the Brunei people it was the Sultan who wielded the power. This is 
the point in which the first part of my central argument in this thesis 
become evident because this is period in Brunei’s history saw the 
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consolidation of power into one office and the start of that power 
being seen to be wielded by the Sultan. We have looked at how the 
State Council, the only possible form of check and balance on the 
Resident, was essentially a “rubber stamp” used in order to legitimize 
the rule by Resident. We have seen the impact of the discovery of oil 
and also the Japanese occupation on the relationship between the 
Resident and the Sultan. In the following chapter we will examine 
how, in the years after the Second World War, British policy towards 
Brunei changed. We will also consider how the initial stirrings of 
nationalism in Brunei, combined with this change in British policy, 
gave rise to the promulgation of the Brunei Constitution of 1959 
which was the point at which the Sultan first came into real power. 
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Chapter Three 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In the aftermath of World War Two, like many other countries in the 
region, Brunei witnessed a time of great political upheaval. This 
period in Bruneian history saw the rise of nationalism in Brunei, the 
wresting of power from the British Government back to the Sultan 
and the first attempts of the Bruneian people to be represented in the 
governance of the country. 
 
The aim of this chapter is to provide an understanding of the various 
factions involved in the promulgation of the Brunei Constitution of 
1959, their differing motivations in this first step towards Brunei 
independence and also to highlight the problems encountered in the 
writing of the Constitution.  
 
It is my intention to examine how Brunei fared in this second wave of 
decolonization1 that was sweeping South East Asia and the world2 
after the Allies’ victory in the Second World War. This was the period 
                                                        
1 As defined by Samuel Huntington and mentioned in the introduction 
in this thesis. Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in 
the late Twentieth Century, University of Oklahoma Press (1993) 
2 In the ten years after the Second World War countries such as India, 
Pakistan, Israel, Sudan and Ghana gained independence from the British 
with many more countries following suit in the 1960’s. 
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in which Brunei’s neighbour Malaysia gained its independence from 
the British. My focus in this chapter is on the period immediately 
following the handing back of the administration of Brunei from the 
British Military Administration to the British Resident in September 
1946 to the promulgation of the first Brunei Constitution in September 
1959. At the end of this chapter, we will understand why the Brunei 
Constitution of 1959 took the form it did and see how this 
Constitution in fact consolidated great power in the hands of the 
Sultan. This transfer of power from the Resident to the Sultan under 
the Brunei Constitution of 1959 was the first step in the building of 
the absolute monarchy we see in Brunei today. 
 
There were three main factions heavily involved in this period of 
Brunei history: the British Government, the Sultan and the Brunei 
People’s Party. I will first look at these three factions to understand 
their motivations and what they hoped to achieve by way of the 
promulgation of a written constitution. 
 
This will be followed by a thorough analysis of two reports prepared 
for the purposes of making recommendations as to what a written 
constitution of Brunei should contain. These two reports were the 
Report of the Brunei Constitution Advisory Committee, which was an 
advisory committee set up by the Sultan, and the Hickling 
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Memorandum, which was a report prepared by the Office of the High 
Commissioner to Borneo. 
 
Moving forward, I will then consider the negotiations that took place 
between the British Government and the Sultan in drafting the 
Constitution as well as the role the Brunei People’s Party tried to play 
in these negotiations.  This chapter concludes with a look at the 
Brunei Constitutional Conference in March and April 1959 where the 
Brunei Constitution of 1959 was promulgated. 
 
2. The Factions 
2.1. The British Government 
 
After the Second World War, Sarawak and North Borneo formally 
became British colonies. Brunei however maintained its status as a 
protectorate with an independent sovereign. Regardless of the lack 
of change in Brunei’s legal status, the changes in the neighbouring 
Sarawak and North Borneo, as well as changing British Government 
attitudes in the aftermath of the war, necessitated a restructuring of 
the British Empire in South East Asia. 
 
Malcolm MacDonald, the first Commissioner General of South East 
Asia, suggested the formation of a Malaysian federation from all the 
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British territories in South East Asia3.  This idea was subsequently 
found unsuitable on the grounds that political progress in the North 
Borneo territories was so far behind that of Malaya and Singapore 
that such a federation would be unworkable4.  
 
British policy then shifted towards the idea of a North Borneo 
Federation- an idea that had previously been proposed by Sir Cecil 
Clementi, Governor for the Straits Settlements and High 
Commissioner for the Malay States and Brunei from 1930 to 19335.  
This proposal for a North Borneo Federation was taken up in 1947 by 
MacDonald, who thought that while Brunei should remain a separate 
state, it was too small to be left to stand on its own administrative 
feet.6 
 
With these considerations, the Colonial Office contemplated the 
option of combining the administration of Brunei with either that of 
North Borneo or Sarawak. The Colonial Office decided that, from 1st 
May 1948, Brunei would be administered by the British administration 
                                                        
3 J.R. Angel, ‘The Proposed Federation of Sarawak, North Borneo and 
Brunei’, Unpublished dissertation, University of Sydney, Sydney, 1963 at 
page 338. Taken in the secondary from D.S. Ranjit Singh, Brunei 1839- 
1983: The Problems of Political Survival, Oxford University Press (1984) 
at page 127 
4 Secretary of State to the Colonies, Straits Times, 4th June 1954 
5 N. Tarling, Sir Cecil Clementi and the Federation of British Borneo, 
JMBRAS, Vol. 44, No. 2, 1971, pages 1 - 34 
6 CO 537/2244, Telegram from the Governor General of Malaya to the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies, 16th May 1947 
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in Sarawak7. The reasons given by the Colonial Office to the Sultan 
for this change was twofold. Firstly to bring Brunei in line with 
changes that were happening in Borneo and Malaya after the war 
and secondly to improve the services that the British administration 
could render to Brunei as a result of it being part of a larger body8. 
 
Sarawak was chosen over North Borneo for the very practical reason 
that, because Limbang (now a part of Sarawak) divided Brunei 
geographically into two parts, it would be more efficient for Brunei to 
be administered by the British officials in Sarawak.9 This was not a 
popular decision with the Bruneian Sultan or his nobles.  They 
considered it an affront to their dignity to be subservient to the 
Sarawak administration as, not too long before, Sarawak had been 
ruled by Brunei10. This decision to administer Brunei from Sarawak, 
added to the resentment from the loss of Limbang ,was perhaps what 
initially soured the prospects for a North Borneo Federation11 from 
the perspective of the Brunei Sultan. 
 
The man charged with pushing forward the Colonial Office idea of a 
North Borneo Federation in the region was Anthony Abell, the 
                                                        
7 CO537/2244, Memorandum by the Secretary of State for the Colonies 
on the Future of Brunei, 24th December 1947 
8 Notes of Malcolm Macdonald from talks with Sultan of Brunei and his 
advisory council, 27th November 1947, CO 537/2244 
9 Ibid 
10 Ibid 
11 Nicholas Tarling, “Britain and Sarawak in the Twentieth Century”, 
JMBRAS, Vol 43, No. 2, 1970. 
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Governor of Sarawak and High Commissioner for Brunei12. It was in 
the difficult climate of resentment caused by the change in 
administration that Abell was asked to push forward the idea of the 
North Borneo Federation to the Sultan of Brunei. To achieve this 
task, High Commissioner Abell started to cultivate a personal 
relationship with the Sultan, knowing that he would need the Sultan’s 
cooperation should he hope to be successful in his endeavour13.  
 
The new Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddin III, crowned in 1950, was an 
educated man with a strong sense of nationalistic pride. Abell quickly 
realised that unlike the Sultans before him, who were easily 
restrained by the terms of the 1906 treaty with the British, this new 
Sultan would not be so pliable. The character of the new Sultan, and 
the post war sentiment, caused the British to consider a 
reassessment of the 1906 treaty14. The British were however of the 
view that the treaty could not be revised until a constitution on 
“democratic and acceptable lines” was established15. Additionally 
Hussainmiya is of the opinion that the British Government had 
another compelling reason for pursuing the idea of a written 
constitution in Brunei. Having realized that there were procedural 
lapses in the manner in which the Resident passed laws in Brunei, 
                                                        
12 Hussainmiya, B A, Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddin III and Britain: The 
Making of Brunei Darussalam, Oxford University Press, (1995) 
13 Ibid 
14 B.A. Hussainmiya and Nicholas Tarling, “Brunei: Traditions of 
Monarchic Culture and History”, Brunei Press Sdn. Bhd (2011) 
15 Ibid 
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the British Government was keen to rectify the problem and to 
formalize law-making processes in Brunei16. 
 
2.2. The Sultan 
 
Between 1946, when the British Military Administration handed 
Brunei back to the British Resident, and the Constitution of 1959, 
there were two Sultans in power. 
 
The first was Sultan Ahmad Tajuddin, who ruled from 1924 to 1950. 
Sultan Tajuddin ascended the throne as a minor at the age of eleven. 
However, due to the fact that he was a minor, Brunei was actually 
ruled by a Council of Regency until 1931 when Sultan Ahmad 
Tajuddin turned eighteen17. The Council of Regency was comprised 
of the two highest nobles at the time i.e. the Bendahara and the 
Pemancha. 
 
Sultan Tajuddin was the ruling Sultan during the time of the Second 
World War and it was during his reign after the war that relations 
between the Sultan and the Resident began to deteriorate. Much of 
this strained relationship can be attributed to the fact that Sultan 
Tajuddin was hardly allowed to enjoy the profits of the oil wealth with 
                                                        
16 B.A. Hussainmiya, “The Brunei Constitution of 1959: An Inside 
History”, Brunei Press Sdn. Bhd (2000) at pages 14 to 16 
17 Hussainmiya, B A, Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddin III and Britain: The 
Making of Brunei Darussalam, Oxford University Press, (1995) 
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which Brunei was now rich18. As seen in the previous chapter, the 
Resident had a very tight hold on the nation’s purse strings. The 
difficult relationship with the Resident, combined with Sultan 
Tajuddin’s poor health, meant that he spent very little time on state 
affairs and, indeed, very little time in the State. 
 
In his absence, his brother, Omar Ali Saifuddin at that time styled as 
Pengiran Muda Tengah, became heavily involved in state affairs. He 
was made a member of the State Council in 1942 and was trained in 
the office of the Japanese Military Administrator of Brunei. In 1947 he 
was given the title Pengiran Bendahara (First Minister) and it was in 
this role that he came to be greatly respected by both the British 
Government as well as the Brunei people. He formed the ideal link 
between the British and the Brunei people19. 
 
Upon the death of his brother Sultan Ahmad Tajuddin in 1950, 
Pengiran Bendahara Omar Ali Saifuddin ascended the throne with 
the support of both the British government and the Brunei 
dignitaries20. 
 
Ascending the throne at the age of thirty- five the Pengiran 
Bendahara, now styled Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddin III, had the 
                                                        
18 Ibid 
19 Ibid 
20 Ibid 
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immediate advantage over the two previous Sultans in that he was 
not a minor at the point of accession. As a mature adult, with his own 
experiences when he became Sultan, he was much less inclined 
simply to take advice given to him at face value. Sultan Omar Ali 
Saifuddin III was the first Sultan to have received a formal education. 
This, coupled with his work in various government departments from 
the age of twenty- one, and his involvement with local government 
from before the Japanese occupation, had given the Sultan a real 
determination to advance his country socially, politically and 
economically21. 
 
From the start of his accession to the throne in 1950 Sultan Omar Ali 
Saifuddin III began to assert his independence as a monarch and 
challenge the British administration on what he believed to be 
decisions in which he should be involved as Sultan of Brunei22. An 
example of this was seen in 1953 when the Resident attempted to 
get assent from the State Council for the passing of the State 
Treasurer (Incorporation) Enactment. Previously the State Council 
would have “rubber stamped” the enactment. In this case, 
encouraged by the new Sultan, the State Council decided that the 
passing of the enactment would allow the State Treasurer too much 
                                                        
21 Ibid 
22 Ibid 
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discretion. When the motion was put to a vote the enactment was 
defeated23. 
 
The Sultan formed a close relationship with Abell, the High 
Commissioner for Brunei, which came at the expense of the Sultan’s 
relationship with the Resident. In fact the Sultan’s regular complaints 
to Abell of the “high handedness” and insensitivity of the two 
Residents at the beginning of his rule, J.C.H Barcroft (Resident from 
1951 to 1953) and J.O. Gilbert (Resident from 1953 to 1958), caused 
Abell, rather reluctantly, to give in to the Sultan’s wishes and have 
them transferred to other positions within the British administration24.  
 
The Sultan increasingly sought more power to make political 
decisions and also to have more latitude in deciding how the 
country’s wealth was being used for its future advancement. Aware 
of the nationalist movements in neighbouring Indonesia and Malaysia 
it was at this juncture that the Sultan started to demand that the 
                                                        
23 BA/0682/1983, Minutes of Brunei State Council meeting 9th April 
1953. Cited in the secondary from B.A. Hussainmiya, Sultan Omar Ali 
Saifuddin III and Britain: The making of Brunei Darussalam, Oxford 
University Press (1995) at pages 70 to 72 
24 Full details of the events that caused the transfer of these two 
residents can be found in B.A.Hussainmiya, Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddin III 
and Britain: The making of Brunei Darussalam, Oxford University Press 
Southeast Asia (1997) 
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terms of the 1906 treaty be revised and that a constitution for Brunei 
be promulgated.25 
 
Ranjit Singh in his book on the political survival of Brunei stated the 
Sultan’s intentions for the future as follows: - 
 
“(The Sultan) being conservative in outlook, sought to provide 
national leadership through a programme of guided democracy 
following the virtues of a paternalistic, enlightened despotism. (The 
Sultan) wanted Brunei to come out of its political backwater status as 
under the Residential System and therefore wished to introduce 
constitutional changes designed towards the gradual achievement of 
self- government but one controlled by the Sultan who alone by virtue 
of his despotic will could bestow whatever democratic institutions he 
deemed desirable”26 
 
While the Sultan was aware that he would have to contend with 
British government interests in achieving his aim he did not anticipate 
that he would have to deal with political aspirations from the Brunei 
people in the form of a political party. 
 
2.3. Partai Rakyat Brunei (Brunei People’s Party) 
 
                                                        
25 B.A. Hussainmiya and Nicholas Tarling, Brunei: Traditions of 
Monarchic Culture and History, Brunei Press Sdn. Bhd. (2001) at pages 
22- 24. 
26 See Singh, supra at note 3 
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The Partai Rakyat Brunei (hereinafter referred to as the PRB) or the 
Brunei People’s Party was formed on 22nd January 1956 by A.M. 
Azahari27. Sent to Indonesia to further his education by the Japanese 
during the Japanese occupation, Azahari was highly influenced by 
the nationalist movements towards independence in both Malaysia 
and Indonesia in the 1950’s and became politically active in Brunei in 
1952. The PRB, due to the influences that Azahari brought to it, was 
modeled on the left- wing Malayan Party Rakyat28. The PRB was 
successfully registered29 as an organization in 1956 with a party 
manifesto that stated its aims as being: - 
 
“…(to) oppose all forms of colonialism, safeguard the position of the 
Sultan and his heirs, fight for the freedom of Malay homeland, and 
bring about the formation of one Malay nation and state covering the 
whole Malay Archipelago”30 
 
Singh31 observes that the PRB seems not to have had a clear 
objective; rather that the manifesto put together a series of ill-defined 
end results. His summation of the various goals of the PRB is 
succinctly put as follows:- 
                                                        
27 Hereinafter referred to as Azahari 
28 M.B Leigh, The Rising Moon, Political Change in Sarawak, Sydney 
University Press, Sydney, 1974 at page 44 
29 In Brunei up to the present day all societies and organizations have to 
be registered under the Societies Act, Chapter 66 Laws of Brunei (1951) 
30 Quoted in the secondary from A.C. Brackman, Southeast Asia’s Second 
Front: The Power Struggle in the Malay Archipelago, F.A. Praeger, New 
York, 1966 at page 138 
31 D.S. Ranjit Singh, Brunei 1839 – 1983: The Problems of Political 
Survival, Oxford University Press, 1984 
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“Firstly, he (Azahari) revealed his idealistic, romantic side when he 
spoke of the creation of the ‘Malay Homeland’ or ‘Melayu Raya’ 
comprising the whole of the Malay – Indonesian archipelago. In this 
context his idea was strikingly similar to Sukarno’s ‘dream’ of 1945, 
when he envisaged a pan- Indonesian state comprising the whole 
archipelago. Secondly. More definite but short- lived, was his support 
for a federation of the Federation of Malaya, Singapore, Brunei, 
Sarawak and British North Borneo as suggested by Tungku Abdul 
Rahman in 1955. Thirdly, despite his support for the Federation 
concept as suggested by the Tunku, Azahari indicated his intention 
of asking for the return of British North Borneo and Sarawak to 
Brunei. He has a dream of resurrecting the glories of the Brunei 
Empire and it was this dream that he adhered to fervently after 
1958”32 
 
The PRB was the first political party in Brunei and was said to have 
attracted about 10 000 followers even prior to its official registration. 
This was a large percentage of the Brunei population which at that 
point was estimated to be only about 40 000 people.  With this large 
following, and buoyed by the nationalist fervour that was sweeping 
South East Asia in the 1950’s, the PRB wanted democracy in Brunei 
and furthermore, they wanted to take a leading role in the 
discussions that would have to take place for the transfer of power 
from the British government to the Brunei people33.  
                                                        
32 D.S. Ranjit Singh, Brunei 1839 – 1983: The Problems of Political 
Survival, Oxford University Press, 1984, at page 133 
33 B. A Hussainmiya, The Brunei Constitution of 1959: An Inside History, 
Supra from footnote 12 at page 30 
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The PRB saw the future of Brunei as one that was more democratic, 
with the leadership of the nation being shared with the people via a 
rapid democratization of governmental institutions.34 As will be 
covered later in this chapter, it was their desire for this constitutional 
progress to occur at speed, that, in the end, restricted their ability to 
contribute to the writing of the new constitution. It was also this hasty 
approach that led to a state of emergency being declared in Brunei in 
1962, which will be discussed in Chapter Four. 
 
 
3. The Sultan’s Titah (Proclamation) 
 
With the general feeling in Brunei in the early 1950’s being that a 
move should be made towards Brunei becoming more self-
governing, the question then became how this change should take 
effect. The British Government was at this point, wrestling with the 
question of whether they had the authority to frame this constitution 
for Brunei.35 What legal authority did they have to do this, given that 
Brunei was not a colony but a protectorate. The terms of the 1906 
treaty specifically stated that the Sultan of Brunei was an 
independent ruler. Brunei’s sovereignty precluded the British from 
                                                        
34 D.S. Ranjit Singh, Brunei 1839 – 1983: The Problems of Political 
Survival, Oxford University Press, 1984, at page 125 
35 B.A. Hussainmiya, “The Brunei Constitution of 1959: An Inside 
History”, Brunei Press Sdn. Bhd (2000 
Rabiqah N. H. B. M. Yusof 
March 2017 
Chapter Three 
148 
launching a constitution for Brunei via an Order-In-Council, as they 
would have done for a colony. 
 
Understanding his status as sovereign ruler of Brunei, the Sultan pre- 
empted a decision being made by the British on how they could 
implement a constitution by making a speech that expressed his 
desire to grant Brunei a constitution by the power vested in him as 
Brunei’s Sultan. His opening to this “titah”, or proclamation, made on 
12th May 1953, is as follows:- 
 
“For some time it has been my intention and desire to grant to my 
people a written constitution by means on which proper provision can 
be made for the Government and well- being of our State of Brunei. It 
is my wish to set out in this Constitution firstly, the laws by which the 
succession to the Sultanate shall be secured, and such other matters 
relating to the sovereign and his family as is right and proper; and 
secondly, the composition, powers and duties of the State Council 
together with rules for the conduct of the State business and the 
making of laws”36 
 
Thus the wheels were set in motion for the first Brunei Constitution. 
 
4. The Report of an advisory Committee- the Tujuh 
Serangkai37 
                                                        
36 Quoted in the secondary from Hickling R.H, Memorandum Upon 
Brunei Constitutional History and Practice, Brunei Museum, June, 1955. 
37 Full report can be found at CO 1030/113 
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The Sultan’s first action, with regards to the preparation for the 
constitution, was to set up an Advisory Committee made up of seven 
Brunei Malays who represented a wide range of views, from the 
more liberal opinions of the educated teachers to the more orthodox 
views of religious officials. The committee was called “Tujuh 
Serangkai”38 and its objective was to canvas public opinion on the 
content of the proposed constitution and prepare a draft of the 
proposed constitution39. To satisfy the mandate given to them, the 
committee travelled to the four districts of Brunei to gather public 
opinion. They then visited the Malayan states of Johore, Negeri 
Sembilan, Kedah and Kelantan to study the constitutions of these 
States to aid the drafting of a constitution for Brunei. The report, as 
well as a draft constitution, were then submitted to the Sultan and the 
British Resident in November 195440 and forwarded to the Colonial 
Office to be used as a starting point for negotiations. 
 
The Tujuh Serangkai Report was arranged into 8 parts, each 
containing recommendations based on the outcome of the fieldwork 
that was done. I will be discussing the report by dealing with each of 
the 8 parts in turn. The parts contained in the report are as follows:- 
                                                        
38 Translated this means “Seven branches” 
39 Pehin Orang Kaya Amar Diraja Dato Seri Utama Dr. Hj Awang Mohd. 
Jamil Al Sufri, Brunei Darussalam: The Road to Independence, Brunei 
History Centre, Bandar Seri Begawan, 1992 at page 66 
40 CO 824/3- Brunei Annual Report 1954 
Rabiqah N. H. B. M. Yusof 
March 2017 
Chapter Three 
150 
 
1. government and matters affecting it; 
2. the Sultan, his Heir and ministers; 
3. Council of State; 
4. District Council; 
5. Town/ Municipal Council; 
6. Brunei citizenship; 
7. Chief Penghulu, Penghulu and Headmen; 
8. Other recommendations. 
 
4.1. Government and matters affecting it 
 
This is perhaps the first official mention of “Islamic Democracy” as a 
policy of the Brunei Government41. While this idea is not elaborated 
on, there is in the report a clarification that Brunei would always have 
a sovereign Sultan who has full authority in the country. From this it 
is possible to deduce that the Tujuh Serangkai committee did not see 
the concept of “Islamic democracy” as running contrary to the idea of 
an absolute monarchy. As will be seen in the last two chapters of this 
research, the current Brunei government has taken this concept 
forward by the introduction of the Brunei national vision of  “Malay 
Islamic Monarchy” in the last years of the 20th century. 
 
                                                        
41 CO 1030/113- Tujuh Serangkai Report, Part A, Section 1 
Rabiqah N. H. B. M. Yusof 
March 2017 
Chapter Three 
151 
The introductory chapter of the report specifically mentions the desire 
to keep friendly relations with the British government. It however also 
emphasizes Brunei’s independence from the British and confirms the 
Sultan as the sovereign ruler of Brunei with full authority over the 
country42. It further confirms Islam as the official religion of the 
country43 and Malay the official language44. The significance of this 
introductory paragraph is its insistence on the Sultan’s dominion over 
all matters concerning the governance of the nation. Despite being a 
report made for the purposes of research for a constitution, instead of 
affirming a desire for greater self governance, the report started with 
a desire to be governed in an absolute fashion by a monarch. 
 
On the matter of the British Resident, the report’s suggestion was to 
change the title to that of “British Adviser” to mark a change in the 
role of this British official in Brunei45. In contrast to the role in the 
1906 agreement, it was suggested that while the “British Adviser” 
continues to offer the Sultan good advice on all matters other than 
that of the Islamic religion and Malay custom, this advice is 
something that the Sultan is not obliged to accept and put into action. 
 
                                                        
42 CO 1030/113- Tujuh Serangkai Report, Part A, Section 2 
43 CO 1030/113- Tujuh Serangkai Report, Part A, Section 4 
44 CO 1030/113- Tujuh Serangkai Report, Part A, Section 3 
45 CO 1030/113- Tujuh Serangkai Report, Part A, Section 5(1) 
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The Tujuh Serangkai committee recommended that appointments to 
the posts of British Adviser46 and British High Commissioner47 should 
meet the approval of the Sultan and additionally meet the criteria of 
being a senior officer, fluent in the Malay language and familiar with 
Malay customs. The significance of this is that it is an assertion of the 
Sultan’s power over the representative of the British Government. As 
we see in the rest of this report, this assertion is a theme that seems 
to run through the whole report, indicating a desire of the people to 
return to being internally self governing again. 
 
Perhaps the most important and controversial recommendations from 
the Committee were contained in their suggestion for the transfer of 
all the powers of the High Commissioner to the Sultan and the State 
Council, as well as the transfer of all the powers of the British 
Resident to a new post of Menteri Besar (First Minister), who should 
be Bruneian, Malay and Muslim48. The said Menteri Besar would be 
the chief government officer in Brunei. The Committee then gives 
recommendations as to the procedure and tenure of the post of 
Menteri Besar. Here again we see a recommendation by the 
committee to divert power away from the British administration in 
Brunei. 
 
                                                        
46 CO 1030/113- Tujuh Serangkai Report, Part A, Section 5(3) 
47 CO 1030/113- Tujuh Serangkai Report, Part A, Section 6 
48 CO 1030/113- Tujuh Serangkai Report, Part A, Section 7 
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Other recommended posts were that of a Secretary of State49, a 
Legislative Advisor50 and a State Financial Officer51. Again the Tujuh 
Serangkai committee provided criteria that the people in these new 
posts should fulfill as well as procedure and tenure of appointment. 
With these appointments, as it was for the position of Menteri Besar, 
the Committee recommended that the holders of these posts should 
be Bruneian, Malay and Muslim. For all these recommended posts 
the method of appointment that was suggested was appointment by 
the Sultan with the consent of the “Jamaah Pemangku Negeri”52 and 
of the State Council. 
 
The Committee recommended the establishment of a Council- of- 
State, four District Councils and a State Executive Council and 
suggested the composition of members for these councils53. 
 
On the subject of a Brunei administrative service the Committee 
appreciated that there was a lack of training in the Brunei populace to 
have an effective administration. The committee therefore 
recommended that the onus for providing education and training 
                                                        
49 CO 1030/113- Tujuh Serangkai Report, Part A, Section 9 
50 CO 1030/113- Tujuh Serangkai Report, Part A, Section 12 
51 CO 1030/113- Tujuh Serangkai Report, Part A, Section 11 
52 This was a council that the Tujuh Serangkai committee suggested be 
set up. The composition and functions of which will be explained in the 
next sub section. 
53 CO 1030/113- Tujuh Serangkai Report, Part A, Section 13 
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(including Islamic education and training in Islamic laws) should fall 
to the Brunei Government with the support of the Sultan54. 
 
The Tujuh Serangkai Committee recommended the ideas of the 
Governmental protection of the Bruneian people (which would 
include the setting up of a Malay army)55, freedom from unlawful 
detention, freedom of speech and assembly, the right to a fair trial 
and religious freedom56. Here we see recommendations that fall 
more in line with traditional tenets of constitutionalism. 
 
The Committee cautioned against the admission of foreigners into 
Brunei. The report mentioned that the reason for this caution was for 
fear of being inundated by non Malay foreigners57. This was perhaps 
a reflection of the fear that the Malay race in Brunei would cease to 
be a majority. The Committee also cautioned against allowing the 
entry into Brunei of any foreign military presence58. The report 
specifically recommended that any suggestions of uniting Brunei with 
neighbouring Sarawak and Sabah should not be entertained. Should 
unification be necessary then their recommendation was that Sabah 
                                                        
54 CO 1030/113- Tujuh Serangkai Report, Part A, Section 14 
55 CO 1030/113- Tujuh Serangkai Report, Part A, Section 19 
56 CO 1030/113- Tujuh Serangkai Report, Part A, Section 15 
57 CO 1030/113- Tujuh Serangkai Report, Part A, Section 22 
58 CO 1030/113- Tujuh Serangkai Report, Part A, Section 20 
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and Sarawak be restored to Brunei due to the fact that historically 
they were part of Brunei59. 
 
The Tujuh Serangkai Committee ended this part of their report by 
affirming that the Sultan alone with the consent of the State Council 
should have the power to amend the constitution and called for a 
restructuring of the agreements between Brunei and the British 
government made in both the 1888 and the 1906 treaties60. This part 
of the report seems rather contradictory in aim because on the one 
hand it calls for a division of power but on the other hand also affirms 
the Sultan’s supreme role in governance. 
 
4.2. The Sultan, his heir and ministers 
 
The first recommendation in this section of the report was the setting 
up of a “Jamaah Pemangku Negeri”, a council translated by the 
report as “The supporters of the country”61. This council would have 
the function of ensuring the succession to the throne and also of 
appointing the traditional ministers. The Tujuh Serangkai Committee 
then went on to recommend that the composition62 of this council 
should be:- 
                                                        
59 CO 1030/113- Tujuh Serangkai Report, Part A, Section 21 
60 CO 1030/113- Tujuh Serangkai Report, Part A, Section 24 
61 CO 1030/113- Tujuh Serangkai Report, Part B, Section 1 
62 CO 1030/113- Tujuh Serangkai Report, Part B, Section 2 
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1. all the ministers (Wazirs); 
2. all the Cheterias (members of the princely or warrior 
caste); 
3. six Menteris (Pehins); 
4. two religious leaders (of Islam); 
5. all the Malay members of the State Council; 
6. one Menteri Darat for every district; 
7. two or three suitable persons of royal blood. 
 
This section then confirmed that the Sultan of Brunei should be a 
Bruneian, Male, Malay, Muslim and have attained 21 years of age. It 
confirmed the rules that should be followed in determining the order 
of succession to the throne as well as a short list of what would make 
an heir to the throne ineligible to succeed. 
 
On the matter of the heir to the throne, the Committee recommended 
the title that should be given to the heir, detailed requirements of the 
heir to the throne, as well as the procedure for the official 
appointment of the heir63. 
 
Although the recommendations stated that the Sultan should have 
attained twenty- one years of age, provision was made for the 
                                                        
63 CO 1030/113- Tujuh Serangkai Report, Part B, Section 4 to 6 
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eventuality that the rightful heir might be a minor. The Committee 
recommended the composition of a Council of Regency in such 
situations. It further recommended the criteria for members of the 
Council of Regency and the procedure for appointment to the Council 
of Regency64. 
 
The Committee detailed recommendations for behaviour that would 
invalidate the Sultan’s right to his position and then set out a list of 
royal personages who were to be entitled to a subsistence allowance 
from the Sultan, via the government65. 
 
With respect to the recommendations as to Ministers, the Committee 
recommended the provision for titles and medals to be given to 
deserving Bruneians by the Sultan, on the advice of the Jamaah 
Pemangku66. The Committee also recommended that the 
appointment of to the traditional Brunei posts of Wazirs and 
Cheterias should also be within the ambit of the Jamaah Pemangku, 
set out the criteria for appointment to those positions as well as the 
method of appointment and remuneration available for those 
positions. 
 
                                                        
64 CO 1030/113- Tujuh Serangkai Report, Part B, Section 7 
 
65 CO 1030/113- Tujuh Serangkai Report, Part B, Section 15 
 
66 CO 1030/113- Tujuh Serangkai Report, Part B, Sections 22 to 25 
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These recommendations by the committee with the aim of clarifying 
succession in Brunei could be viewed as an attempt to further bolster 
the Sultan’s position in Brunei by ensuring that the line of succession 
follows the rules of promogeniture. 
 
4.3. Council of State 
 
The Tujuh Serangkai Committee recommended that with regards to 
the State Council, the method of election should be “amended 
according to … the ways of governing adopted by the United 
Kingdom” with the intention of “giving the Bruneian people the 
opportunity to participate in governing the country”.67 
 
The composition of the State Council, as advised by the committee 
was as follows:- 
 
“III(1) We bring forward that the State Council Brunei should possess 
28 members, including:- 
 
(a) five ex- officio members- Prime Minister, Secretary of State, 
State Financial Officer, Legal Advisor and the British Advisor 
(b) six official members including the Pengiran Bendahara, 
Pengiran Pemancha, Head of the Cheteria, The Chief 
Religious Officer, The President of the Municipal Council and 
the Head of the Menteri 
                                                        
67 CO 1030/113- Tujuh Serangkai Report, Part C 
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(c) Fourteen unofficial members to be elected by the public 
through the representatives in the District Councils 
(d) Members elected by the Sultan from among religious officers, 
government servants or the public68” 
 
The Committee then detailed the breakdown of the fourteen unofficial 
elected district members by district, and laid down reasons for the 
rejection of any person to be appointed to the State Council. There 
were also recommendations as to tenure of office, the setting up of 
standing orders for State Council meeting, and the method of 
election69. 
 
It was recommended by the Committee that any would be 
ordinances70 would have to be discussed and approved by a majority 
in the State Council, and signed and sealed by the Sultan, before 
they would be legally binding71. All such ordinances were to be 
published in an official government gazette. The recommended duty 
of the State Council generally was to advise and assist the Sultan in 
the governance, administration, and politics of Brunei72. 
 
                                                        
68 Ibid 
69 Ibid 
70 An ordinance was the first form of a law in Brunei at the time. An 
equivalent in the UK would be a bill. 
71 CO 1030/113- Tujuh Serangkai Report, Part C 
 
72 CO 1030/113- Tujuh Serangkai Report, Part C 
 
Rabiqah N. H. B. M. Yusof 
March 2017 
Chapter Three 
160 
While the committee recommended elections as method of 
populating half the state council, the fact remains that fifty percent of 
the recommended state council would be elected and the other fifty 
percent would be elected by the Sultan. Realistically this composition 
would have made it difficult for the state council to do anything that 
was against the wishes and the will of the Sultan for this reason. It is 
also noted that the duty of the state council as recommended seems 
to bridge both legislative and executive functions, which would not be 
in line with traditional constitutional practice. 
 
4.4. The District Council 
 
The recommendations of the committee with respect to the district 
councils were very comprehensive and covered:- 
 
1. the matters which would fall within the ambit of the district 
councils 
2. powers of the district councils 
3. rights of the members 
4. criteria for members 
5. disqualification 
6. tenure of office 
7. criteria for voters 
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8. a breakdown of positions available per district as well as a 
list of unofficial members by district73. 
 
4.5. The Town/ Municipal Councils 
 
Here the Committee recommended the setting up of two Town or 
Municipal Councils whose function would be to promote the health 
and the physical development of Brunei. Detailed recommendations 
were provided for the composition of members, tenure of office, 
method of election to the municipal board, and eligibility criteria for 
voters74. 
 
The significant of both the recommendations for the district and town 
councils is that they recommended that the members of these 
councils be elected, showcasing a desire by the people to be more 
involved in their own governance 
 
4.6. Brunei Citizenship 
 
Within this section the Tujuh Serangkai Committee made 
recommendations for who should be considered “subjects of His 
                                                        
73 CO 1030/113- Tujuh Serangkai Report, Part D 
74 CO 1030/113- Tujuh Serangkai Report, Part E 
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Highness the Sultan”75. Recommendations were also made for the 
criteria foreigners would have to meet to become naturalized 
Bruneian citizens. Noteworthy about these recommendations in 
general is that the residency requirement before an application to be 
naturalized was set at a rather lengthy 15 years. This perhaps 
reflects fears implanted in the committee members by their Malayan 
counterparts who were facing fears of being pushed out by Chinese 
merchants. 
 
4.7. Chief Penghulu, Penghulu and Headmen 
 
This section contained the Tujuh Serangkai Committee’s 
recommendations as to the method of appointment, tenure of 
appointment, criteria for candidates, jurisdiction and remuneration for 
the positions of Village Headmen, Penghulu (chief of headmen) and 
Chief Penghulu76. 
 
While these postions were not to be elected, the significance of these 
recommendations is their intention to create more positions that 
would allow more public participation in the governance of Brunei. 
 
4.8. Other Recommendations 
                                                        
75 CO 1030/113- Tujuh Serangkai Report, Part F 
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This part of the Committee report reads, essentially, like a catch all 
section, where the committee provided recommendations to deal with 
the myriad of problems that were brought to their attention when 
interviewing the Bruneian public in the four districts. Among the 
recommendations were an increase in governmental wages; the 
building of an oil refinery plant in Brunei; and the provision of 
overseas university scholarships for Bruneian youth77. 
 
5. The Hickling Memorandum78 
 
The British government considered some of the recommendations of 
the Tujuh Serangkai committee too drastic to allow for a safe 
transition of power. Tarling is of the opinion that the British 
government was also struggling to find a balance between their 
“altruistic ideal of introducing progressive constitutional government 
with the desire to safeguard their own commercial and strategic 
interests”79 
 
It was in order to consider what the next constitutional steps were in 
Brunei in light of the recommendations forwarded by the Tujuh 
                                                        
77 CO 1030/113- Tujuh Serangkai Report, Part H 
78 Memorandum found reproduced in full in B.A.Hussainmiya and 
Nicholas Tarling, Brunei: Traditions of Monarchic Culture and History, 
Supra from footnote 15  
79 B.A.Hussainmiya and Nicholas Tarling, Brunei: Traditions of 
Monarchic Culture and History, Supra from footnote 15 at page 26 
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Serangkai that a memorandum, the Hickling Memorandum, was 
prepared by R.H. Hickling, the Ex Officio Legal Adviser based in 
Sarawak at the time, for the British Government80. Hickling’s 
involvement with the drawing up of the draft proposals for the 
Constitution of Sarawak, and his knowledge of Brunei Laws and 
Malay customs from his time in Sarawak, made him particularly 
suited to this task. Whilst not prescribing any specific provisions to be 
included into the Brunei Constitution, the Hickling Memorandum 
provided a succinct discussion of the issues that were the main 
concerns of the British administration. The objective behind the 
memorandum was to serve as an aid for the familiarisation of colonial 
officers with conditions in Brunei. 
 
The first half of the Hickling Memorandum gives an overview of the 
early history, geography, racial make- up, religious views, 
government and economic situation of Brunei in 1954. Hickling also 
discusses the Residential system as well as the operation of the 
State Council. Whilst the Hickling Memorandum provides an 
excellent overview of Brunei, to consider all the points discussed in it 
would not advance this chapter further for the reason that the first 
half of the Hickling memorandum covers the same content that has 
been previously discussed in detail in Chapters One and Two of this 
thesis. I will instead consider only the matters in his report which I 
                                                        
80 Ibid 
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have identified as being directly relevant to the Tujuh Serangkai 
report and the Brunei Constitution. I will discuss the Hickling 
Memorandum under the following themes of discussion. 
 
1. the status of Brunei; 
2. the Resident, the High Commissioner and the State 
Council; 
3. the Sultan and his heir; 
4. Brunei citizenship; 
5. District Councils. 
 
5.1. The status of Brunei 
 
To paraphrase Wright, when writing about Brunei, he observes that 
the Sultan of Brunei is an independent sovereign who does not have 
control over the internal affairs of his country. The Resident exercises 
internal control and the British Crown, though a fundamental 
institution in Brunei, does not possess full legislative authority or 
jurisdiction81. 
 
Tarling adds to this confusion of what the status of Brunei is to the 
British and therefore the status of Sultan, by questioning the 
description of the Brunei Sultan as an “independent sovereign”. Prior 
                                                        
81 Wright, British Colonial Constitutions, Oxford University Press (1974) 
at page 10 
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to the coming of the Resident, traditional governance required that 
the Sultan be advised by his ministers; a role that was taken over by 
the British Resident upon the British involvement in Brunei. Tarling 
implies that the practice of consultation, prior to the arrival of the 
British, meant that Brunei was never, in fact, ruled absolutely by one 
person. This view was supported by Sir Frank Swettenham, High 
Commissioner for Brunei, when he stated “Although Brunei had no 
written Constitution the Sultan had in practice been a constitutional 
monarch, always acting with the advice of at least two of his 
Ministers.”82  
 
From these conflicting opinions it is evident that the extent of the 
Sultan’s power and the status of Brunei’s sovereignty was uncertain. 
This uncertainty would have had an effect on how Britain could 
proceed with regards to Brunei. Hickling therefore spent a substantial 
portion of his memorandum considering Brunei’s legal status. 
Hickling considers the differences between a protectorate, a 
protected state and a colonial protectorate and concluded that the 
situation in Brunei most likely resembled that of a colonial 
protectorate. For this reason he concluded that the British 
Government could legally confer a constitution on Brunei by means 
of an Order- in- Council under the Foreign Jurisdiction Act 1890. 
Hickling was also however of the opinion that promulgating the 
                                                        
82 CO 1030/113, Correspondence Between Sir F. Swetteham and the 
Colonial Office, 23rd March 1955. 
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Brunei Constitution in that manner would not be the correct solution 
because to do so would likely cause a political uproar and therefore 
unlikely to advance any future plans the British had for Brunei.83 
 
5.2. The Resident, the High Commissioner and the State 
Council 
 
On the office of the Resident, other than a consideration of the 
powers of the Resident, Hickling also summarised the constitutional 
developments that had taken place under the Resident chief of which 
is the State Council.  As these constitutional changes, as well as a 
discussion of the State Council, have already been discussed in 
great detail in Chapter Two of this thesis, I will only consider 
Hickling’s points in brief. 
 
On the matter of the State Council, Hickling’s memorandum observes 
that the composition and functions of the State Council had never 
been defined, a consequence of which was that the council dealt with 
legislative, executive and judicial matters. 
 
The Memorandum then went on to consider the practical effect of 
Brunei being administered by the British administration in Sarawak84. 
                                                        
83 CO 1030/113, R.H. Hickling Memorandum upon Brunei 
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The High Commissioner for Brunei, who was also Governor of 
Sarawak would now, by constitutional convention, be required to 
approve all Bruneian legislation, by virtue of the Resident being the 
agent and representative of the High Commissioner, and the High 
Commissioner, in turn, being the person appointed to act on behalf of 
the British Crown. 
 
Hickling noted that despite the fact that the treaty of 1906 did not 
permit the Resident to give advice on matters pertaining to the 
Islamic religion, by virtue of the widespread functions of the Resident 
and the High Commissioner, legislation concerning these two areas, 
in practice, required the approval of the High Commissioner. In his 
discussion of the functions of the High Commissioner and the 
Resident, Hickling drew heavily on his experience in Malaya to cast a 
better understanding of the Brunei situation85. 
 
The Memorandum then follows, via an examination of colonial office 
correspondence to the British Resident, suggestions for the next step 
in Brunei constitutional development. These included the separation 
of the State Council functions into two different councils, i.e. a 
Legislative Council to function as the law-making arm of the 
                                                                                                                                             
84 Hickling Memorandum, Ibid at paragraphs 118 to 123 
85 Hickling Memorandum, Ibid, at paragraphs 40 to 82 
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government, and an Executive Council to deal with policymaking and 
the day-to-day problems of Government86. 
 
5.3. The Sultan and his heir 
 
On the issue of succession, Hickling observed that there appeared to 
be two codes of social law in operation in the Malay countries, of 
which Brunei was no exception. These were the Hukum Kanun (local 
traditional customary codes) and the Hukum Syaria (codes of Islamic 
law). Hickling examined how the operation of these two types of 
social law, hand in hand, had contributed to the situation where the 
issue of succession in Brunei was not clear87.  
 
5.4. Brunei Citizenship 
 
Hickling considered the status of a British Protected Person in Brunei 
and who would fall within this category, under the British 
Protectorates, Protected States and Protected Persons Order- in- 
Council 194988. He also looked at the criteria for the naturalization of 
a British Protected Person as a citizen of the United Kingdom under 
the British Nationality Act 194889. The reason he considered these 
                                                        
86 Hickling Memorandum, Ibid at paragraphs 126 to 127 
87 Hicking Memorandum, Ibid at paragraphs 32 to 34 
88 Hicking Memorandum, Ibid at paragraphs 97 to 117 
89Ibid 
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issues was to discover how these British Government Acts would 
affect the proposed Brunei Citizenship recommendations of the Tujuh 
Serangkai report. 
 
Hickling considered the concepts of jus soli and jus sanguini in trying 
to understand who would come under the term “natural born subject” 
of the Sultan, and what the status was of the people of Brunei who 
did not fall within the seven indigenous groups as identified by the 
Tujuh Serangkai report90. He mentioned in particular the difficulties 
the locally born Chinese were having in Malaya and anticipated that 
the situation would likely be similar in Brunei. Under the current 
status of Brunei and the laws for British Protected People the 
Chinese would have some rights as to nationality. However should 
any Brunei citizenship legislation be enacted, this would cease to be 
so. Hickling cautioned against shaping such legislation at this stage 
in Brunei’s constitutional development for two reasons91. Firstly he 
anticipated that the formation of such legislation would retard the 
possibility of a North Borneo Federation, and secondly he felt that the 
citizenship legislation, as recommended by the Tujuh Serangkai 
report, would only allow about twenty percent of the then 55 000 
people in Brunei to qualify as citizens. This was a situation he 
thought would cause serious difficulties at a later stage. 
 
                                                        
90 ibid 
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In the conclusion to his discussion on Brunei citizenship, Hickling 
considered that citizenship legislation would prove in the future to be 
useful in controlling immigration, revisions of land law, the 
introduction of travel documents, and particularly electoral law. 
However the enactment of such laws in Brunei was a few years away 
and Hickling therefore suggested the deferral of citizenship 
legislation until such time as the working of the new constitution had 
been tested92. There was no urgency to frame citizenship legislation 
considering that the criteria for membership of District councils, (the 
only form of election that could possibly occur in the near future), 
could be defined by allowing the operation of rules that already 
existed. 
 
5.5 District councils 
 
Following the Sultan’s titah in November 1953, District Councils were 
formally established at a meeting of the State Council in July 1954. 
Hickling sets out in his memorandum what the membership of the 
four District Councils were. He noted that the District Councils were 
to elect, from within their ranks, a few members to sit as observers in 
the State Council93. This change to the composition of the State 
Council would become particularly important in the lead up to the 
written constitution of 1959. 
                                                        
92 Ibid 
93 Hickling Memorandum, Ibid at paragraphs 129 to 133 
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Rather oddly, the formal establishment of the District Councils pre 
dated the production of the Tujuh Serangkai report, which, as stated 
previously in this chapter, set out recommendations for the various 
functional elements of the District Councils such as the method of 
election and tenure of office.  
 
6. Initial Negotiations: 1955 to 1957 
 
Between 1953 and early 1955 the Tujuh Serangkai Committee 
prepared its report, the District Councils were set up and the Hickling 
Memorandum were prepared. These two years can perhaps be 
viewed as the period in which the Sultan and the British Government 
consolidated internally how they would proceed. Negotiations 
between the Sultan and the British Government began in earnest in 
1955 following on from the recommendations of both the Tujuh 
Serangkai Report and the Hickling Memorandum94.  
 
A summary95 of Brunei’s main proposals that were brought to the 
British Government for negotiation were as follows: - 
 
                                                        
94 B.A. Hussainmiya, “The Brunei Constitution of 1959: An Inside 
History”, Brunei Press Sdn. Bhd (2000 
95 Ranjit Singh, Supra from footnote 3 at page 136 
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1. all authority within the state to be vested in the Sultan’s 
name as chief executive; 
2. Brunei to continue as a British protected state, the British 
Resident to merely act as an advisor, i.e. essentially asking 
for the abolition of the advice clause contained in the 1906 
treaty; 
3. a Legislative Council, a Privy Council and an Executive 
Council to be created; 
4. provision be made for elections to district councils and for 
the nomination of elected district councilors to the 
Legislative Council which would have an unofficial majority; 
5. provision to be made for a clear definition of succession to 
the sultanate and regency powers; 
6. the appointment of a First Minister or Menteri Besar who 
would take over the powers currently possessed by the 
Resident. 
 
The proposals that were agreed to by the British were as follows96:- 
 
1. the establishment of a Legislative Council headed by the 
Resident as well as an agreement as to the function and 
composition of the Legislative Council; 
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2. the establishment of an Executive Council headed by the 
Sultan as well as agreement as to the function and 
composition of the Executive Council; 
3. the establishment of a Privy Council also headed by the 
Sultan along with agreement as to the function and 
membership of the Privy Council; 
4. the establishment of a Succession Council as well as 
agreement as to its function and membership; 
5. principles of elections to take effect in both the Legislative 
and District Councils. 
 
Additionally, the British government proposed and the Sultan agreed 
to the formation of a Public Services Commission and the formation 
of Local Councils97. 
 
The points of contention between the Sultan and the British 
Government were from the British standpoint, the abolition of the 
advice clause of 1906 and the creation of the post of Menteri Besar. 
From the Sultan’s standpoint, he could not accept the reserved 
powers that in the proposed constitution were to be given to the High 
Commissioner. 
 
                                                        
97 Ibid 
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High Commissioner Abell, who was negotiating with the Sultan on 
behalf of the British Government, recommended that the Colonial 
Office give two concessions to the Sultan in order to win the Sultan 
over, bearing in mind the wider Colonial Office aim of a possible 
North Borneo Federation98. The concessions he proposed were that 
firstly the advice clause of 1906 be abolished in return for the 
Sultan’s promise to “observe the provisions of the new constitution in 
letter and spirit and to exercise powers and authority in accordance 
therewith”, and secondly he proposed that the administrative ties 
between Brunei and Sarawak be cut as he knew this to be a point of 
great displeasure for the Sultan99. Neither of these concessions was 
acceptable to the Colonial Office. The abolition of the advice clause 
was unacceptable for the reason that because the British 
government would still be responsible for certain aspects of Bruneian 
governance therefore they considered the continued existence of the 
advice clause as vital. Another reason for their refusal of these 
concessions was because the Colonial Office feared that should this 
concession be given to Brunei it would open the floodgates for similar 
concessions in the Malayan states. The severance of the 
administrative ties between Brunei and Sarawak was seen as 
                                                        
98 CO 1030/113, Secret Correspondence No. 47 from Anthony Abell to 
the Colonial Office, 23rd March 1955 
99 Ibid 
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something that should only happen after constitutional reform and 
therefore considered premature at this stage100. 
 
Undeterred, Abell continued to make further concessions to the 
Sultan by agreeing to a further dilution of the powers of the Resident 
and High Commissioner except in matters concerning defence, state 
finances, public security, external affairs and certain levels of public 
servants101. The Sultan pressed Abell for further concessions and 
eventually was given the power to appoint two Wazirs on all three of 
the main councils102. Despite all these concessions, however, the 
Sultan still refused to ratify the draft proposals. In the wider regional 
context at this point, negotiations with Brunei reached a stalemate. 
This was partially due to the inability to reach a consensus but 
primarily due to the fact that pre independence deliberations had 
begun in London over the issue of Malaya103. The Colonial Office 
was occupied with dealing with constitutional issues surrounding their 
interests in the Malayan Federation, and plans for Brunei took a 
backseat. 
 
                                                        
100 CO 1030/164, Secret Correspondence No. 77 from the Secretary of 
State for the colonies, 25th March 1955  
101 B.A. Hussainmiya, The Brunei Constitution 1959, Supra from 
footnote 12 at pages 28 to 30 
102 Ibid 
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While these negotiations were taking place between the Sultan and 
the High Commissioner, the PRB continued to gain in popularity104. It 
was estimated that, by 1957, membership was approximately 16 000 
out of a population of 80 000105 which represented about seventy- 
five percent of the adult male population of Brunei. By this point the 
State Council had passed an enactment to form the District Councils. 
Despite all their nationalist fervour, the PRB did not avail themselves 
of this opportunity to participate in representative government. They 
considered this to be another colonial distraction that did not go the 
heart of democratic representation, and wanted instead to be 
involved with national level representation106. 
 
In the State Council the introduction of the “observers” from the 
District Council had a rather unexpected outcome. Through the route 
of the District Council observers, a few educated and very vocal local 
teachers had gained seats on the State Council. Choosing to ignore 
their observer status, they used this opportunity to criticize and 
embarrass the British administration and essentially obstruct the 
operations of the State Council107. 
 
                                                        
104 Ranjit Singh, supra from footnote 3 at page 133 
105 CO 824/4, Brunei Annual Report 1957 
106 Ranjit Singh, supra from footnote 3  
107 CO 1030/113, Secret correspondence No47 From High 
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At the beginning of 1957, four years after the Sultan’s announcement 
that he intended to grant a Constitution, negotiations had reached a 
standstill. It was not until Malaysian independence in 1957 that the 
idea of a Constitution would start to gather momentum again108. 
 
7. Missions to London: The Raeburn Memorandum (1957 
to 1959)109 
 
Despite its large following, the PRB were not given any avenues by 
which they could participate in or contribute to the process of 
negotiation for the constitution. The attitude of the Sultan at the time 
was neatly summarized by Singh in saying:- 
 
“The Sultan’s attitude, though benevolent, was typical of a feudal 
monarch. Though he wanted to introduce democratic changes, he 
was nevertheless suspicious of democracy itself. To him, nationalism 
in Brunei must come from above, led by himself and his pengirans, 
who were the ones who ‘knew’ the wishes of the people. His attitude 
was not unlike Plato’s philosopher- king who alone knew the peoples’ 
will and what was best for them”110 
 
                                                        
108 B.A. Hussainmiya, The Brunei Constitution of 1959, Brunei Press 
Sdn. Bhd. (2000) 
109 The account in this sub section has been summarized and condensed 
from Chapter 5 of B.A. Hussainmiya, The Brunei Constitution of 1959, 
Brunei Press Sdn. Bhd. (2000) and B.A. Hussainmiya, Sultan Omar Ali 
Saifuddin III and Britain: The Making of Brunei Darussalam, Oxford 
University Press (1995) at pages 165 to 172. 
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Feeling that he knew what was best for the people of Brunei, the 
Sultan refused to get entangled in discussions with the PRB. The 
attitude of the Sultan towards the PRB in general, and his refusal to 
consult with or have representatives of the PRB participate in any of 
the negotiations with the British Government, infuriated the PRB and 
added fuel to an already acrimonious relationship111. 
 
Constitutional development was progressing very slowly due partly to 
the strategy of the Sultan of refusing to negotiate on certain points in 
order to extract maximum concessions. Moving at this pace, 
however, was causing chaos in the day-to-day administration of the 
country as members of the State Council, swept up in nationalist 
fervour, by opposing any changes and suggestions that the Resident 
made, made it near impossible for the Resident to run the country.  
The Sultan, who had had a de facto veto power at the State Council 
since its inception, utilized this de facto veto power in the State 
Council more frequently. According to a colonial office official, this 
exercise of power was allowed to exist because of “the 
administration’s natural reluctance to use its Treaty powers and 
compel acceptance of advice”112. The combination of these two 
                                                        
111 B.A. Hussainmiya, The Brunei Constitution of 1959: An Inside 
History, Brunei Press Sdn. Bhd. (2000) at page 35 
112 CO 1030/658, Correspondence between Anthony Abell to W.I. J. 
Wallace (CO), 30th July 1958. 
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things caused the prestige of the Resident to decline and the Sultan’s 
image to be bolstered.113 
 
In mid 1957, spurred on by the Independence celebrations in 
Malaysia, the pace of constitutional negotiations suddenly increased. 
Having gained so much momentum in Brunei, the PRB were 
organizing their first party congress and had invited Malaysian and 
Singaporean activists to attend. Mindful of the increasingly difficult 
relationship between the PRB and the Sultan, the Resident refused 
entry to these activists. This action caused anger amongst the PRB 
supporters.114 
 
Also in mid 1957, the Secretary of State for the Colonies had paid a 
visit to Brunei and it was known that the Sultan was planning to 
reciprocate. Whilst the visit of the Sultan to London was never meant 
to be for the purposes of finalizing the Constitution, Azahari, hoping 
to emulate the success of the Malayan delegation in the previous 
year, planned a mission to London as well, to participate in any 
constitutional discussion that may take place, regardless of whether 
he was invited or not. In preparation for this mission, the PRB 
engaged Walter Raeburn QC, a constitutional expert who had had 
                                                        
113 B.A. Hussainmiya, Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddin III and Britain: The 
Making of Brunei Darussalam, Oxford University Press (1995) at pages 
165 to 172 
114 B.A. Hussainmiya, The Brunei Constitution of 1959: An Inside 
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some involvement in constitutional matters in Singapore, to draft a 
memorandum to the Colonial Office setting out the position of the 
PRB.115 
 
Abell knew that the PRB mission to London would cause the Sultan 
to be completely resistant to any British proposals with regards to the 
constitution and, therefore, tried his best to dissuade Azahari from 
this mission. He emphasized to Azahari that the way forward was to 
work with the Sultan and not to force his way into the negotiations.116 
The advice fell on deaf ears and the PRB mission went ahead. The 
reputation of Azahari however preceded him, as was seen in the 
correspondence between the colonial office and Abell when the 
Colonial Office referred to Azahari and the PRB as “enfants 
terribles”117.  
 
Ultimately, both the Sultan and the PRB met with failure at the end of 
their visit to London.  
 
The two main issues the Sultan hoped would be addressed were that 
of the reserve powers of the High Commissioner and the 
                                                        
115 B.A. Hussainmiya, Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddin III and Britain: The 
Making of Brunei Darussalam, Oxford University Press (1995) at page 
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appointment of the Menteri Besar. The Sultan had three meetings at 
the Colonial Office; the first on 11th September 1957 with the 
Permanent Under Secretary of State for the Colonies, and on 27th 
and 30th September with the Secretary of State for the Colonies118. 
From these meetings it emerged that the Sultan was coaxed out of 
his two principal demands and on top of that was encouraged to take 
steps to accommodate his people’s desire to participate in 
government. Further, the Sultan was asked to commit to the holding 
of district council elections, by way of secret ballot, over the 
traditional method of a show of hands. Finally, the Sultan was asked 
to consider a closer association with North Borneo and Sarawak in 
advancement of the Colonial Office’s aim to have a North Borneo 
Federation. In all senses of the word, the Sultan’s meetings had been 
a failure.  
 
7.1. Raeburn Memorandum119 
  
The Raeburn Memorandum, prepared on behalf of the PRB, 
contained six sections followed by a number of recommendations for 
the Brunei Constitution. In general the memorandum expressed the 
sentiments and aspirations of the PRB for Brunei. These sentiments 
had become so familiar, in so many parts of the world, that in 
                                                        
118 Notes for all three of these meetings which form the basis for my 
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Azahari, 26th September 1957  
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discussing the memorandum with the Sultan, Sir John Martin, the 
Permanent Under Secretary of State for the Colonies, referred to 
them as “the voice of 1957120”.  They were the sentiments of a 
people demanding to be part of the internal governance of their 
country. 
 
The Memorandum detailed the membership of the PRB and claimed 
to be widely representative of the Brunei public. Therefore, the need 
for the democratisation of Brunei was urgent in order to give a voice 
to the illiterate and uneducated of the county. The memorandum 
seemed to equate democracy with effective administration and 
raising the standards of living for the country. 
 
A summary of the PRB proposals for the constitution, as was 
forwarded by the Raeburn Memorandum, was set down in a 
minute121 of the Colonial Office is as follows:- 
 
1. universal, adult, male suffrage for all Brunei citizens 
regardless of race; 
2. a legislative assembly of 36 members, 27 elected via 
secret ballot with the remaining 9 nominated by the Sultan 
but to include two representatives of the oil company; 
                                                        
120 CO 1030/460, Meeting notes from Meeting between the Sultan and 
Sir John Martin 
121 CO 1030/ 460, Minute of C.C.Whitely dated 3rd September 1957 
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3. the British Resident would be the speaker of the 
Legislative Assembly with a casting but no original vote; 
4. executive authority to be vested in the Government of the 
day. The Sultan would be under constitutional obligation to 
call upon the leader of the party commanding a majority of 
votes in the Assembly to form a Government and should 
act on his advice in approving the list of ministers to hold 
office; 
5. the First Minister would have the duty of tendering the 
advice of his Government to the Sultan but only after 
consultation with the British Resident. Similarly the Minister 
for Home Affairs and the Minister for Finance would act 
only after consultation with the seconded officers from the 
Public Works Department and Treasury. 
 
Whilst most of the proposals submitted by the Raeburn 
memorandum were constitutionally sound, the issue with the 
Memorandum, and the PRB as a whole, was the speed at which they 
wanted change to happen in Brunei. The British Government viewed 
the PRB’s proposals as unrealistic in the short term as they were of 
the opinion that the Brunei people were not ready. While the 
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proposals submitted could potentially be a long-term plan for the 
PRB, progress needed to be made in stages122. 
 
Furthermore, Azahari’s mission was blighted from the beginning by 
procedural impropriety. He was rebuked by Sir John Martin, the 
Permanent Under Secretary of State for the Colonies, at the manner 
in which the Memorandum as submitted to the Colonial Office. The 
proper procedure would have been to first submit the Memorandum 
to the Sultan and not a direct submission to the High Commissioner. 
It was also impressed upon Azahari that the Colonial Office did not 
approve of Azahari’s instruction to members of the PRB to boycott 
the Sultan’s constitution, and that the meeting with the PRB had only 
been agreed to at the behest of the Sultan. The advice left to the 
PRB was to submit their views to the Sultan, and work within the 
Constitution upon its enactment to prove their fitness to play a part in 
state governance123. The London visit was a failure for the PRB, and 
their popularity quickly declined on their return to Brunei. 
 
8. Political situation in Brunei 1958 
 
1958, the year after the missions to London by both the Sultan and 
the PRB, was marked by amendment after amendment of the 
                                                        
122 CO1030/464 Minutes of Meeting between PRB and Secretary of 
State, 30th September 1957 
123 Ibid 
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proposed constitution. Despite the missions to London ending in the 
favour of the Colonial Office, on the Sultan’s return to Brunei, the 
same cycle between Abell and the Sultan continued, as was the case 
prior to the London meetings. The situation was, in fact, exacerbated 
by the fact that now proposals were also coming from the District and 
State Councils, both of which had by this point developed strong anti 
Resident sentiments124. The proposed constitution, that was 
submitted to the High Commissioner, after the input from the 
Councils, was so far removed from the original drafts that the High 
Commissioner and Resident became concerned as to the possibility 
of ever promulgating the constitution. 
 
It was also in 1958, that the first election to the District Council was 
due to take place when the Sultan was touring Europe. The 
infrastructure required for a secret ballot was not properly in place. 
However, it was anticipated that they would go ahead using 
traditional methods of election. Unfortunately, the elections received 
such widespread and vocal opposition, that they had be cancelled 
days before they were meant to take place. The State Council’s 
rejection of the election was based on their belief that the British 
administration was trying to achieve elections without the Sultan’s 
knowledge. The PRB’s rejection was because they claimed that the 
manner in which the elections would take place would contravene 
                                                        
124 CO 1030/462 Confidential correspondence from the High 
Commissioner of Brunei to the Colonial office, 4th November 1958. 
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democratic principles. Upon the Sultan’s return, contrary to his 
agreement with the Colonial Office, he did not introduce any change 
to the method of election to the District Council125. 
 
By the end of 1958, with so much opposition, and amidst so much 
discontent from all factions, Abell felt he had no choice but to refer 
the matter of the proposed Brunei Constitution to the Colonial Office 
in London. Abell also made the decision to remove himself from 
these discussion, fearing that his presence would hinder any 
possibility of consensus as he was, at this point, regarded by many in 
the State Council as the principal opponent126. 
 
In preparation for the Constitutional Conference in London, the 
Sultan and State Council decided to engage their own legal advisors. 
Abell worked with these legal advisors to come up with a shortlist of 
points of contention to bring to the conference127. The list that was 
eventually agreed upon was as follows128:- 
 
1. the proposed separation of Brunei and Sarawak; 
                                                        
125 B.A. Hussainmiya, Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddin III and Britain: The 
Making of Brunei Darussalam, Oxford University Press (1995) at page 
86 to 190 
126 CO 1030/462 Correspondence between Anthony Abell and Colonial 
Office, 4th November 1958. 
127 CO 1030/462 Resolutions of a Special Meeting at Istana Darul Hana 
Brunei, 2nd November 1958 
128 CO 1030/462 Confidential correspondence from The British 
Resident to the Colonial Office, 26th February 1939 
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2. the timing for the appointment of a Menteri Besar; 
3. the powers of Her Majesty in respect of defence and 
external affairs and the reserve powers of the High 
Commissioner; 
4. the voting rights and the question of citizenship; 
5. the public service and the staffing of key posts; 
6. the powers of Her Majesty and the British adviser under 
the Regency and Succession enactment. 
 
9. Brunei Constitutional Conference 1959 
 
The Brunei Constitutional Conference was held in London from 23rd 
March to 6th April 1959. By the end of the conference it had been 
agreed that the Constitution would be implemented in stages. The 
first stage would see the appointment of the Menteri Besar and the 
transfer of the functions of the British Resident to him. The second 
stage would involve District Council elections and the introduction of 
a Nationality Enactment. Both stages were due to be completed 
within a 2-year time frame.129 
 
10. Conclusion 
 
                                                        
129 CO 1030/462- Outward telegram from the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies to The Acting Resident in Brunei, 6th April 1959 
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The form that the Constitution took at the end of the conference was 
a resounding triumph for the Sultan as it saw the administrative 
separation of Brunei from Sarawak, the abolition of the Resident, the 
removal of the High Commissioner’s role in its entirety from the 
Constitution and the complete omission of British input on matters of 
succession and regency. The only real loss to the Sultan was that he 
was overruled in wanting to assume complete responsibility for 
internal security. The British retained the power of defence of the 
Sultanate completely130. In the following chapter we shall see how 
this clause was to come to Brunei’s aid within the first five years of 
the promulgation of the Constitution. 
 
At the end of this chapter we are able to understand how the 
involvement of the British had inadvertently managed to transform 
the position of the Sultan, from a respected position with very little 
authority, into one with considerable power. The following chapters 
will examine how the Sultan exploited the circumstances, and his 
position, to ensure the entrenchment of the absolute monarchy in 
Brunei. 
                                                        
130 CO 1030/462- Outward telegram from the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies to The Acting Resident in Brunei, 4th April 1959 
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Chapter Four 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Having described the events that led up to the promulgation of the 
1959 constitution in the previous chapter, we now discuss the years 
immediately following the drawing up of the Constitution, up to 1979, 
when the first in a series of treaties granting independence to Brunei 
was signed.  
 
The argument that runs through this thesis is that the building and 
entrenchment of the absolute monarchy in Brunei was a two- 
pronged process. The first part of the process was the transfer of 
power from the British Resident to the Sultan of Brunei in 1959, 
which placed a large portfolio of power in the hands of one man; the 
Sultan. The second part of the argument, which is what this chapter 
aims to show, is that the Sultan of Brunei then augmented and 
entrenched that power by using the opportunity presented to him in 
the aftermath of the Brunei Rebellion, and by propagating a useful 
national ideology. 
 
This chapter discusses the two proposals for Brunei following the 
attainment of internal self- governance, the political climate preceding 
the Brunei Rebellion of 1962 with a brief description of the rebellion 
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itself and discusses the powers afforded to the Sultan following the 
declaration of emergency. 
 
I start this chapter by taking us through the two main proposals that 
were considered by the British, the Sultan and the Brunei people in 
trying to forge a path for Brunei after the achievement of internal self- 
governance. These two proposals were the North Borneo Federation 
proposal and the Malayan Federation proposal. I will discuss the 
reactions of the three main parties, i.e. the British, the Sultan and the 
Partai Rakyat Brunei (PRB), to these proposals. 
 
A discussion of the two proposals is important because it was the 
reactions of all the three parties to these proposals that contributed to 
the climate that fostered the eventual rebellion in Brunei in 1962. The 
state of emergency that Brunei entered into as a result of the 
rebellion in 1962 continues to this day and being under this state of 
emergency greatly enhances the power of the Sultan. 
 
Having examined the two proposals, I move on to a description of the 
various political parties that formed in this period, as well as a 
description of the National Army of North Kalimantan. An account of 
the political parties is useful as evidence of the 1959 Constitution as 
a step towards a more democratic state that was overtaken by the 
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events of 1962, in which the National Army of North Kalimantan, 
under the direction of the PRB, played a significant part. 
 
Following on from that, this chapter briefly examines the 1962 
rebellion and focuses on the powers afforded to the Sultan, 
constitutionally, in the state of emergency that Brunei entered into. 
This chapter concludes with brief summaries of the Brunei- British 
treaties of 1971 and 1979. 
 
A brief note on the chronology in this chapter is required at this point. 
The ideas and discussions for the two proposals discussed in this 
chapter spanned many years. In the case of the North Borneo 
Proposal in particular, discussions started at almost the same time as 
British involvement in Brunei affairs. For this reason I have chosen to 
deal with the two proposals first and separate to the chronological 
account, allowing the reader to understand the proposals in isolation 
before explaining the resultant politically charged atmosphere in 
Brunei between 1959 and 1962 which came to a head with the 
Brunei Rebellion of 1962. 
 
2. The Proposals 
 
2.1. The Northern Borneo Federation Proposal 
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The first mention of a possible amalgamation of British interests in 
North Borneo dates as far back as the 1890. However at that point, 
Brunei was not a British protectorate and therefore not part of the 
equation. The idea of amalgamation was revived again in 1931 by 
Cecil Clementi1. Clementi, the Governor of the Straits Settlements, 
High Commissioner for the Malay States and Brunei and British 
Agent for Sarawak and North Borneo at the time, was of the opinion 
that “ … progress and development throughout British Borneo would 
be greatly facilitated if its four component parts2 could be drawn 
together in a loosely knit federation. This could be achieved without 
in any way altering the constitution of any one of its important parts. It 
would only be necessary that the four component parts should bind 
themselves by treaty to constitute a Federal Council”3 
 
The proposal by Clementi was deemed premature by the Colonial 
Office as it was unlikely at that point that the Governments of 
Sarawak and North Borneo would agree to be reduced to Crown 
Colonies4. At this point Sarawak and North Borneo, like Brunei, were 
                                                        
1 Clementi Papers, Cementi to Tuan Muda on 6th August 1930. Quoted in 
the secondary from Nicholas Tarling, ‘Sir Cecil Clementi and the 
Federation of British Borneo’, JMBRAS, 44(2), 1971, pp 1- 34. 
2 By 1931 when Clementi was reviving this idea Brunei was under the 
British sphere of protection. The four component parts he was talking 
about were therefore Brunei, Northern Borneo, Sarawak and Labuan. 
3 Clementi Papers, Supra at note 1 
4 Ibid at page 33 
Rabiqah N. H. B. M. Yusof 
March 2017 
Chapter Four 
194 
British protectorates and so legally the British did not have the 
jurisdiction to force federation on them. 
 
In 1940 the idea of amalgamating the states in Borneo was revived 
yet again, this time supported by a Colonial Office official, 
J.M.Martin5. The difference between Martin’s proposal and 
Clementi’s proposal however, was that Martin saw Brunei as 
supremely important. Martin saw Brunei becoming the capital of a 
self-governing Borneo with the former Bruneian territories of Sarawak 
and North Borneo being returned to the Sultanate. Essentially, he 
envisioned a federation along the lines of modern day Malaysia for 
the states in Borneo. He, however, conceded that such a change 
could not be done at the time due to the weakness of the reigning 
Bruneian Sultan. All plans or discussions about this proposal were, 
however, placed on the proverbial shelf for the duration of the 
Second World War. 
 
In the aftermath of World War Two the proposal was once again 
considered by the Colonial Office6. Perhaps the amenability of the 
British to the idea of combining the states in Borneo can be partly 
attributed to the fact that, since the discovery of oil in 1929, Brunei’s 
                                                        
5 CO 531/29 (File 17), Memorandum by J.M.Martin, 14th February 1940. 
6 B.A. Hussainmiya, Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddin III and Britain; The 
Making of Brunei Darussalam, Oxford University Press (1995)  at pages 
220 to 222. 
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economy had increased considerably. In fact, the Brunei economy 
had been superseding the economies of both North Borneo and 
Sarawak in recent years. Brunei’s newfound wealth, the fact that it 
was not a practical option to spend Colonial funds to administer a 
state as small as Brunei, and also the further problem that the war 
had caused much damage to the infrastructure of North Borneo and 
Sarawak, meant that closer cooperation of the Borneo territories 
would be very much in the British interests7.  
 
Aware of the fact that the Sultan of Brunei would need to be enticed 
into this proposal, C.F.C. Mackaskie, a Colonial Office official 
suggested the return of some of the former Brunei territories to the 
Sultan, to placate him into accepting the proposal8. The British 
Government however, while realizing the benefit of Brunei as the 
nucleus of their Borneo territories, were unwilling to even consider 
extending the authority of the Sultan, as they were of the opinion that 
the Sultan possessed no qualities which would justify such an 
extension9. 
 
                                                        
7 CO 537/2244, Telegram, Secret, Governor General to Colonial Office, 
23rd October 1947, item 14. 
8 CO 825/42 (55104/3/1943-4). Memorandum, Secret, Macaskie to 
Wodeman, 4th December 1944. 
9 CO 825/42(55104/3/1943-4), Memorandum for Constitutional 
Reconstruction in thru Far East, 20th March 1943, item A. 
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In 1946 both Sarawak and North Borneo became Crown Colonies10. 
While this made it administratively easier for the concept of a “United 
Borneo”, because being a Crown Colony made Britain sovereign in 
these two states, which was the ultimate aim for the British 
Government11, they also became aware of racial tensions within the 
territories. It was decided that there would be no public endorsement 
of the North Borneo Federation proposal for fear of encouraging 
opposition to the plan that was already visible from anti- cessionists12 
in Sarawak and also the Brunei Malays13. From their experience of 
native opposition to the Malayan union the British were not keen to 
arouse a strong opposition from the local people that could 
potentially derail British plans in North Borneo its entirety14. The 
British were also awaiting the appointment of a new Governor- 
General (of the Malayan Union and the new colony of Singapore) 
who was to advise on the viability of the proposal15. 
 
                                                        
10 CO 537/2244, Memorandum by Secretary of State for the Colonies. 
24th December 1947, item 23. 
11 CO 1022/61, Secret, Colonial Office Paper, ‘Political Objectives in 
British Territories of South- East Asia’, 10th March 1953. 
12 The anti- cessionist movement in Sarawak was a movement of people 
who were against the idea of Sarawak becoming a Crown Colony of 
Britain. After Sarawak became a Crown Colony, this movement was still 
active in opposing British rule in Sarawak. 
13 CO 1022/61, Secret, Colonial Office Paper, ‘Political Objectives in 
British Territories of South- East Asia’, 10th March 1953 
14 Ibid 
15 Ibid 
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The solution that the British Government decided on was to place 
Brunei administratively under Sarawak, with the Governor of 
Sarawak also becoming the High Commissioner for Brunei16. The 
British Resident in Brunei was under the authority of the High 
Commissioner. Unbeknownst to the British at the time, it was this 
decision, to place Brunei administratively under Sarawak that 
scuppered any plans they had to bring the North Borneo Proposal to 
fruition. This was because to be placed in any way under a territory 
that used to belong to Brunei was deeply offensive to the Sultan17.  
 
British plans for the region were perhaps most obviously displayed by 
the public pronouncement of the Commissioner- General for the 
United Kingdom in South East Asia stating “whether this can develop 
into a political federation of Borneo territories, leading ultimately to 
the creation with Malaya of a Southeast Asian Dominion 
Government, is another matter, but Bornean federation is both logical 
and achievable in the not distant future”18. 
 
This pronouncement was followed shortly by the “Sarawak- North 
Borneo- Brunei Conferences” or also known as the “Inter- Territorial 
                                                        
16 Ibid 
17 B.A. Hussainmiya, “The Brunei Constitution of 1959: An Inside 
History”, Brunei Press Sdn. Bhd (2000)  
18 Straits Times, 24th April 1953 
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Conferences”19. While the objectives of the conferences were never 
for the purposes of discussing a federation of the British Borneo 
territories they led to speculation that such a federation would be 
born as a result of the conferences20. The Sultan of Brunei was 
however very quick to counter such speculation21. 
 
There were a few reasons for the Sultan’s opposition to the North 
Borneo Federation proposal. The first reason was economic. The 
Sultan feared that he would have to share Brunei’s wealth with North 
Borneo and Sarawak. A second reason lay in the fact that the Sultan 
felt the placing of Brunei administratively under Sarawak to be an 
affront to his sovereignty. Thirdly, the Sultan had concerns that a 
federation would eliminate Brunei’s status as a sovereign nation. 
Furthermore the Sultan feared the lowering of his own status as 
sovereign ruler of Brunei. Lastly the Sultan feared a flood of 
foreigners would swamp the local Malay population of Brunei 
because of the higher standard of living that Brunei offered as 
compared to neighbouring North Borneo and Sarawak.22 
 
                                                        
19 CO 1022/294, Minutes of the first meeting of the Sarawak- North 
Borneo- Brunei Conference, 21st April 1953. 
20 Straits Budget, 30th April 1953 
21 Sunday Mail, 18th May 1953 
22 B.A.Hussainmiya, Supra from footnote 6 at page 226. 
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The PRB, who emerged in 1956, found that their interests to some 
degree, matched that of the British Government in that they 
supported the idea of a combination of the territories in Borneo23. The 
PRB’s concept of Bruneian nationalism centered on the restoration of 
Brunei territorial rights in Borneo and therefore. In this respect, they 
found that their interest aligned with the interests of the British 
Government. The difference was that while the British Government 
wanted a federation of the Borneo states, the PRB wanted Sarawak 
and North Borneo to be absorbed into Brunei. 
  
Between 1956 and 1959, the North Borneo proposal, supported 
heavily by the British, continued to gain momentum in Sarawak and 
North Borneo24. The position of the Brunei Sultan however remained 
unchanged25. The popularity of the PRB continued to grow the more 
the proposal was promoted by the British26. The North Borneo 
Federation proposal suffered a serious setback with Malayan 
independence on 31st August 1957, for the reason that Malayan 
Independence was the start of the Sultan’s interest in the Malayan 
Federation Proposal27. 
                                                        
23 Ranjit Singh, Brunei 1839- 1983: The Problems of Political Survival, 
Oxford University Press (1984)  
24 Ibid 
25 Hussainmiya, B A, Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddin III and Britain: The 
Making of Brunei Darussalam, Oxford University Press, (1995) 
26 Ranjit Singh, Brunei 1839- 1983: The Problems of Political Survival, 
Oxford University Press (1984)  
27 Hussainmiya, B A, Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddin III and Britain: The 
Making of Brunei Darussalam, Oxford University Press, (1995) 
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2.2. The Malaysian Federation Proposal 
 
The independence of Malaya on 31st August 1957 caused the Sultan 
of Brunei to reassess his position with the British government. He 
began to gravitate towards Malaya in hopes that this would help to 
withstand colonial pressure to accept the North Borneo Federation 
Proposal. To the Sultan’s mind an association with an independent 
nation would serve him better than an association with other 
colonies28. 
 
The British were not keen on Brunei’s closer association with Malaya 
as it disrupted their plans for uniting the Borneo territories. Brunei 
was an important part of that plan because without the financial 
backing of Brunei the two other Borneo territories would become 
financial liabilities to the British Government29. 
 
Associations between the Brunei Sultan and the Malayan Prime 
Minister grew from strength to strength. Evidence for this can be 
found not only in the large loan given to Malaya in 1958, which did 
not go through the proper British channels of administration, but also 
                                                        
28 Ibid 
29 DO35/9950- Various correspondence between Anthony Abell and the 
Home Office 
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in the fact that the Sultan requested the presence of the Malayan 
Prime Minister to participate, on Brunei’s behalf, in the constitutional 
talks that led up to the promulgation of the 1959 Constitution30. 
 
The first public pronouncement of the Malaysian Federation proposal 
was made by the Sultan of Selangor in 1958 with regional papers 
stating “since the recent visit by Malayan VIPs, the bonds between 
Brunei and Malaya have undoubtedly been strengthened to the 
extent where Brunei would like to make a public show of her desire 
for closer union with the Federation of Malaya”31. 
 
It was in the midst of the increasingly close bonds between Malaya 
and Brunei that the Brunei Constitution of 1959 was promulgated. 
Given the Sultan’s recalcitrance with regards to the North Borneo 
Federation and his increasing friendship with Malaya, the British 
Government were forced consider the idea of a Malaysian Federation 
union rather than the Borneo Federation that they had hoped for32 
and to consider alternatives for North Borneo and Sarawak. The 
main problem for the British was how they would now guarantee 
development in the Borneo territories to the level where the British 
                                                        
30 CO1030/608 – Various correspondence between the British Resident 
and the Home Office 
31 North Borneo and Sabah Times, 10th November 1958 
32 CO1030/608- E. Melville’s Minute to Sir John Martin of 2nd March 
1959 
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would be ready to give up their hold on them33. Knowing how long 
they had courted the Sultan on the merits of the North Borneo 
proposal, with disappointingly little progress, the British decided to 
take a step back to allow further developments in the region without 
interference34. 
 
Tunku Abdul Rahman, the first Prime Minister of Malaya, had plans 
for a super- federation of the region that was to include not only 
Malaya but also Singapore and the Borneo territories35. The reason 
for the inclusion of the Borneo territories in this equation was largely 
due to the balancing of racial populations. The Tungku’s fear of 
including Singapore without the Borneo territories was that it would 
upset the racial balance in favour of the Chinese36. It was for the 
same racially motivated reasons that the Sultan was more taken with 
joining the Malaysian Federation over the North Borneo Federation 
proposal. There was an increasing dislike towards the Chinese 
community in Brunei from the Brunei Malays, and an increasing fear 
of becoming a minority should the North Borneo Federation proposal 
                                                        
33 Ibid 
34 DO35/10035- Various correspondence between Malcolm McDonald 
and Home office 
35 CO 1030/608- Note of meeting between Malcolm MacDonald and 
Tungku Abdul Rahman, 30th December 1958 
36 B. Simandjuntak, Malayan Federalism 1945- 1963: A Study of Federal 
Problems in a Plural Society, Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 
1969. 
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come to fruition37. The worry was that support of the North Borneo 
Federation proposal would allow Chinese domination of Brunei by 
the large Chinese and other non-Malay population in North Borneo 
and Sarawak. Evidence of this need to protect the Brunei Malays can 
be seen in the fact that citizenship rights under the Constitution of 
1959 were for a very narrow class of people that largely did not 
embrace the Chinese and is also seen in the racial discrimination in 
favour of the Malays for high-ranking official posts.  
 
Shortly after the launching of the 1959 Constitution, plans were put 
into place to replace British officials in key positions with Malayan 
civil servants, as had been agreed between the British and the Sultan 
during the negotiations leading up to the 1959 Constitution38. This, 
along with other factors such as the sending of the royal children to 
school in Malaya rather than to England as was originally planned 
and the building of a royal residence in Kuala Lumpur, added to the 
general feeling that the union between Brunei and the Malayan 
Federation was imminent. Despite all this, however, the Sultan 
continued to keep his cards close to his chest never specifically 
stating his intentions one way or the other39. Contrary to the 
indications as listed above, the British, through one of their officials 
who had become close to the Sultan, had it on good authority that, 
                                                        
37 CO 1060/462- Report on the situation in Brunei 
38 B.A. Hussainmiya, “The Brunei Constitution of 1959: An Inside 
History”, Brunei Press Sdn. Bhd (2000 
39 Ibid 
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though the Sultan intended to keep good terms with Malayan 
leaders, he had no intention of a federation with Malaya40. Meanwhile 
the British Government were generally still weighing up the merits of 
this proposal over the original North Borneo Federation proposal. It 
was the view of Lord Selkirk, the UK Commissioner- General at the 
time, that the Malaysian Federation Proposal would give stability to 
the region and that the matter should be resolved with much haste as 
“the forces dividing the territories are likely to become stronger, as 
time passes at the same time as the cohesive factor- the imprint of 
British rule- becomes less marked”41. 
 
3. Breakdown of Brunei- Malaya Relations 
 
The efforts of Tungku Abdul Rahman, in trying to convince the Sultan 
of Brunei to commit to the Malayan Federation proposal, were 
essentially torpedoed by his remarks regarding Brunei and the 
Malayan Federation at an informal tea party in London in 196042. 
Both Malayan and Bruneian students attended this event and the 
dialogue between the students and the Tungku was reported in the 
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media43. As was the norm when speaking about the ties between 
Malaya and Brunei, the Tungku spoke about how Brunei looked to 
Malaya as a benchmark for progress and good Government, and 
how he looked forward to further friendly relations between Malaya 
and Brunei44. This time however, he went on to say more specifically 
that he would soon be in talks with the Colonial Office for the 
purposes of making Brunei a member of the Federation and that he 
believed Brunei to be too small to be an independent nation or a 
member state in the Commonwealth. He also commented on his 
belief that Brunei had a bleak economic future due to the fact that the 
cornerstone of the Brunei economy was a non- renewable resource.  
 
The comments made by the Tungku were used to great effect by the 
PRB in furthering their cause against the Malaysian Federation 
Proposa45l. The PRB had lost a lot of its popularity with the 
implementation of the Brunei Constitution of 1959 due to the fact that 
the Sultan, through the implementation of the Constitution, was seen 
to be trying to advance the country politically and increase 
participation in governance, although on a more measured scale. 
There was, however, dissatisfaction amongst the Brunei people 
about the presence of Malayan civil servants in government 
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positions. While the Sultan saw the Malayan officers as a necessary 
measure until local Bruneians had the experience to take over, the 
local sentiment was overwhelmingly negative against these officers. 
Looking to regain popularity with the Bruneian people the PRB 
seized the opportunity it saw in the dissatisfaction of the people and 
the comments made by the Tungku. The PRB claimed that the 
Malayan Federation proposal was a “neo colonialist” endeavour by 
Malaya. They furthered their own interests in the North Borneo 
Federation proposal by falling back on their stance of Brunei for 
Bruneians, and continued to insist on the claiming back of ancient 
Bruneian territorial rights in Borneo. The PRB started to see a return 
to their pre- constitution popular status46. 
 
The response of the Bruneian people to the announcement of Brunei 
entering into the Malaysian Federation by Tungku Abdul Rahman 
finally caused a direct comment on the matter from the Sultan. The 
Sultan’s denial that any negotiations had taken place between 
himself and the Tungku, was carried in the state media on 6th July 
1960. Hussainmiya writes that the reason for the public denial of the 
Malayan Federation proposal was due to the fact that the 
proclamation for such a monumental change had come too early and 
the Sultan had not had ample time to prepare his people47. Singh is 
of the opinion that this pronouncement by the Sultan was made out 
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of a sense of national pride and an interest in preserving the political 
status of Brunei as a sovereign nation48.  
 
Regardless of the reason for the announcement, the result of it was 
that the announcement, combined with mounting international 
pressure on the British to decolonise, spurred the British Government 
into making a decision on how it would manage its position in the 
region. The resolution of the United Nations General Assembly 
passed in December 1960 urged “the necessity of bringing to a 
speedy and unconditional end colonialism in all its forms and 
manifestations”49 which caused Whitehall to favour a speedy 
decolonisation process. 
 
The British Government needed to settle the problem of Singapore, 
which was considered a threat to the stability of the region due to 
communist elements that remained there after the end of the Second 
World War50. The framework provided by the Malayan Federation 
became the best option for the British to relinquish its responsibilities 
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in the region and the Borneo territories became the bargaining chip. 
The British would support Malaya its quest to combine with the 
Borneo territories on the condition that Singapore would also be 
included51. British official acknowledgement of the Malaysian 
Federation proposal however was not forthcoming until mid June 
196152 and even at that point the terms under which such a merger 
would be acceptable were still being discussed internally by the 
Colonial Office. 
 
The Tungku however, prior to British acknowledgement of their 
concurrence to the Malaysian Federation plan, had once again 
jumped the gun in his address to the Foreign Correspondents 
Association of South- East Asia in Singapore on 27th May 1961. A 
quote of his address is as follows: - 
 
“Malaya today as a nation realizes that she cannot stand alone and 
in isolation… Sooner or later she should have an understanding with 
Britain and the peoples of Singapore, North Borneo, Brunei and 
Sarawak. It is premature for me to say how this closer understanding 
can be brought about, but it is inevitable that we should look ahead to 
this objective and think of a plan whereby these territories can be 
brought closer together in political and economic co-operation”53. 
 
                                                        
51 Ibid 
52 Answer of British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan in the British 
Parliament as cited in Straits Times, 21st June 1961. 
53 Sunday Times, 27th May 1961. 
Rabiqah N. H. B. M. Yusof 
March 2017 
Chapter Four 
209 
Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddin III’s reaction to the Tungku’s proclamation 
was muted, stating that any association between Brunei and Malaya 
would be up to the British Government by virtue of the treaty 
agreements between Brunei and Britain in 195954.  
 
In an effort to balance the wishes of Whitehall with those of the 
Borneo people the Governors of the three Borneo territories met in 
June 1961 to consult with the Commissioner General in South East 
Asia on how best to move forward. Sarawak and North Borneo’s 
sentiments were that to join the Malaysian Federation would be 
complicated due to the differing levels of progress between their two 
territories and Malaya55. Furthermore, having been invested for so 
many years in the idea of a North Borneo Federation, it would take 
the people some time to embrace this new concept56. Trying to 
straddle the interests of both Whitehall and the Borneo people, the 
three British officials left the consultations with the primary aim of 
uniting the three Borneo territories prior to and in anticipation of the 
Malaysian Federation proposal57.  
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Matters were then made more complicated by a series of events 
which became known as “the Officers affair”. As was noted 
previously in this chapter, the appointment of Malayan Civil service 
officers into Brunei Government jobs previously done by British 
officials was causing discontent amongst the Bruneian people. The 
feeling was very much that these Malayan officers had usurped 
positions that should have gone to locals. The divisions between 
these two groups were exacerbated by the haughty attitude of some 
of the Malayan officials as well as the fact that some of the Malayan 
officials were not capable in their work and had been given the 
positions over qualified Bruneians. This discontent felt by the 
Bruneian people, combined with inflamed local sentiments stemming 
from the first time the Tungku had proclaimed the idea of the 
Malaysian Federation, led to some verbal attacks on Malayans in 
Brunei58. These attacks were followed by a more serious incident 
where two brothers of the leader of the PRB physically assaulted a 
Malayan State Forest Officer. Upon the settlement of the matter by a 
Magistrate, the officer returned to Malaya and gave press interviews 
sensationalizing the assault59. Leaping to the defence of the Malayan 
Officer Tungku Abdul Rahman issued public statements whilst on a 
state visit to Brunei. He criticized the Brunei police and other senior 
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officers and threatened to withdraw all Malayan officers60. This 
incident, called “the Officers affair”, led to a mass resignation of ten 
Malayan officials from Brunei posts, including the two top Malayan 
administrators in Brunei. It also launched a series of vitriolic verbal 
and written exchanges contained in the national press between the 
PRB and the Tungku. A sample of a pamphlet produced by the PRB 
in this exchange stated “Let there be thousands of well equipped 
soldiers sent to Brunei, yet the people will smash them even with 
bloodshed, for the Brunei people aim to smash all forms of 
colonialism”61.  
 
The Tungku’s threat to withdraw all Malayan employees from Brunei, 
knowing full well that it would incapacitate the administration of 
Brunei, was seen by some as coercion by the Tungku to get Brunei 
to join the Malaysian Federation62. The Tungku’s threats caused a 
breach in the relationship between Brunei and Malaya because the 
Sultan took offence to the threat made by the Tungku to withdraw 
Malayan personnel from Brunei63. Despite all this bad feeling, and 
knowing the Sultan’s reservations on the matter64, the Tungku, during 
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his state visit to Brunei in July 1961, continued to assume the Sultan 
and Brunei’s assent to the Malaysian Federation proposal65.  
 
4. Growing Political Unrest 
 
One of the obligations imposed on Brunei, under the treaty 
accompanying the Constitution of 1959, was the holding of elections 
to the District Councils within two years of the 1959 Constitution66. In 
preparing for these elections a Nationality enactment was to be 
drafted, with consultation of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 
after which an electoral register could be drawn.  
 
An immediate problem with this was that the High Commissioner, 
under the terms of the 1959 treaty, was void of any executive power 
and therefore could not hurry the preparation of the Nationality 
enactment. Additionally, in the years immediately after the 1959 
Constitution the British Government chose to adopt a “wait and see” 
approach in its dealings with Brunei. As we have seen above, official 
British support for the Malaysian Federation Proposal was not 
forthcoming until mid 1961. Prior to that official pronouncement of 
support, a “wait and see” attitude was adopted not only with regard to 
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Brunei’s future within the region but also in the attitude with internal 
Brunei matters such as District elections.  
 
Hussainmiya67 lists four reasons for this delay in District Council 
elections which were: - 
 
1. the initiative to spearhead the enactment was left to the 
Brunei Government, which was at that point struggling to 
cope with the “teething difficulties” that came with new 
administration; 
2. the British were still discussing the viability of holding 
elections in Brunei; 
3. the British were unsure how to cope with the conflicting 
interests of the Sultan and the PRB; 
4. the British prioritized their own agenda which was at this 
stage indecision between the North Borneo Federation 
proposal and the Malayan Federation proposal. 
 
Unable to decide between the merits of either the North Borneo 
Federation proposal or the Malaysian Federation proposal, the British 
used the District Council elections as a delaying tactic. They insisted 
that a move towards either proposal would have to wait until the 
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elections took place to allow public participation in the decision68. 
They then allowed an extension on the initial time period of two years 
for the holding of the elections. This extension was given on the 
basis that Brunei lacked the maturity to deal with an electoral system 
at that point and any elections that took place would yield a skewed 
one party result due to the dominance of the PRB69.  
 
The postponement of District Council elections led to a mass 
demonstration organized by the PRB in Brunei town on 17th June 
1961. The PRB demanded that elections be held post haste70. The 
aggressive stance adopted by the PRB at this demonstration and the 
general political climate in Brunei at the time was best exemplified by 
the words of the leader of the PRB when he said “There is no 
administration in the world so weak. We urge the Government to 
improve things… the first time we will be patient, the second time we 
give warning, and the third time we give a slap”71. Another large 
demonstration was held in Brunei town on 6th August 1961. At this 
demonstration the British High Commissioner was given a petition 
from the leaders of the demonstration requesting that the extension 
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be revoked (amongst various other campaign appeals) and that 
District Council elections should be held within the original timeline72.  
 
The British High Commissioner was unable to do anything to solve 
the political upheaval he was witnessing in Brunei73. Having been 
stripped of all executive power by the 1959 treaty he was unable to 
push forward with the Nationality Enactment which would allow 
elections to take place, and had no choice but to adhere to the ‘wait 
and see’ approach that the British government had chosen. The 
Sultan was not inclined to hurry the Nationality Enactment as he 
feared the popularity of the PRB would mean a large victory for them 
at the proposed elections.74 
 
5. Political Parties and Public Participation 
 
Shortly after the British Government’s acknowledgement of its 
interest in the Malaysian Federation proposal as discussed above, 
progress started to be made. In August 1961, a month after British 
acknowledgement, the Nationality Enactment was approved and 
elections were scheduled to happen before 18th October 196275.  
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Following talks with Tungku Abdul Rahman in November 1961, a 
joint statement between the British and Malaya, announcing the 
possibility of the Malaysian Federation was issued76. Under this joint 
statement a commission was to be set up to gather the popular views 
of Sarawak and North Borneo as well as the views of the Sultan of 
Brunei in this matter. This commission was called the Cobbold 
Commission. Open negotiations were held between the British, the 
Malayans and Brunei to discuss terms under which Brunei would 
consider association with the Federation77. The Sultan of Brunei 
then, for the first time, made a public statement describing the 
Malaysian Federation proposal as an attractive one that had been 
received favourably by the British Government, and seeking the 
views of the Brunei people on the matter78. In order to gather the 
views of the Brunei people, the Sultan set up of Brunei- Malaysia 
Commission in January 1962. 
 
1962 saw the mushrooming of political parties in Brunei as it 
anticipated the first District Council elections at the end of the year79. 
A majority of the minor parties that formed in this period had distinctly 
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pro- Malaysian Federation policies despite most of them being 
breakaways from the PRB. 
 
One such party active in this period was the Brunei National 
Organisation (BNO)80. The BNO was formed in November 1960 by 
Abdul Manan Bin Mohamed who had also been a founding member 
of the PRB. While initially being firmly opposed to the Malaysian 
Federation proposal this approximately 700 strong party was in 
support of the Malaysian Federation proposal because they were 
satisfied with the steps the Sultan was taking to ensure that the 
people’s views were heard through the Brunei- Malaysia 
Commission. 
 
Other parties that were formed along similar lines as the BNO, and 
had similar views were the Brunei United National Organisation 
(BUNO) and the Brunei United Party (BUP)81. Unable to properly get 
off the ground, these three parties allied to support the Malaysian 
Federation proposal. Despite the fact that there were more parties in 
support of the Federation proposal, none of them was as organized 
or as popular as the PRB. 
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The Brunei United Labour Front (BULF), registered on 27th October 
1960, was one of the few parties that allied itself with the PRB82. 
Formed before the mass demonstrations in 1961, the BULF had 
pledged to support all PRB activities83 in a bid to be allied with a 
party who it foresaw to be the winner of any future elections. 
 
The findings of the Brunei- Malaysia Commission were never 
published. Despite this however, in February 1962, Brunei signed a 
memorandum accepting the Malaysian Federation proposal in 
principal, subject to the inclusion of safeguards to protect the Borneo 
territories84. The Legislative Council became an important forum for 
debate on this issue. It was in fact, in an address to the Legislative 
Council on 18th July 1962, that the Sultan shared the findings of the 
Brunei- Malaysia Commission85. In summary, the address of the 
Sultan on this occasion stated that the general impression of the 
people was that they agreed in principle to the Malaysian Federation 
proposal. There was a belief that the advantages of increased 
prosperity and peace through the Malaysian Federation would 
outweigh any disadvantages. There was some variance of opinion as 
to the route to Federation, with a percentage of the results favouring 
a unification of the Borneo territories prior to joining the Malaysian 
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Federation. The Sultan felt however that he required further 
clarification of the terms of the Federation and had dispatched a 
mission to Malaya to obtain this information. Of note in the Sultan’s 
address is that he stressed that the agreement to Federation was 
only “in- principle” and subject to conditions being met that would be 
advantageous to Brunei. The Legislative council was prorogued after 
the July sessions of 1962 in anticipation of a Council with a different 
composition, returning after the upcoming elections86. 
 
The Cobbold Commission, as mentioned previously, was jointly 
commissioned by the Malayan Government and the Colonial Office 
to identify the sentiments of the North Borneo and Sarawakian 
people. This Commission also returned with results similar to that of 
the Brunei- Malaysian proposal and had come to the conclusion that 
the two other Borneo territories would be included in the Malaysian 
Federation87. 
 
The British Government and Tungku Abdul Rahman were keen to 
press on with finalizing the arrangements for Brunei’s entry into the 
Malaysian Federation before the District Council elections. They 
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feared the success of parties not amenable to the Malaysian 
Federation proposal gaining a foothold in the Legislative Council88. 
 
At the July sessions of the Legislative Council, Sultan Omar Ali 
Saifuddin III was given the mandate by the Legislative Council to 
negotiate the terms for Brunei’s entry into the Malaysian Federation. 
The mission sent by the Sultan’s government for further clarification 
returned with the following assurances89:- 
 
1. that Brunei would be accorded the same status as the 
other sovereign Malay states already in the Federation; 
2. confirmation that ascendance to the title of Yang di- 
Pertuan Agong90 was in accordance to date of accession 
to the throne which would make the Sultan of Brunei the 
next in line on expiry of the incumbent Agong’s tenure; 
3. that Brunei state investments, and interests from those 
investments, would continue to be the Brunei State 
property with further discussions in the future as to how 
Brunei would contribute economically to the Federation 
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The mandate given to the Sultan to negotiate terms for Malaysian 
Federation caused tensions to run high within the PRB. In 
preparation for the elections the PRB formulated a two- pronged 
approach to gaining power. Should they not be able to obtain it 
through election, the PRB was prepared to take it through stronger 
means91. In the words of Haji Zaini Haji Ahmad, a founding member 
of the PRB, the alternative approach was through “the creation of a 
power vacuum by violence and once created, a revolutionary group 
would take over the machinery of the Government in the midst of a 
confused society”92.  
 
With this in mind the PRB started a secret campaign for the formation 
of an army known as the North Kalimantan National Army (TNKU) 
hoping to recruit members from across the three Borneo territories. 
While not much information about the formation of the TNKU is 
available it is known that outside of Borneo, Azahari, the leader of the 
PRB, courted support for the TNKU from leftist groups in Indonesia, 
Kucing, Singapore and the Philippines93. 
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6. District Council Elections94 
 
Brunei’s first District Council elections were held in August 1962. The 
PRB won an overwhelming victory when they were elected into 54 
out of the 55 seats available. An independent candidate who 
promptly joined the PRB at the end of the elections won the 
remaining seat. Like the systems in Sarawak and North Borneo the 
55 seats in the District Council formed an electoral college from 
which 16 of the 33 members of the Legislative Council were elected. 
As a result of their landslide victory the PRB made up the elected 
portion of the Legislative Council in its entirely. This was not however 
sufficient to form the government by virtue of the 17 members 
nominated by the Sultan. Victory at the polls gave the PRB no more 
than another avenue to denounce the undemocratic nature of the 
Brunei constitution as the Sultan continued to hold the ultimate 
authority. The Sultan seemingly saw the elections as no more than a 
means for the people to have a voice. He did however have to be 
more cautious in his dealings with the Executive and Legislative 
councils due to the fact that there was only a slight majority in his 
favour.  
 
Immediately following the elections the Sultan, having not made a 
concrete decision as to his position on the Malaysian Federation 
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proposal, was occupied in negotiations with Malayan and British 
officials. On top of these negotiations the Sultan also had to keep an 
eye on the PRB members of the Legislative Council who were 
preparing to raise three motions. These motions were:- 
 
1. rejecting the Malaysian Federation proposal; 
2. requesting the return of the Brunei’s ancient territorial 
rights over Sarawak and North Borneo and the installation 
of the Sultan as the Constitutional Monarch over all these 
territories; 
3. requesting the independence of Brunei from the British 
Government by August of the following year. 
 
The first session of the Legislative Council after the elections, initially 
set for 5th December 1962, was postponed three times. The initial 
postponement was called by the Speaker on the basis that the 
motions tabled were not within the jurisdiction of the Legislative 
Council. The further two postponements were made on the basis that 
the prerogative for summoning the Legislative Council after an 
election belonged to the Sultan’s Government95 i.e. the Sultan with 
the aid of the Executive Council. Perhaps also the practical reason 
for the postponements was to allow the Government time to prepare 
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the answers to the 106 questions set to them by PRB members96. 
Speculation was that the delay was so that the Malaysian Federation 
issue could be resolved before the sitting of the Legislative Council 
for fear that the Government would be defeated in an anti- merger 
resolution due to a rumoured defection of one of the nominated 
members97. The many reasons given made no difference to the PRB 
who saw the postponements as an outright rejection of their motions 
and in the early hours of 8thDecember 1962 they activated the TNKU. 
 
7. Rebellion of 1962 
 
Whole studies have been devoted to the theories behind, the 
reasons for and the minute details of the rebellion of 1962. For the 
purposes of this research however a blow-by-blow account of the 
rebellion is unnecessary it is enough to know the basic facts of the 
outbreak. More important to this study is the aftermath of the 
rebellion and, in particular, the consequent impact to the 
constitutional powers of the Sultan when the nation is under a state 
of emergency. 
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In the early hours of the 8th of December 1962, TNKU rebels 
descended onto Brunei town, the capital city of Brunei, from the 
nearby hills. They seized the highest commanding British officer and 
attacked the Palace, police stations and various other small coastal 
towns including Seria, the centre of oil production. Other than the big 
police stations in Brunei town, Seria and Kuala Belait, the police 
detachments surrendered to the rebels giving the rebels access to a 
considerable amount of ammunition. The Brunei Rebellion was 
dubbed by an American political analyst as a “teapot rebellion”98 due 
to its miniscule size and lack of organization. Brunei was saved by 
the invocation of the treaty of 1959 to call for military help from the 
British Government. By the 14th of December 1962 British troops had 
the last vestiges of the rebellion under control. Brunei then entered 
into a state of emergency which exists to the present day. Some 
2500 people were detained by the Brunei Police for involvement in 
the rebellion and the leaders of the PRB fled to the Philippines and 
Indonesia. 
 
Opinion as to the level of effectiveness of the rebellion is varied. 
Some, such as Hussainmiya, dismissing it as “a hopelessly botched 
attempt by dreamy revolutionaries”99 whereas others such as 
Brigadier E.D. Smith affirming it as “well considered” and potentially 
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successful had it been executed faster. However ineffectual the 
rebellion was at taking control from the Sultan there is no denying 
that it was an event that altered Brunei’s future. Ironically Azahari’s 
rebellion whose intention was to force Brunei onto a more democratic 
path is the very event which halted any potential for Brunei’s 
democratic progress. 
 
8. Emergency Powers 
 
The constitutional powers given to the Sultan in an emergency can 
be found in Section 83(1) of the Brunei Constitution 1959 which 
states:- 
 
“Whenever it appears to the Sultan that an occasion of public danger 
exists whereby the security or economic life of the State, or any part 
thereof, is threatened, whether by war or external aggression or 
internal disturbance, actual or threatened, he may by Proclamation 
(hereinafter referred to as a “Proclamation of Emergency”) declare a 
state of emergency either in the whole State or in such part of the 
State as may be specified in the Proclamation.” 
 
Section 83 then goes on to clarify that while each proclamation of 
emergency cannot be in force for more than two years, the state of 
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emergency would continue should another proclamation be issued to 
that effect before the end of the first two year period100. 
 
In particular, the section of the Constitution dealing with emergency 
powers which provides unfettered power to the Sultan in times of 
emergency, is found at Section 83(3) which states:- 
 
“When a Proclamation of Emergency has been made and so long as 
such Proclamation is in force, the Sultan may make any Orders 
whatsoever which he considers desirable in the public interest; and 
may prescribe penalties which may be imposed for any offence 
against any such Order; and may provide for the trial by any court of 
persons guilty of such offences” 
 
This section provides that the Sultan can make any order when in a 
state of emergency so long as he deems it in the “public interest”. 
There is no definition of what “public interest” means, however, 
section 83 does then proceed to provide a non- exhaustive list of 
matters that could form the subject of the Orders made under this 
section101. Vitally however, the only person who has the power to 
decide what is in the “public interest” is the Sultan alone. 
 
An attempt to control the power provided under these provisions in 
Section 83(7) which provides as follows:- 
                                                        
100 Section 83(2) Brunei Constitution 1959 
101 Section 83(4) (a) to 83(4)(n) Brunei Constitution 1959 
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“Every Order made under this section shall, at the next meeting of 
the Legislative Council, be laid on the table of that Council and the 
Legislative Council may resolve that any such Order shall, to the 
extent and as from such date as may be specified in such resolution, 
cease to have effect; and any such cessation shall, if assented to by 
the Sultan, have the same effect as the repeal of a written law” 
 
This attempt to provide some measure of control seems futile 
because within this section it is made clear that any resolution made 
by the Legislative Council, deciding that any Orders made in a state 
of emergency should cease, would have to be assented to by the 
Sultan. This requirement of assent by the Sultan negates any 
possibility that the Legislative Council could, in any meaningful way, 
provide a check and balance on the powers of the Sultan in a state of 
emergency. 
 
Section 83(10) states that “Every Order made in pursuance of this 
section and every instrument made in pursuance of any such Order, 
shall have effect notwithstanding inconsistent therewith contained in 
this Constitution or in any written law”. This subsection places Orders 
made under emergency, above the Constitution, because it confirms 
that, in the event of an inconsistency between any Orders (made 
while in a state of emergency) and constitutional provisions, the 
Orders would prevail. 
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The cumulative and practical effect of these sections can be seen in 
the aftermath of the failed Brunei rebellion of 1962. On 12th 
December 1962 the Sultan of Brunei, using the power afforded to 
him under Section 83(1) of the Brunei Constitution of 1959, 
proclaimed a state of emergency in Brunei as a direct response to 
the Brunei rebellion which had just been subdued with the help of 
British forces. The Emergency (Suspension of Constitution) Order 
1962 dissolved the Legislative Council, allowing the Sultan to rule by 
decree and declared the PRB an illegal society102. The state of 
emergency in Brunei, which has been renewed by the Sultan 
continuously and regularly, has ensured that the Sultan has ruled 
Brunei by decree since 1962.  
 
9. 1963 to 1967: External Pressure and Abdication of 
Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddin III  
 
In July 1963 the Sultan finally decided to permanently opt out of 
joining the Malaysian Federation103. The reasons for the Sultan’s 
decision not to join the Federation were, in the end, primarily 
financial. No agreement could be reached on the issue of Brunei’s oil 
                                                        
102 CO 1030/1068- Various correspondence to Secretary of State for the 
Colonies 
103 Hussainmiya, B A, Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddin III and Britain: The 
Making of Brunei Darussalam, Oxford University Press, (1995) 
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revenues. The Sultan wanted Brunei’s oil revenues to remain hers in 
perpetuity whereas the Malaysian Federation would only allow Brunei 
sole ownership of the revenue for ten years after Brunei’s joining of 
the Federation. Furthermore, the Malayan Federation wanted to 
impose taxes on any new oil discoveries made after joining it; a 
situation which the Sultan was also not agreeable to. 
 
Other than these financial reasons, there were perhaps two other 
reasons for this decision. Firstly, should Brunei have joined the 
Federation at that point, the Sultan would have been the most junior 
in the ranking of the Sultans of the Malay states by virtue of the fact 
that Brunei was the last to join the Malaysian Federation104. Secondly 
it may also be possible that another reason for the Sultan opting out 
of the Malayan Federation was due to his realisation that the 
Federation would insist on the establishment of a representative 
government in Brunei as was found in other members of the 
Federation. This was in fact the hope that was harboured by the 
political parties remaining in Brunei at the time105. The establishment 
of a representative government in Brunei would have necessitated a 
decrease in the Sultan of Brunei’s power as it had the Sultans of the 
                                                        
104 Tsun Hang Tey, Brunei’s Revamped Constitution: The Sultan as 
Grundnorm?, Volume 9 Issue 2, Australian Journal of Asian Law, August 
2007. 
105 G. Saunders, A History of Brunei, Oxford University Press (1994) at 
chapter 9. 
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various states in Malaya, a fact which would not have escaped the 
Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddin III’s notice. 
 
With the Sultan’ of Brunei’s refusal to join the Malaysian Federation, 
any direct political pressure Malaysia could have exerted on Brunei 
to introduce any measure of popular government was gone (Malaysia 
is the name that the Malaysian Federation adopted when the other 
two Borneo territories and Singapore joined it)  
 
The Sultan of Brunei was conscious, however, that a large 
percentage of the Brunei populace wanted a greater level of 
participation in governance and made concessions to this in the form 
of a promise to hold general elections in 1965106. Negotiations 
between the British Government and the Sultan reconstituted the 
composition of the Legislative Council to 21 members, 10 of whom 
were to be elected. This was intended by the British Government to 
be an interim composition that would eventually be replaced with a 
31 member Legislative Council, 20 of whom would be elected. The 
British Government also intended for there to be a wholly elected 
Cabinet. In the face of mounting international pressure to decolonise 
the British government wanted to hasten the development of 
representative institutions in Brunei. Elections were held in March 
1965 and the 21 member Legislative Council was sworn in. 
                                                        
106 Hussainmiya, B A, Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddin III and Britain: The 
Making of Brunei Darussalam, Oxford University Press, (1995) 
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Unsurprisingly, despite the fact that the PRB no longer existed, the 
majority of the 10 elected members of the Legislative council were 
former members of the PRB. A Council of Ministers was set up to 
replace the Executive Council which had been suspended under the 
state of emergency. This Council of Ministers was composed of 6 ex- 
officio ministers and 4 assistant minister members. As a concession 
to the British Government, the Sultan agreed that 2 of the 4 assistant 
ministers would be appointed from the elected members of the 
Legislative Council107. 
 
Other than pressure from the British Government, the Sultan Omar 
Ali Saifuddin III was also at the time facing pressure from a 
resurgence of political activity. Buoyed by the 1965 elections the 
remaining political parties merged to form the Brunei People’s 
Independence Party (PBKR) led by a former vice- president of the 
PRB. The PBKR gathered momentum similar to the PRB before it108. 
 
In an attempt to quell the pressure put on him by both the British 
Government and the Brunei People, Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddin III 
abdicated the throne on 4th October 1967 in favour of this son, Sultan 
Hassanal Bolkiah, who is the current Sultan of Brunei. In the words of 
Saunders, the old Sultan “had bought the time he believed Brunei 
needed to transform itself into a viable independent state under a 
                                                        
107 Ranjit Singh, Supra at note 31 at pages 209- 210 
108 Ibid 
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benign if autocratic monarchy”109. The coronation of the new Sultan 
brought with it a cooling off period from both the British Government 
and the Brunei people to allow the new monarch time to settle into 
his role. 
 
10. The 1971 Amendment to the Brunei Agreement of 1959 
 
Under the new Sultan, Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah, Brunei continued to 
be ruled by decree.  The composition of the Legislative Council was 
changed again to be an entirely appointed body110 and elections 
were suspended111. Brunei reluctantly, and very much at her own 
pace and under her own terms, started to move towards 
independence.  
 
The 1959 agreement between Brunei and the British Government 
was amended in 1971. This was seen as the first step in the 
shedding of official British control over Brunei. Under the 
amendment, the formal title of the British High Commissioner to 
Brunei was changed from “Her Majesty’s High Commissioner” to the 
“British High Commissioner”. This change removed from the office of 
the High Commissioner, the responsibility and the right to advise the 
                                                        
109 Saunders, Supra from footnote 75 at page 160. 
110 Emergency (Council of Ministers and Legislative Council) Order- 12th 
April 1970 
111 By the suspension of the Election (Conduct of Elections)(district 
Councils) Regulations 1961 and the Constitution (District and 
Legislative Councils) Order 1962. 
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Sultan on any matters concerning the government of Brunei. Brunei 
was reluctant to accept the 1971 Agreement, even with the prospect 
of this amendment. The crux of Brunei’s reluctance, as gathered from 
correspondence between the Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah and the 
Foreign and Commonwealth office in 1970, was the issue of 
Bruneian defence112. The Sultan’s main concern seemed to be that 
Brunei should be protected from external aggression. 
 
British reluctance in this matter seemed to be twofold113. Firstly the 
fact that the British Government did not want to be absolutely 
committed to aiding Brunei with her defence and, secondly, the 
British Government did not want to bear the financial burden of 
maintaining defence personnel in Brunei. 
 
The amendment to the 1959 agreement in 1971 saw Brunei and the 
British meeting halfway in the interests of maintaining good 
diplomatic relations and also protecting British economic interests in 
Brunei. Under the amendments made in 1971, the financial burden of 
maintaining a military presence in Brunei would be borne by Brunei 
and the British Government would agree to aid Brunei in its external 
defence should both Brunei and the British agree that there is a need 
for British help upon consultation. It was also agreed that this 
                                                        
112 FCO 24/725- Correspondence between the Sultan and the Foreign 
Office 
113 FCO 24/2100-  Internal reports and correspondence of the foreign 
office on the British policy towards Brunei 
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Agreement would lapse in 1978 when the British would withdraw all 
defence responsibilities and Brunei would be independent. This 
would allow Brunei time to build its own defence capabilities. 
 
11. The British Brunei Treaty of 1979 
 
In the lead up to the renegotiations of the Brunei British relationship 
in 1978, Brunei, ever reluctant to become independent, raised a 
number of issues114. 
 
First and foremost the issue of defence arose again. The Brunei 
position was that it felt threatened by Malaysia and therefore was 
dragging its feet in attaining independence. The PRB, now illegal in 
Brunei, had set up its headquarters in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia and 
had in 1975, with some measure of success, brought its issues to the 
Decolonisation Committee of the United Nations. Sultan Hassanal 
Bolkiah contended that Malaysia’s aim, in aiding the PRB to attain 
representative government in Brunei, was so that Brunei would 
become part of Malaysia. Furthermore the Sultan was of the view 
that the idea of an independent Brunei threatened the stability of the 
East Malaysian states of Sarawak and Sabah as it would spur them 
towards trying to attain independent state status. Malaysia’s 
                                                        
114 Issues summarized from various correspondence between Foreign 
and Commonwealth office and various personnel within South East Asia 
found at FCO 24/2100 
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response to this was that it was aiding the PRB for the reason that it 
considered the Brunei system an anachronism and would prefer that 
the PRB sought aid from a moderate Malaysia rather than other more 
undesirable allies. The British were of the opinion that whatever 
Malaysia’s motives, the idea of a Malaysian “grab” of Brunei was 
unrealistic given the political climate in Brunei and Malaysia, though 
they conceded that they would through their diplomatic channels, 
suggest that Malaysia “cool down” in its involvement in Brunei 
internal affairs. 
 
Carrying on from the issue of defence, Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah was 
keen to retain a British Gurkha battalion in Brunei beyond 1978. The 
British were against this arrangement because it could be viewed 
that the continued stationing of a British Gurkha battalion in Brunei 
would seem to sanction the autocratic nature of the Brunei 
Government and subject them to much international criticism115. 
 
On the issue of the constitutional development of Brunei generally, it 
was obvious that the British had a declining interest. The British felt 
that while constitutional development was desirable they could not 
allow it to become an integral factor in any more negotiations with 
Brunei. This was for the simple reason that from past experiences 
with the previous Sultan, Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddin III, the British 
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Government were fully aware that they would be given a series of 
open- ended promises with no prospect of ensuring implementation. 
There was no indication that the situation would prove to be different 
now and so the best outcome for the British Government would be to 
distance itself from the situation while ensuring a convivial diplomatic 
relationship and safeguarding British economic interests116.  
 
Thus it came about that a new treaty was signed between Brunei and 
the British government on 7th January 1979 confirming that Bruneian 
independence would occur in 1983. This treaty signaled the slow 
transfer of the remaining powers the British had into Brunei hands. 
 
12. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has examined the important events in Brunei history 
from 1959 to 1979, through the eyes of the Sultan, the British and the 
Brunei people. These events included the proposals for the 
governance of Brunei; which at that point was deemed to be on the 
road to independence. It was the reactions to this proposal from 
various interested parties that invariably led to the “failed” Brunei 
rebellion of 1962 and the state of emergency that Brunei entered into 
in its aftermath. This chapter has contextualized the political climate 
in Brunei in the years after the failed rebellion of 1962 and allowed us 
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to understand the circumstances and laws that allowed the Sultan of 
Brunei to consolidate his powers. It has also examined in detail, what 
these additional powers of the Sultan were. Finally, we looked at the 
treaties of 1971 and 1979 in which we see Brunei’s gradual move 
towards Independence. 
 
Previous chapters in this thesis have outlined the transfer of power 
from the British Resident to the Sultan of Brunei in 1959. This 
chapter shows how the Sultan effectively wielded the raft of power 
already given to him and multiplied it. The absolute monarchy in 
Brunei as we know it was built; here, and in this time frame. 
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Chapter 5 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The focus of this chapter is Brunei’s political and constitutional 
development from 1979 to the present day. This chapter discusses 
issues that have had an impact on the entrenchment of the absolute 
monarchy as we know it in present day Brunei. Previous chapters 
have shown the process of how power in Brunei came to be 
consolidated into one office i.e. the “building” of the absolute 
monarchy. This chapter on the other hand aims to show the 
accumulation of factors in this time period that allowed the further 
expansion of the powers of the Sultan i.e. the entrenchment or 
fortification of that position. 
 
2. Pre Independence: 1979 to 1984. 
 
In the lead up to Bruneian independence perhaps the most 
significant political development was the shift in power from Sultan 
Omar Ali Saifuddin III (hereinafter referred to as “the Begawan”) to 
his son the present Sultan of Brunei, Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah1.  
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Referred to as “the architect of modern Brunei” for this role in 
shaping Brunei as a nation during his reign the Begawan had 
officially abdicated in favour of his son in 1967. This move by the 
Begawan was seen as a political move in order to ease the mounting 
pressure put on him by the British government for further and 
immediate constitutional reform2 as was previously discussed in 
Chapter Four of this thesis. Despite his abdication however the 
Begawan continued to play a very important role in ruling the nation 
evidenced by his primary role in the negotiations leading up to the 
Brunei- British Treaty of 19793.  
 
From 1979 onwards however there was a definite shift in the balance 
of power between the Begawan and the Sultan. The Sultan 
embraced his role as the ruler of Brunei and was visibly seen to be 
doing so by his increased interest in state events and increased 
formal public appearances. In doing this the Sultan made himself 
more accessible and popular at grassroots level. Furthermore he 
took steps to strengthen and reorganize the bureaucracy of Brunei- 
new government departments were established, national 
development plans were instituted and diplomatic activity within the 
region was increased.  By independence in 1984 the Sultan had 
                                                        
2 Ranjit Singh, “Brunei: 1839- 1983. The Problems of Political Survival”, 
OUP (1984) at page 210 and Saunders “A History of Brunei” OUP (1994) at 
page160. 
3 Ibid 
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done more than enough to ensure that he undoubtedly was the ruler 
of Brunei in his own right.4 
 
3. Proclamation of Independence 
 
On 1st January 1984 the Sultan of Brunei made the Proclamation of 
Independence. The proclamation started with an invocation to God 
and pronounced Brunei to be in charge of all her international 
responsibilities and a fully sovereign nation from the date of the 
proclamation. It also reinforced that Brunei was never in fact a colony 
of the British. The proclamation confirmed that the Constitution of 
1959 was the supreme law of Brunei and stated Brunei “shall forever 
be a sovereign, democratic and independent Malay Islamic 
Monarchy based upon the teachings of Islam according to Ahli 
Sunnah wal- Jema’ah and based upon the principle of liberty, trust 
and justice and ever seeking with the guidance and blessing of Allah” 
 
An analysis of the text of this proclamation indicates a desire to 
highlight three important themes on the occasion of Brunei’s 
independence. 
 
Firstly and unsurprisingly there was a definite emphasis on Brunei’s 
sovereignty. From the specific mention of the fact that Brunei was 
                                                        
4 Summarized from Saunders, Ibid at pages 168 to 177. 
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never a British colony to the express termination of all British rights 
and responsibilities over Brunei it is clear that the Sultan wanted to 
ensure there could be no question as to Brunei’s status as an 
independent state. 
 
Secondly the whole language of the proclamation, which was 
peppered with references to the Islamic faith, brought to a fore the 
importance of Islam in Brunei and also pointed towards the fact that 
one of the ways in which the Sultan sought to legitimate his rule was 
though the Islamic faith. 
 
Thirdly and perhaps most interestingly were the parameters set for 
the future of Brunei i.e. that it would “forever be a sovereign, 
democratic and independent Malay Islamic Monarchy”. This was the 
first mention of what would become the national ideology of “Melayu 
Islam Beraja”, (hereinafter referred to as MIB) which translates into 
Malay Muslim Monarchy. As will be discussed later in this chapter 
this national ideology of MIB would in the years following 
independence become a vital aspect in the entrenchment of the 
absolute monarchy in Brunei. Also interesting to note is the fact that 
while democratic principles had not taken root in Brunei and were in 
fact actively avoided by the Sultan, democracy was specifically 
mentioned as a standard for Brunei’s future. 
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4. Independence: The Early Years (1984 to 1994) 
 
On the international front the first decade after independence saw the 
Sultan trying to establish Brunei’s place in the international 
community5. Shortly after independence Brunei became a member of 
various organizations such as the Association of South East Asian 
Nations (ASEAN), the Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC) and 
the United Nations (UN). Much time and effort were invested by the 
Sultan in building diplomatic relations with many countries around the 
world.  
 
Seemingly the mention of democracy in the proclamation was simply 
to pay lip service to the expectations of newly independent nations 
because from independence onwards Brunei started to move 
towards further empowerment of the Sultan. The first example of this 
was seen in the form of the Emergency (Constitution) (Amendment 
and Suspension) Order that was passed on 13th February 1984, a 
mere two weeks after the proclamation of independence6. This Order 
effectively dissolved the Legislative Council (which was at that point 
a fully appointed body) and the suspension of Parts VI and VII of the 
1959 Constitution which were the sections of the Constitution dealing 
with the Legislative Council generally. Considering the wholly 
                                                        
5 G. Saunders, Supra 
6 All laws passed since Brunei entered into the State of Emergency in 1962 
are called Emergency Orders. 
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appointed nature of the Legislative Council at that point and the fact 
that the Sultan was ruling by decree due to the powers given to him 
under the Constitution in a State of Emergency it is fair comment that 
the Legislative Council was redundant at that point and its dissolution 
had no practical effect. In terms of constitutionalism in Brunei though, 
this was a resounding rejection of constitutional principles and made 
very clear Brunei’s intentions not to place any emphasis on any ideas 
of representative government. 
 
Upon independence in 1984 the Sultan announced the setting up of 
a fully appointed Cabinet of Ministers7. This Cabinet consisted of the 
Sultan who was the Prime Minister, the Finance Minister and also the 
Minister for Home Affairs. The Begawan was made Defence Minister. 
Two of the Sultan’s brothers were made Foreign Affairs Minister and 
Minister for Culture, Youth and Sports. Three other Brunei Malays 
who had managed to gain some experience in government prior to 
independence were also elevated to ministerial positions. The 
Sultan’s brothers were bestowed with traditional high- ranking titles 
from Brunei’s past. The presence of so many royals in the Cabinet 
and also the reintroduction of traditional titles seemed to signify that 
the royal family would play a significant role in government in post 
                                                        
7 G. Saunders, Supra 
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independence Brunei. Indeed one scholar remarked that Brunei’s 
government was “ministerial in form but royal in essence”8.  
 
1986 saw the death of the Begawan. This was a politically significant 
moment as though the Begawan had abdicated in favour of his son 
he still found his decreasing role in Brunei’s governance difficult to 
come to terms with. This caused tension between the Begawan and 
the Sultan when there were differences in opinion between the two 
as to the governance of the country. This tension was evident to the 
general populace. The passing of the Begawan relieved this tension 
and was the last step in the “cutting of the apron strings” between the 
Sultan and the Begawan9. Evidence of this can be seen in the fact 
that the Sultan officially mourned the loss of his father and 
announced his new Cabinet in the same speech10. It is noteworthy 
that despite the change in the personnel in the Cabinet and the 
increase in the number of ministries the composition of the cabinet 
was not altered. It was still filled with a mix of royals and western 
trained technocrats, all of whom were appointed by the Sultan. 
   
 
 
 
                                                        
8 Ranjit Singh, Supra from footnote 1 at page 176 
9 Ibid 
10 G. Saunders, Supra from footnote 1 at pages 183 to 185. 
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4.1. Political Parties 
 
Political parties did not flourish in post independence Brunei. While 
political parties in general were not illegal (with the exception of the 
PRB after the 1962 revolt) Brunei certainly did not provide an 
environment that would nurture the growth of any political parties and 
therefore the growth of democracy. The short-lived history of the 
Brunei National Democratic Party (BNDP) and Brunei National 
Solidarity Party (BNSP) exemplifies the restrictive environment in 
which political parties in Brunei were allowed to exist11. 
 
4.1.1. Brunei National Democratic Party (BNDP) 
 
The BNDP was registered in May 1985. Membership of this party 
was restricted to Brunei Malays by the party and its main platforms of 
contention were the call for democratic reform and the end of 
Emergency rule in Brunei. A few months after the registration of the 
BNDP the Government banned government servants from joining 
political parties. This was a problem for the BNDP because most 
Brunei Malays at the time were government servants and therefore 
the ban of government servants severely curtailed party membership. 
 
                                                        
11 History of two parties summarized from Saunders, Supra from footnote 1 
at pages 185 to 187. 
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The leaders of the BNDP frequently travelled to neighbouring 
countries and received much publicity for their criticism of the Sultan 
and his government. The leaders were arrested in 1988 on 
accusations of association with the Pacific Democratic Union12 and of 
sending delegations to foreign countries without Government 
approval. The BNDP’s registration as an association was 
subsequently revoked by the Brunei Government. 
 
4.1.2. Brunei National Solidarity Party (BNSP) 
 
The BNSP was a breakaway from the BNDP. It aimed to be more 
inclusive, not restricting their membership to Brunei Malays and in 
fact espoused tolerance of other races and religions. The BNSP was 
supportive of the concept of MIB. The BNSP was much less popular 
than the BNDP indicating perhaps a desire in the general populace to 
be more involved in the governance of Brunei. The chairman of the 
BNSP resigned in 1988 due to the low membership of the party. 
 
The brief life and popularity of the BNDP and the history of the PRB 
as compared to the BNSP indicated that public political sentiment at 
this point in Brunei’s development was likely to be critical of the 
status quo as it seemed that the political parties that garnered the 
                                                        
12 A member of the International Democratic Union that is an organization 
that believes that countries can only develop fully if they heed the ideals of 
liberal democracy, freedom of the individual and a free competitive 
economy. 
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most support were those that were interested in a move towards 
more democratic ideals and representative government. 
 
4.2 Melayu Islam Beraja or Malay Islamic Monarchy (MIB) 
 
Formalised by the Sultan in 1984, the individual concepts that make 
up MIB had been sowed into the Bruneian mentality for many 
years13. An example of this can be seen by the dominance of the 
Malay culture, the enshrining of the Islamic religion and the 
codification of the supreme authority of the Sultan in the framing of 
the 1959 Constitution.  Prior to 1984 however all these factors had 
been separate ideals that were upheld by the Sultan and therefore 
the Brunei Government. The death of the Begawan and the relatively 
new independence of Brunei saw the Sultan looking to “nation build” 
and in search of a unifying ideology14. MIB was the chosen vehicle to 
provide a national identity the aims of which were “to shape the 
thinking of all Bruneians, particularly the young, and to justify the role 
of the Sultan as guardian and protector of Islamic principles and 
Malay culture”15. 
 
                                                        
13 Black, A, Ideology and law: the impact of the MIB ideology on law and 
dispute resolution in the sultanate of Brunei Darussalam, Asian Journal of 
Comparative Law, Jan, 2008, Vol.3(1) 
14 G. Saunders, Supra 
15 Far Eastern Economic Review 1993 Yearbook: 89 
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 In July 1990 MIB was officially announced the state ideology. From 
1990 onwards the concept of MIB was refined and propagated to the 
population by the Government in order to shape the manner of 
thinking of all Bruneians. The Sultan was portrayed as a guardian of 
Islamic principles and the protector of Malay culture. Slowly there 
began a drift in Brunei towards more conservative Muslim values.  An 
example of this is seen in the fact that it is in the first decade after 
independence that Brunei became a ‘dry’ country. Dress codes were 
implemented in schools and government offices that conformed to 
the Islamic idea of modesty. Civil servants were given free passage 
to Mecca to allow them to do a pilgrimage upon the completion of 10 
years in government service. These examples amongst many others 
show the slow move Brunei was starting to make towards Islamic 
conservatism that continued into the second decade after 
independence and indeed continues to the present day. To date MIB 
has infiltrated almost all aspects of Brunei life including court 
reforms16, school curriculums17, national defence18, economic 
                                                        
16 The Syariah Penal Code is currently being drafted and Brunei hopes to 
implement this in 2016. It is anticipated that this would cause many changes 
in the current court processes because Brunei courts currently operate on a 
common low system 
17 Since 1991, MIB is a compulsory subject in all schools and universities in 
Brunei 
18 Sulaiman, Ayu & Lim, Jock, “Armed Forces Unveil Vision” Borneo 
Bulletin (12 May 2001); “Call for Cooperation and Sincerity in the 
Military”, online: 
<www.brudirect.com/DailyInfo/News/Mar01/310301/rtb04.htm 
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policy19, administrative procedures20, dress requirements21 and home 
design22. 
 
5. 1994 to 2004: The second decade after independence23 
 
The second decade after independence saw a series of gestures that 
seemed to indicate a possible movement towards a more 
representative government. 
 
In the Sultan’s speech commemorating the 10th anniversary of Brunei 
independence in 1994 he announced his intentions for a review of 
the 1959 Constitution. The aim of this review was to increase political 
public participation via the medium of a Legislative Council. Despite 
this speech and the setting up of a committee to carry out this review 
there was no further action taken. 
 
In 1995, after a period of dormancy, the BNSP was given permission 
to hold its first national assembly. At this assembly the party elected 
a president who was a former political detainee after the 1962 revolt. 
                                                        
19 Anwar, MK, “Brunei's Capital Market Vision” Borneo Bulletin (15 
March 2006 
20 Malai Hassan Othman & Laila Rahman, “Islamic Strategy to Reform 
Administration” Borneo Bulletin (4 May 2001). 
21 Dress Codes that follow Islamic principles have been implemented in all 
Government Institutions and schools 
22 Hussin, Haji, “Islamic Values prevail in Brunei House” Borneo Bulletin 
(5 August 2005)  
23 Subsection summarized from Saunders, Supra from footnote 1 at chapter 
13. 
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The resurgence of the BNSP was however short lived as the 
president was reminded that due to his status as a former political 
detainee he required permission from the ministry of Home Affairs to 
engage in political activity. This permission was not forthcoming and 
so leaderless yet again the BNSP returned to dormancy. 
 
1996 saw the release from detention of a small group of political 
detainees from the 1962 revolt. That same year the Sultan again 
ordered a constitutional review. This review proceeded with little 
haste and little public interest.  
 
1999 saw the reform of “Consultative Councils”. These councils, 
originally formed in 1992, were set up with the aim to create a 
conduit between the Government and the people. Membership and 
management of these Consultative Councils were however 
complicated and overly bureaucratic making it difficult for the people 
to use the councils for the purpose of airing their views. The 
appointed nature of the consultative council caused them to operate 
like offices of civil servants and so they ultimately failed in their aim of 
being a more accessible way for the public voice to be heard.  
 
MIB as the state ideology continued to bloom in this period. It was 
taught as a compulsory subject in all educational institutions, used as 
the ethos to which all government offices aspired to and was also 
Rabiqah N. H. B. M. Yusof 
March 2017 
Chapter Five 
252 
promoted as the overriding objective at all state events. Whilst the 
Monarchy remained the central pillar of MIB, and therefore of 
Bruneian statehood, this period saw the increasing importance of 
Islam in Brunei. Interestingly, the role of the Sultan as guardian and 
protector of Islamic principles under MIB while initially envisaged to 
provide legitimacy to the Sultan’s rule and to check the development 
of Islamic fundamentalism, has subsequently become the vehicle for 
conservative Islamic values. It was under the auspices of MIB that 
conversions to Islam started to receive national media publicity. 
While there was no pressure to convert, there were enticements into 
conversion such as welfare payments24 and housing benefits25 to the 
new converts. Islamic days of importance were observed as national 
holidays, a large number of mosques were built and the National 
Quran Reading Championships started to become a major annual 
event. Despite the increasing Islamic conservatism however, Brunei 
remained tolerant and Islamic fundamentalism was not an issue. An 
obvious side effect of MIB was that the Chinese population of Brunei 
however started to emigrate out of Brunei because the emphasis on 
the Malay race as part of MIB meant that Chinese citizens were not 
                                                        
24 Bernstein, Jay, “The Deculturation of the Brunei Dusun” [Bernstein] in 
Winzeler, Robert L, Indigenous Peoples and the State: Politics, Land, and 
Ethnicity in the Malayan Peninsula and Borneo (USA: Yale University 
Southeast Asian Studies, 1997) 
25 Zaide, Haji Mohd Damit, Haji, Six Muslim Converts to get Special 
Houses, Borneo Bulletin (5 August 2005) 
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always given the same rights as their Malay counterparts26. The 
Monarchy continued to be celebrated with annual festivals and 
processions to mark the Sultan’s birthday. These traditional 
ceremonies and banquets were opulent and resplendent with royal 
paraphernalia all symbolizing the supremacy of the Sultan. 
 
By the end of the second decade after independence Brunei has 
acquired the status of “developed nation” and was internationally and 
internally stable with the Sultan firmly at the helm of the country. 
 
6. Constitutional Amendments 2004 
 
Ten years after the first mention of Constitutional reform by the 
Sultan the subject was brought up again in 2004.  There was no 
trigger for this sudden interest in reform other than perhaps an 
understanding that an absolute monarchy in the 21st century was an 
anachronism and a desire to preempt any public call for greater 
representation. This time, unlike in 1994, the Sultan’s speech was 
followed swiftly by a raft of constitutional reforms. 
 
In the Sultan’s speech on 15th July 2004, on the occasion of his 58th 
birthday, the Sultan requested that constitutional reforms be made to 
increase levels of political participation in the country. Within four 
                                                        
26 Bujang, Abdul Ghani, “Education for Nationhood” (1987) 24 Southeast 
Asian J. of Education Studies, 39 at 43 
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weeks of this speech the suspension of parts VI and VII of the 
Constitution relating to the Legislative council, put in place shortly 
after independence, was lifted pursuant to the Constitution 
(Amendment and Suspension) (Amendment) Order 2004. A mere 
four weeks after the lifting of the suspension, on 25th September 
2004, the Legislative Council was reinstated.  
 
The Legislative council that was reinstated was a completely 
appointed body. It was made up of 21 members- 6 ex- officio, five 
official and ten nominated members.  This Legislative Council was 
then dissolved on 1st September 2005, and reconvened the day after 
with a new set of members now totaling 29 people, all of whom were 
appointed by the Sultan. 
 
I will now proceed to highlight the changes to the 1959 constitution 
that were made in 2004, focusing in particular on the constitutional 
changes that enhance the already substantial powers of the Sultan. 
For ease of reference in the rest of this chapter the 1959 constitution 
shall referred to as “the old constitution”. 
 
6.1. Executive Authority 
 
The amendments clarified, expanded and consolidated the executive 
authority of the Sultan. Section 4 (1A) named the Sultan the Prime 
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Minister, Section 4 (1B) made the Sultan the Supreme Commander 
of the armed forces and Section 4(1) and 4 (2) clearly vested 
supreme executive authority in the Sultan.  All mention of the position 
of “Menteri Besar” or “Chief Minister” was removed from the 
constitution. This was a significant departure from the old constitution 
because under the old constitution the position of “Menteri Besar” 
was intended to be the office that would hold executive power in the 
country under the Sultan. The abolition of this post indicates the 
intention that executive power in Brunei would never be shared or 
delegated to another office. 
 
Section 4(3) which reads “ His Majesty the Sultan and Yang Di- 
Pertuan may appoint from among citizens of Brunei Darussalam any 
number of Ministers and Deputy Ministers who shall be responsible 
solely to His Majesty the Sultan and Yang Di- Pertuan for the 
exercise of executive authority and who shall assist and advise His 
Majesty the Sultan and Yang Di- Pertuan in the discharge of His 
Majesty the Sultan and Yang Di- Pertuan’s executive authority”  
empowers the Sultan to define the scope of delegated executive 
power and choose to whom that delegated power shall be bestowed 
upon. 
 
Section 4(5) constitutionalised the racial and religious discrimination 
against non- Malay - Muslim citizens for ministerial positions unless 
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otherwise decided by the Sultan by stating “the appointment of 
Ministers and Deputy Ministers shall be made from among the Malay 
race professing the Islamic Religion, save where His Majesty the 
Sultan and Yang Di- Pertuan otherwise decides.” 
 
 Section 4(6) states “The Ministers and Deputy Ministers shall be 
appointed by His Majesty the Sultan and Yang Di- Pertuan by 
Instrument under His Sign Manual and the State Seal and shall hold 
office for a period of 5 years or such other period, and on such terms 
as His Majesty the Sultan and Yang Di- Pertuan may determine, and 
the same persons may be reappointed, when such appointment 
expires, for a further period as specified in the Instrument appointing 
him: Provided that His Majesty the Sultan and Yang Di- Pertuan may 
revoke the appointment of any Minister or Deputy Minister at any 
time without showing cause”. This section allows the Sultan to make 
appointments to Ministerial positions for any number of years as is 
suitable to him and allows him to revoke appointments at will.  The 
absence of security of tenure and administrative safeguards on the 
Sultan’s authority further entrench the monarchy in Brunei. 
 
By virtue of Section 19 which states “His Majesty the Sultan and 
Yang Di- Pertuan is not bound to act in accordance with the advice of 
the Council of Ministers…” the Sultan was given the power to ignore 
advice given to him by his council of ministers. In Section 19 A which 
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states “No decision of the Council of Ministers shall be valid unless 
approved by His Majesty the Sultan and Yang Di- Pertuan” takes the 
ability of the Sultan to act against the advice of his Council of 
Ministers one step further by confirming that decisions taken by the 
Council of Ministers would only be valid with the assent of the Sultan. 
Clearly the advice and decisions of the Council of Ministers were only 
meant to guide the Sultan and not meant to in any way to divest him 
of any executive power. 
 
6.2. The Legislative Council 
 
Section 24 of the old constitution dealt with the composition of the 
Legislative Council. Under the old constitution this was to be a 
twenty- one member body consisting of six ex- officio members, five 
official members and ten nominated members. Under the 
amendments, section 24 now attaches a schedule that details the 
new composition of the Legislative Council. The new Legislative 
Council is now an up to forty- five member body. Thirty members are 
to be appointed by the Sultan and up to fifteen are to be elected 
district representatives. It is worth noting that despite this provision 
for elected district representatives there have been no public 
elections in Brunei since 1965. 
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This new schedule with respect to the composition of the Legislative 
Council is however rendered relatively meaningless by two clauses. 
The first clause is section 24(2) which states that “His Majesty the 
Sultan and Yang Di- Pertuan may by Order published in the Gazette 
add to, revoke or amend the provisions of the Second Schedule”. 
This simply means that the Sultan has the power to alter the 
composition and membership of the Legislative Council at will and 
very easily. The second clause that renders the Legislative Council 
ineffective can be found in Section 8 (1) of the second schedule 
which says “His Majesty the Sultan and Yang- Di Pertuan shall have 
the absolute discretion to proclaim that the Legislative council is or 
has been properly and validly constituted, notwithstanding that no 
Members have been appointed under…(various provisions in the 
schedule)”. This provision essentially states that despite a codified 
method of appointment to the Legislative Council, any Legislative 
Council can be validly constituted despite not following the provisions 
in the schedule so long as the Sultan deems it so. The ability to 
decide who sits on the Legislative Council places legislative authority 
in Brunei even more firmly in the hands of the Sultan. 
 
Disloyalty or disaffection towards the Sultan was made a reason for 
the disqualification of members of the Legislative council under the 
amended Section 30 (a) which reads “No person shall be a qualified 
to be a Member of the Legislative Council who is, due to his own act, 
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under any acknowledgement of allegiance, obedience or loyalty to a 
power or state outside Brunei Darussalam, or has voluntarily 
acquired the citizenship of or has exercised rights of citizenship in a 
foreign country, or has shown himself by act or speech to have the 
intent to be disloyal or disaffected towards His Majesty the Sultan 
and Yang Di- Pertuan” 
 
Section 39 of the old constitution read “It shall be lawful for the 
Sultan, with the advice and consent of the Legislative Council, and 
subject to the provisions of this Constitution, to make laws for the 
peace, order and good government of the State”. The Legislative 
Council of Brunei was never a powerful institution. Under section 39 
of the old constitution however while the Sultan was given the power 
to make laws, such laws would be on the advice and consent of the 
Legislative Council. By the amendments made in 2004 even this 
small nod to a check and balance on the Sultan’s legislative power 
was taken away. The current version of Section 39 does away with 
any reference to the Legislative Council and reads “His Majesty the 
Sultan and Yang- Di- Pertuan shall have the power to make laws for 
the peace, order, security and good government of Brunei 
Darussalam” 
 
Section 43 in the original constitution dealt with voting rights in the 
Legislative Council. The amendments in 2004 inserted further sub 
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clauses into section 43 to the effect that should a bill be put to a vote 
by the Legislative Council and be rejected i.e. become a negative 
resolution, the Sultan as per the new section 43(5) would still have 
the power to declare that the bill would come into effect. This is 
further evidence of the decreasing authority of the Legislative 
Council. It is arguable that the effect of Section 43(5) is in the end 
rather duplicative because Section 39, as discussed above, has 
clearly given the Sultan supreme power of legislation already. 
 
The reserved powers of the Sultan to legislate under section 47 of 
the old constitution were also widened. Section 47 after the reforms 
of 2004 reads “If His Majesty the Sultan and Yang Di- Pertuan shall 
consider that it is expedient in the interests of public order, good faith 
or good government of Brunei Darussalam, (or for any other reason 
whatsoever), that any Bill introduced, or any motion, petition or 
business proposed in the Legislative Council shall have effect, then if 
that Council shall fail to pass that Bill or carry that motion, petition or 
business within such time and in such form or manner as His Majesty 
the Sultan and Yang Di- Pertuan may think reasonable and 
expedient, his Majesty the Sultan and Yang Di- Pertuan may, at any 
time, notwithstanding any provision of this constitution or the 
Standing Orders, declare that that Bill or motion, petition or business 
shall have effect as if it had been passed or carried by that Council 
either in the form in which it was so introduced or proposed or with 
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such amendments that His Majesty the Sultan and Yang Di – 
Pertuan shall think fit…” . The amendment in 2004 inserted the 
bracketed portion into the section and in so doing extending the 
already extensive reserved powers of the Sultan to unfettered 
reserved power to legislate. Again, in light of Section 39 as 
previously discussed, in practice it seems that the powers afforded to 
the Sultan in this section are duplicative. 
 
Section 53 of the old constitution dealt with the freedom of 
expression within the Legislative Council. Under the amendments 
this freedom was restricted by the insertion of Section 53 (1A) which 
states:- 
 
 “No member of the Legislative Council shall speak or make any 
comments: 
(a) directly or indirectly derogatory of the rights, status, 
position, powers, privileges, sovereignty or prerogatives of 
His Majesty the Sultan and Yang Di- Pertuan, his 
successors, His consort or other members of the Royal 
Family or the National Philosophy of Malay Islamic 
Monarchy; or 
(b) which constitute an offence under the Sedition Act” 
 
Under the above amendment matters involving the Royal Family and 
MIB were placed beyond discussion and the scrutiny of the 
Legislative Council. With this section the curtailment of the freedom 
of expression with regards to the monarchy and MIB is tantamount to 
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a curtailment of discussion with respect to the governance of the 
country because the ruler and his ideology for rule are not matters 
open for discussion. Freedom of expression is a parliamentary 
privilege as it provides a check and balance on the government. This 
section shackles the Legislative Council from performing one of its 
basic functions. 
  
6.3. The State of Emergency 
 
An additional clause was inserted in the form of Section 83 (2A) 
which reads “His Majesty the Sultan and Yang Di- Pertuan may by 
another such Proclamation declare the cessation of a state of 
emergency in the whole of Brunei Darussalam or in such part of 
Brunei Darussalam as may be specified in the Proclamation before 
the end of 2 years”. This section which gives the Sultan the power to 
cease the State of Emergency via a Proclamation at any point in time 
essentially also gives the Sultan the ability to decide whether or not 
he should continue to have the large portfolio of power afforded to 
him in a State of Emergency. 
 
Section 83 A (1) reads “It is hereby declared for the avoidance of 
doubt that every existing law including-… (b) each and every Order, 
Instrument, Act, Enactment or other written law made under Article 
83 during any such period of emergency, shall be deemed to have 
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been validly passed or made, to be fully effectual and to have had full 
force and effect from the date on which such Proclamation, Order, 
Instrument, Act, Enactment or other written law was declared or 
made even if such Proclamation, Order, Instrument, Act, Enactment 
or other written law was inconsistent with any provision of this 
Constitution; and the said Proclamation, Order, Instrument, Act, 
Enactment or other written law referred to in paragraphs (a) and (b) 
shall be deemed to have been duly laid before and passed by the 
Legislative Council in accordance with Clause (7) of Article 83” 
 
This section was essentially a “mopping up” clause that confirmed 
the validity of any written law that was made by the Sultan during the 
State of Emergency. The said written laws would be deemed to be 
validly passed as if they had been laid before the Legislative Council 
as is the procedure when not in a State of Emergency. On the one 
hand this could be seen as a clause introduced for purely 
administrative reasons i.e. so that there would be no need for all the 
laws since 1962 to go through the normal procedure when Brunei 
eventually stops being in a State of Emergency as to do so would 
cause a definite backlog in legislation in Brunei. It is more likely 
however that this clause was passed so that the laws passed by the 
Sultan would be above questioning and scrutiny. Another interesting 
thing to note is that by virtue of this section, in the case of any 
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inconsistency, the Constitution is subservient to laws passed by the 
Sultan in this State of Emergency. 
 
6.4. Amendment of the Constitution 
 
Section 84(2) of the amended Constitution was rewritten to ensure 
that there would be no ambiguity in the fact of the Sultan’s 
supremacy over the constitution, his powers to make laws and 
amend the Constitution as he sees fit. 
 
Under the old constitution, any amendment or revocation of any part 
of the Constitution by the Sultan would have to be approved by a 
resolution of the Legislative Council. Upon amendment and insertion 
of extra clauses the situation now is that the purpose of laying of any 
amendments before the Legislative Council is simply to see if they 
would recommend any amendments27. Should the Legislative 
Council recommend any amendments to the proposed changes a 
written report should be given to the Sultan as stated in Section 85(4) 
of the amended Constitution. The Sultan is however under no 
obligation to accept any of the changes proposed by the Legislative 
Council and has the last say on the final form of the amendment28. 
 
6.5. Immunity 
                                                        
27 Section 85(3) of the amended constitution. 
28 Section 85 (5) of the amended constitution. 
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Whereas the old constitution did not provide the Sultan immunity 
against civil and criminal proceedings, Section 84B (1) of the 
amendments state “His Majesty the Sultan and Yang Di- Pertuan can 
do no wrong in either his personal or any official capacity. His 
Majesty the Sultan and Yang Di- Pertuan shall not be liable to any 
proceedings whatsoever in any court in respect of anything done or 
omitted to have been done by him during or after his reign in either 
his personal or any official capacity” 
 
To supplement the Constitutional immunity that was afforded to the 
Sultan under the Constitutional amendments of 2004, a slew of 
legislative amendments were made to the Supreme Court Act at the 
same time with the aim of protecting the Sultan from the 
embarrassment of exposure in the courts. An example of this can be 
seen in Section 15(4) of the Supreme Court Act  (Amendment) Order 
2004 which reads:- 
 
“ Whenever any party or the Supreme court in any proceedings or 
any part thereof- 
(a) makes a reference, whether orally or in writing, directly or 
indirectly, to any act, decision, grant, revocation or suspension 
or refusal or omission to do so, any exercise of or refusal or 
omission to exercise any power, authority or discretion of His 
Majesty the Sultan and Yang Di- Pertuan or 
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(b) intends to refer to any issue or matter that may directly or 
indirectly pertain to or concern the inviolability, sanctity or 
interests of the position, dignity, standing, honour, eminence 
or sovereignty of His Majesty the Sultan and Yang Di- 
Pertuan, 
the Supreme Court shall hold such proceedings or such part thereof 
incamera” 
 
In the same vein, the Sultan is also given to power to order the 
hearing of any court proceedings in camera29 and to decide on the 
venue and time of court proceedings30. Under these amendments 
power is also given to the Sultan to seal any court materials or 
proceedings that may portray the Sultan in a bad light31. 
 
6.6. Judicial review 
 
The old constitution made no mention of judicial review however the 
amendments inserted Section 84C into the Constitution which reads 
as follows:- 
 
“(1) The remedy of judicial review is and shall not be available in 
Brunei Darussalam. 
 
(2) For the avoidance of doubt, there is and shall be no judicial 
review in any court of any act, decision, grant, revocation or 
                                                        
29 Section 15(5) Supreme Court Act (Amendment) Order 2004 
30 Section 15(6) Supreme Court Act (Amendment) Order 2004 
31 Section 15(8) Supreme Court Act (Amendment) Order 2004 
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suspension, or refusal or omission to do so, any exercise of or 
refusal or omission to exercise any power, authority or discretion by 
His Majesty the Sultan and Yang Di- Pertuan, or any party acting on 
his behalf or under his authority or in the performance of any public 
function, under the provisions of this Constitution or any written law 
or otherwise, including any question relating to compliance with any 
procedural requirement governing such act or decision” 
 
 In short, no decision of the Sultan is open for questioning by the 
courts. 
 
Since the amendments to the constitution made in 2004 there have 
been no further constitutional changes. Indeed there would seem to 
be no need for further constitutional reforms as far as the Sultan is 
concerned as the amendments made in 2004 essentially provided 
the Sultan with unfettered legislative and executive authority and 
removed the last vestiges of checks and balances, no matter how 
weak and indirect, that were in the political system from Brunei’s 
British past. 
 
7. Brunei today 
 
Brunei, today is an absolute monarchy with a written constitution 
which is nothing more than a written account of the Sultan’s powers. 
The written Constitution of Brunei is intolerant of and does not 
support the growth of normal constitutional norms and ideals in any 
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way shape or form. The Sultan is both the head of state and the head 
of government. The Sultan himself holds the posts of Prime Minister, 
Minister of Defence, Minister of Finance and Minister of Foreign 
Affair and Trade. As head of the executive, the Sultan is assisted by 
four councils. Members of these councils are entirely appointed by 
the Sultan. The four councils are: - 
 
i. The Privy Council 
Advises the Sultan on matters of Malay Custom, the 
grant of the plea of mercy and also on the amendment 
or revocation of constitutional provisions. 
ii. the Council of Succession 
advises only on issues of succession 
iii. the religious council 
advises the Sultan on all Islamic matters 
iv. the council of ministers 
also called the Cabinet. The council of ministers is 
made up of the Sultan himself, twelve other 
government ministers, eight deputy ministers and two 
other advisors. The cabinet is entirely appointed by the 
Sultan. The function of the council of ministers is to 
advise the Sultan on matters concerning the daily 
administration of the government. 
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The Legislative Council forms the legislative branch of the Brunei 
government. It is made up of 36 members appointed by the Sultan. 
Its function is  to consult on matters as tabled in an agenda made by 
the government. 
 
The Judiciary of Brunei operates on a dual system. Due to its British 
heritage, Brunei works on a common law system for most matters. 
The Syariah legal system is predominantly used in matters of family 
law for Muslims. In 2013 the Sultan announced the introduction of a 
new Syariah Penal Code. Originally due to come into force in the first 
quarter of 2014, the Syariah Penal Code, while it has been drafted, 
had not actually been put into operation32. It is unclear at this juncture 
how this would affect the judicial structure of Brunei. It is also unclear 
at this point if the delay in the implementation of the Syariah Penal 
Code in Brunei has anything to do with the raft of international 
criticism Brunei found herself subjected to when it was announced 
that a Syariah Penal Code would be adopted.  
 
Further, there is no system of judicial review and appeals to the Privy 
Council are now only done in very specified civil law cases. While the 
constitution does not provide for the independence of the judiciary 
                                                        
32 The Syariah Penal Code is not discussed in further detail and international 
criticism on it is not dealt with in this work because it is felt that doing so 
does not have direct impact on the central argument this thesis seeks to 
prove. The adoption of the proposed penal code does not in any way 
enshrine the monarchy but rather is a byproduct of the absolute nature of the 
monarchy 
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and the Sultan is not seen to be interfering with the judicial process, 
as all governmental institutions operate under the national ideology 
of MIB, in reality all decisions of the judiciary while dictated by 
sentencing guidelines under common law, will also take the tenets of 
MIB into account. 
 
This same adherence to MIB is seen across the board with all 
aspects of Bruneian life. Dissension with respect to any 
governmental policy is never made public as this would be seen to 
be going against MIB and therefore not allowed constitutionally. 
 
In essence, due to a successful implementation of the national 
ideology, Constitutionalism did not take root in Brunei. 
 
 
8. Other Factors 
 
The British involvement in Brunei and the Sultan were undoubtedly 
two of the most important reasons for Brunei’s exceptionalism in 
refusing to allow democratic ideals to take root. Brunei’s ability to 
continue to resist democracy however may also be dependent on a 
few other factors. While by no means a closed list, the following 
factors are a postulation of what other factors exist in Brunei that will 
likely allow a continuation of the status quo for the foreseeable future. 
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8.1. Political parties 
 
The suppression of political parties is something that cannot be 
ignored as a factor in resisting democracy in Brunei. The stark 
contrast between the political system in neighbouring Malaysia with 
that in Brunei is a prime example of this. Brunei and Malaysia share 
a history of Malay Sultans and a residential system. What then 
explains the difference in how these two countries are currently 
governed? It would be a gross oversimplification to say that Brunei is 
not democratic like Malaysia due to the existence of robust political 
parties in Malaysia as compared to the suppression of political 
parties in Brunei after the rebellion of 1962. However the fact 
remains that the suppression of political parties was not something 
that Malaysia had to contend with and it would be naïve to assume 
that this was not a vital reason for the difference. Political parties 
have been at the forefront of governmental change globally and 
historically. Brunei continues to foster a climate that is not welcoming 
to the existence and growth of political parties and therefore this 
factor will continue to allow the supremacy of the absolute monarch. 
 
8.2. Malay dominance 
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The population of Brunei being approximately 80 percent Malay, the 
constitutional dominance of the Malay race as enshrined in the 
Constitution of Brunei and upheld by MIB ensures that the majority of 
the Brunei people are satisfied with the rights given to them. It is my 
contention that for as long as the majority racial composition of 
Brunei correlates with the ideology of MIB, the Malay people would 
remain satisfied and unlikely to call for a change to the status quo. 
 
Added on to this is the quality of the Malay people that have an 
innate respect for authority33. This is a hallmark of traditional 
Bruneian society that was effectively harnessed in the propagation of 
MIB as the national ideology34.  
 
 
8.3. Islam 
 
The role of a ruler in Islam is considered one heavy with 
responsibility. The responsibility of leading his followers onto the right 
                                                        
33 Crane, Cheryl, Gillen, Mark & Dorman, Ted Mc, “Parliamentary 
Supremacy in Canada, Malaysia, and Singapore” in Johnston, Douglas M & 
Ferguson, Gerry, Asia-Pacific Legal Development (Canada, UBC Press, 
1998) at 208–215 and Kessler, Clive, “Archaism and Modernity: 
Contemporary Malay Political Culture” in Wah, Francis Loh & Kahn, Joel, 
eds, Fragmented Vision: Culture and politics in Contemporary Malaysia 
(Australia: Asian Studies Association in association with Allen and Unwin, 
1992) at 133, 148 
34 Black, A, Ideology and law: the impact of the MIB ideology on law and 
dispute resolution in the sultanate of Brunei Darussalam, Asian Journal of 
Comparative Law, Jan, 2008, Vol.3(1) 
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Islamic path falls squarely on the shoulders of the leader. The role of 
the follower in Islam is to support and follow the instructions of the 
leader to the best of their ability35. It is on these basic principles that 
the link between the Sultan and the people of Brunei rests. Through 
an emphasis on Islamic teachings the Sultan has ensured that the 
people of Brunei, a majority of whom are Muslim, place great respect 
and trust in him because Islamic practice teaches that this is how one 
should view one’s leaders.  The link that is then made is that to 
disobey the Sultan would be to disobey religious teachings. In the 
words of Braighlin it is “royal absolutism under a divine mandate”36. 
Islam being constitutionally declared as the official religion of Brunei, 
the link between obedience to the Sultan and obedience to God is 
not one that will be severed in the near future and therefore this is a 
factor that will contribute towards Brunei’s continued existence as an 
absolute monarchy. 
 
8.4. Wealth 
 
The need to entice foreign investment into a country has long been 
used as a way to get recalcitrant countries to conform to a set of 
rules as dictated by the world community. Foreign investment is not 
                                                        
35 Mayer, Ann Elizabeth, “Islam and the State” (1991) 12 Cardozo L. Rev. 
1015  
36 Braighlinn, G, Ideological Innovation under Monarchy: Aspects of 
Legitimation Activity in Contemporary Brunei (The Netherlands: VU 
University Press 1992) 
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however something that Brunei particularly requires. Brunei’s main 
export and the source of her wealth is oil. Oil is not a commodity that 
the world community can do without. The wealth derived from oil puts 
Brunei in the unique position of not requiring foreign investment and 
therefore largely able to ignore the calls to democratise from the 
world community. Brunei is perhaps an ideal example of the “rentier 
effect” which is when rich governments use low tax rates and 
patronage to dampen democratic pressures37. Brunei in fact takes it 
one step further by not having tax at all. Brunei is hence likely to be 
able to sustain being ruled by an absolute monarch for as long as the 
country’s wealth endures. 
 
9. Conclusion 
 
The aim of this final chapter in this thesis was to examine the various 
reforms to the Brunei Constitution, spearheaded by the Sultan in 
2004, that enhanced and entrenched the power of the Sultan in 
Brunei today. Further this chapter introduced briefly the other factors 
that are present in Brunei that would contribute to the continuation of 
the absolute monarchy into the future. The Sultan’s involvement in 
the entrenchment of the absolute monarchy taken in tandem with the 
other factors existing in Brunei that contribute to the status quo lead 
                                                        
37 Michael L. Ross (2001) Does Oil Hinder Democracy?, World Politics, 53 
pp 325-361 
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the reader to the understanding that Brunei’s exceptionalism in not 
democratising is likely to continue into the foreseeable future. 
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Conclusions 
 
The key objective of this thesis was to try and explain the reasons for 
Brunei’s exceptionalism in being able to withstand global waves of 
democratisation to the present day and to question if these factors 
would ensure the continued existence of the Bruneian absolute 
monarchy. 
 
To understand Brunei’s present day situation, it was obvious that we 
would need to look at the route Brunei took to get there. A contextual 
approach was chosen to analyse Brunei’s past, because, despite 
sharing a “colonial master” and a similar cultural, traditional and 
social background with some of her neighbouring states, Brunei 
developed very differently. The reason for Brunei’s exceptionalism 
therefore had to lie in what distinguished her from her neighbours 
thereby necessitating a study into Brunei’s constitutional history that 
took into account various other factors such as the traditions and 
social norms in Brunei. 
 
This research into Brunei’s constitutional history was faced with a 
number of limitations. The first of which was the restriction of access 
to Brunei’s archived records. An aspect of the state ideology of MIB 
is that critical review of the Sultan and his government is not 
encouraged, therefore access to Brunei’s primary sources is 
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restricted as it is deemed unsuitable for the public. This limits the 
scope of scholarly research because the position of the Brunei 
Government on anything has to be based on conjecture. This ties in 
with the second limitation, which is that there is precious little 
scholarly work on Brunei, and in particular none that relate to 
constitutional theory. The third limitation faced by this research was 
that a contextual analysis necessarily makes this research inter- 
disciplinary, touching on other areas of expertise such as history, 
sociology and politics. The difficulty was trying to balance embracing 
all aspects of the interdisciplinary work, while at the same time 
ensuring underpinnings of constitutional law. 
 
Despite these limitations however, we started our examination of 
Brunei’s constitutional by the infancy of the building of the monarchy 
in Chapter One. We examined how the shortcomings of the quasi- 
feudal system that was in operation in Brunei necessitated a 
restructuring of the system by the British on their arrival. We 
observed that the Sultan, prior to the coming of the British, had very 
little authority over his land and subjects. We followed the growth of 
the position of the Sultan in Chapter Two where the many changes to 
Bruneian governance brought by the British, via the British Resident, 
included the consolidation of untrammeled power in the Office of the 
Resident and the bolstering of the Sultan’s veneer of authority by 
operation of the Residential system. The building of the absolute 
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monarchy was completed in Chapter Three when the power to be 
internally self governing was taken back by Brunei and the large 
portfolio of power initially belonging to the British Resident, was 
transferred to the Sultan.  
 
Chapter Four narrated the events leading up to the rebellion of 1962, 
when Brunei entered into a state of emergency, and the Sultan 
began to entrench his powers through constitutional means. The final 
chapter in this thesis saw the enshrinement of the Brunei Monarchy 
through the medium of constitutional reform and the use of nation 
building ideology in the form of Malay Islamic Monarchy or MIB.  
 
This contextual analysis of Brunei’s constitutional history led to the 
conclusion that the continued existence of the absolute monarchy in 
Brunei was a two step process; the first step was the building of the 
absolute monarchy through the consolidation of executive, legislative 
and judicial power in one office by the British and the second step 
was the exploitation of constitutional provisions by the Sultan to 
ensure the continuation of his power. 
 
While democratic ideals blossomed in other South East Asian 
nations, these same ideals did not even take root in Brunei. Despite 
the best efforts of the British Government to leave behind at the very 
least a nascent form of a representative government, all the British 
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actually succeeded in doing in Brunei was leaving the foundations 
behind that would allow the building and subsequent entrenchment of 
the Bruneian absolute monarchy. It would be naïve to attribute 
Brunei’s resistance to democratisation entirely to history and a 
politically savvy monarch. This research has shown that Brunei’s 
exceptionalism must also be attributed to a fortuitous culmination of 
other factors that cannot be ignored, used skillfully by the Sultan to 
lend legitimacy to his rule and enshrine his position in the country. 
This research however has only scratched the surface of these 
contributory factors such as Malay traditional culture, wealth, religion 
and race. 
 
Making a projection as to Brunei’s future, are these factors that have 
allowed the enshrinement of the absolute monarchy in Brunei thus 
far, strong enough to ensure the continuation of the absolute 
monarchy? The logical answer would be, should all factors remain 
the same, that the status quo should continue. This projection is 
however dependent on circumstances both internally and externally 
remaining the same. While the Sultan has the ability to control 
internal factors, external factors are completely beyond his power.  
 
Due to the naturally conservative nature of Brunei, she has generally 
managed to remain under the world’s radar. This is perhaps one of 
the reasons that the world community has not reacted thus far to 
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Brunei’s rule by absolute monarch. Recently however, the 
increasingly conservative Islamic path that the Sultan and the 
ideology of MIB have put Brunei on has caught the attention of the 
world community. The Syariah Penal Code that is supposed to be 
implemented in stages in Brunei has met with much global criticism. 
Should Brunei continue on this path, how much longer will the world 
community choose to remain silent and what if any will the response 
of the world community be? Furthermore, with the price of oil on the 
decline, and Brunei being about 90% dependent on her oil income, 
will Brunei be able to afford to ignore the world community as she 
has done thus far? Are factors that have enshrined the absolute 
monarchy in Brunei thus far, strong enough to continue to resist a 
possibly increasingly hostile outside world? 
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